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References

  • Fricker, Elizabeth. (2006). ‘Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy.’ In The Epistemology of Testimony, eds. Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Greco, John. (2010). Achieving Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Greco, John (2011). ‘Virtue Epistemology.’ In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta . Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/
  • Johnston, Mark. (1989). ‘Dispositional Theories of Value.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63.
  • Kvanvig, Jonathan. (2012). ‘Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding.’ In Knowledge, Virtue and Action, ed. Tim Henning and David Schweikard . Boston: Routledge.
  • Lackey, Jennifer. (2007). ‘Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.’ Synthese 157.
  • Pritchard, Duncan. (2010). ‘Knowledge and Understanding.’ In The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, eds. D. Pritchard , A. Millar and A. Haddock , chs. 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Pritchard, Duncan and Turri, John. (2012). ‘The Value of Knowledge.’ In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta . Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/
  • Riggs, Wayne. (2009). ‘Two Problems of Easy Credit.’ Synthese 169.
  • Sosa, Ernest. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Zagzebski, Linda. (1996). Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Zagzebski, Linda (2007). ‘Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy.’ Episteme 4, no.3.
  • Zagzebski, Linda (2012). Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Zimmerman, Michael. (2010). ‘Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value.’ In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta . Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/