Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?
Article first published online: 4 JUL 2013
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Volume 27, Issue 1, pages 1–16, March 2014
How to Cite
Diaz-Leon, E. (2014), Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?. Ratio, 27: 1–16. doi: 10.1111/rati.12018
- Issue published online: 17 FEB 2014
- Article first published online: 4 JUL 2013
A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view that all facts are either physical or entailed by the physical), and conceptual dualism (i.e. the view that phenomenal truths are not entailed a priori by physical truths). Recently, some philosophers such as Goff (2011), Levine (2007) and Nida-Rümelin (2007), among others, have suggested that a posteriori physicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties. In this paper, I wish to defend a posteriori physicalism from this new and interesting challenge, by arguing that a posteriori physicalists have the resources to explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal at least something of what it would take for the corresponding phenomenal property to be instantiated.