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References

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  • Dretske, Fred (1969). Seeing and Knowing. London: Routledge.
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  • Kalderon, Mark Eli (2011a). “Before the Law”. In: Philosophical Issues 21.1, pp. 219244.
  • Kalderon, Mark Eli (2011b). “Color Illusion”. In: Noûs 45.4, pp. 751775.
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  • McDowell, John (1998). Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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  • McDowell, John (2008). “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”. In: Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Ed. by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 376389.
  • McDowell, John (2011). Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press.
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  • Searle, John (1983). Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  • Williamson, Timothy (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.