The RAND Journal of Economics

© The RAND Corporation

Cover image for Vol. 43 Issue 2

Summer 2012

Volume 43, Issue 2

Pages 215–390

  1. ARTICLES

    1. Top of page
    2. ARTICLES
    1. The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability (pages 215–234)

      Joaquín Poblete and Daniel Spulber

      Article first published online: 19 JUN 2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00163.x

    2. Choosing the rules for consensus standardization (pages 235–252)

      Joseph Farrell and Timothy Simcoe

      Article first published online: 19 JUN 2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00164.x

    3. An approximate dynamic programming approach to solving dynamic oligopoly models (pages 253–282)

      Vivek Farias, Denis Saure and Gabriel Y. Weintraub

      Article first published online: 19 JUN 2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00165.x

    4. How much discretion for risk regulators? (pages 283–314)

      Yolande Hiriart and David Martimort

      Article first published online: 19 JUN 2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00166.x

    5. Consumer-surplus-enhancing collusion and trade (pages 315–328)

      George Deltas, Alberto Salvo and Helder Vasconcelos

      Article first published online: 19 JUN 2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00167.x

    6. Competition among the big and the small (pages 329–347)

      Ken-Ichi Shimomura and Jacques-François Thisse

      Article first published online: 19 JUN 2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00168.x

    7. The great industry gamble: market structure dynamics as a survival contest (pages 348–367)

      Áron Tóth

      Article first published online: 19 JUN 2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00169.x

    8. fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust (pages 368–390)

      Maria Bigoni, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloé Le Coq and Giancarlo Spagnolo

      Article first published online: 19 JUN 2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.x

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