Thanks to Stephan Leuenberger, Kelly Trogdon, Johanna Wolff, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on this paper.
Intrinsicality and Grounding†
Article first published online: 3 JUL 2013
© 2013 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 90, Issue 1, pages 1–19, January 2015
How to Cite
Marshall, D. (2015), Intrinsicality and Grounding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90: 1–19. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12053
- Issue published online: 5 JAN 2015
- Article first published online: 3 JUL 2013
A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities and necessary connections between wholly distinct entities, on which it is plausible that there are such properties. This paper argues that this promise is illusory. It is not possible to give an analysis of intrinsicality in terms of grounding that is consistent with these theories. Given an adequate analysis should be compatible with these theories, it follows that it is not possible to analyse intrinsicality in terms of grounding.