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Abstract

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Interim Measures
  5. The Main Action
  6. The Appeal Procedure
  7. Trade, Environmental and Animal Welfare Interests
  8. Access to the EU Courts
  9. Biography

In September 2009, the European Union (EU) adopted legislation that provides for a wide ban on trade in seal products, allowing, nonetheless, an exception for products resulting from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and contributing to their subsistence. Natural and legal Inuit persons attacked this legislation before the European Courts, arguing that the derogation did not go far enough. This article retraces the discussion before the EU Courts, where an appeal procedure is pending on the question of whether the Inuit action is admissible.


Introduction

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Interim Measures
  5. The Main Action
  6. The Appeal Procedure
  7. Trade, Environmental and Animal Welfare Interests
  8. Access to the EU Courts
  9. Biography

For more than ten years, the Canadian government has fixed annual quotas for the killing1 of seals. Each year, it increases this quota that lies beyond 250,000 animals per year.2 The outcry from environmental and animal welfare organizations worldwide regarding the killing methods of seals – often seen as inhumane due to the fact that animals frequently suffer pain, distress, fear and other forms of unnecessary suffering, not the least because they are often skinned alive – has had little influence on the Canadian policy. The discussions about the effects of seal hunting have not been helped by the fact that European and Canadian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have reached different conclusions on this issue. Indeed, examinations of the practice of seal killing have been made difficult by Canadian legislation that prohibits approaching any seal hunter closer than 900 metres.3

In 2006, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly adopted a recommendation that called for a ban on all cruel seal hunting methods and initiatives to prohibit trade in seal products.4 The European Parliament (EP) similarly proposed a total import ban on seal products,5 and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) delivered a very detailed opinion that equally strongly criticized the inhumane killing methods for seals.6 Moreover, Belgium and the Netherlands adopted national legislation to prohibit trade in seal products, while Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and two two non-EU Member States, Croatia and Switzerland, considered taking such measures.7 In 2008, the European Commission proposed legislation to stop all trade in seal products, and this proposal was adopted in 2009.8 Regulation 1007/2009 provides in Article 3.1 for an exception of the general trade prohibition, stating that: ‘The placing on the market of seal products shall be allowed only when the seal products result from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities and contribute to their subsistence.’ The Commission was charged with adopting implementing measures for this provision.

Interim Measures

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Interim Measures
  5. The Main Action
  6. The Appeal Procedure
  7. Trade, Environmental and Animal Welfare Interests
  8. Access to the EU Courts
  9. Biography

A total of 17 natural and legal persons brought an action for annulment to the European Courts against Regulation 1007/2009.9 Subsequently, they asked in two separate submissions for the suspension of this Regulation.10 The President of the General Court, who is called to decide on interim measures in cases brought before the General Court, considered the applications for interim measures first.

Under the rules of the European Courts, interim measures may be introduced should the circumstances of the case give rise to urgency.11 The applicants argued that the application of Regulation 1007/2009 would result in serious and irreparable harm to them as it would wipe out at least half of the Inuit revenue that comes from the export of seal products. Indeed, the EU market has always been very important for the Inuit economy and the seal-processing industry in general. The derogation, which Regulation 1007/2009 provides in favour of the Inuit, would be of no help here since the Inuit people do not export seal products themselves but use commercial intermediaries who are not necessarily Inuit.

The President of the Court found that Regulation 1007/2009 leaves it to the Commission to define, inter alia, the conditions under which Inuit products could be placed on the EU market.12 As the Commission had not yet taken any such decision, the President concluded that the fears of the Inuit population were premature. He argued that it might well be that as a consequence of the adoption of Regulation 1007/2009, potential purchasers would agree to better protect seals and therefore abstain from buying seal products. However, this would be an independent decision by potential purchasers and not a consequence of Regulation 1007/2009, as the Regulation only states that seals are sentient beings that can experience pain, distress, fear and other forms of suffering. The pecuniary damage alone that was allegedly suffered by the Inuit population was not found to be a reason per se to consider intermediate action urgent since normally such damage could be the subject of subsequent financial compensation. The President of the General Court therefore dismissed the application.13 No appeal has been filed against this Order. However, the applicants introduced an application for interpretation of the Order of 19 August 2010, which the General Court found to be inadmissible.14

In July 2010, the applicants15 applied for interim measures for the second time, arguing that they had become aware of the fact that the Commission intended to adopt an implementing measure under Article 3 of Regulation 1007/2009. They claimed that this measure would render the Inuit exception of Article 3.1 meaningless.

The Commission adopted the implementation measure on 10 August 2010.16 On 19 August 2010, the President of the General Court suspended the application of Article 3.1 of Regulation 1007/2009 insofar as it concerned the applicants until he had decided on the second application for interim measures.17 Furthermore, he decided to limit the examination to questions of urgency, as well as to examine only the implementation measure itself and not the draft of Commission Regulation 737/2010.

To support their second application for interim measures, the applicants argued that the formalities which the Inuit had to comply with in order to prove that the conditions of Article 3.1 were met18 were much too strict and, as such, inutile of providing a real exception to the ban in question.

The President of the Court did not address these claims in detail. He rejected the second application for interim measures and cancelled his order of 5 August 2010.19 He argued that the applicants had not ‘adduced pertinent evidence’ that the application of Regulation 1007/2009 would cause to each of them personally serious and irreparable harm if no suspension was granted. The applicants who were natural persons had not specified the income, which they received from the hunt, other activities or fortunes. Thus, the Court was not in the position to assess the seriousness of the pecuniary damage that the applicants would suffer if the application for interim measures were dismissed. The applicants that were commercial companies needed to prove that should the application for interim measures be dismissed, their existence would be imperilled or their market share would be seriously and irremediably affected. However, the companies had not provided any evidence to allow the Court to assess the individual financial situation of each company. Finally, the applicants that were non-profit-making organizations representing Inuit interests had also failed to provide any information concerning the prejudice that would be caused to each of these organizations.

Moreover, the President held that the applicants had not explained why the loss of income which they claimed to suffer would force them to cease or reduce their seal-hunting activities to an extent that would seriously compromise their means of subsistence, cultural identity and social cohesion. Similarly, it was held that the applications had failed to explain why the average sealskin prices and the reduced revenues resulting from the sale of sealskins at auctions are the result of the alleged market uncertainty following the proposal and adoption of Regulation 1007/2009 that places a ban on seal products, as opposed to, for instance, the worldwide financial turmoil. The President of the General Court thus held that the applicants had not proven the existence of circumstances, which gave rise to urgency, such as to justify the suspension of the application of Regulation 1007/2009.

The applicants appealed against this Order in December 2010. However, in the meantime, in September 2011, the General Court had decided on the main application, which it considered inadmissible;20 this Order is discussed below. The President of the Court of Justice, competent to decide on such an appeal, held that even a successful appeal on the second interim measure would, under these circumstances, not bring the applicants a procedural or substantive advantage and decided that there was no need to adjudicate on the appeal.21

The Main Action

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Interim Measures
  5. The Main Action
  6. The Appeal Procedure
  7. Trade, Environmental and Animal Welfare Interests
  8. Access to the EU Courts
  9. Biography

As regards the main application of case T-18/10, the Commission and the Netherlands obtained permission from the General Court to intervene in the case in favour of the EP and the Council. The Parliament and the Council raised objections of inadmissibility, on which the General Court had to decide first. The conditions of persons to bring an action before the European Courts are laid down in Article 263.4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which reads:

Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.

The General Court found that Regulation 1007/2009 did not constitute a regulatory, but rather a legislative, act. According to the Court, the difference between the two is procedural: if the adoption of an act follows the procedures set out in Article 294 TFEU, the act is deemed a legislative act. This was the case with Regulation 1007/2009. As a result, applicants had to show that they are directly and individually concerned by that Regulation. In this regard, the Court stated that:

For an individual to be directly concerned by a European Union measure, first, that measure must directly affect the legal situation of that individual and, secondly, there must be no discretion left to the addressees of that measure who are responsible for its implementation, that implementation being purely automatic and resulting from European Union rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules.22

As a consequence, only those applicants were directly affected by the Regulation ‘who are active in the placing on the market of the European Union of seal products’.23 It might be that Regulation 1007/2009 also had implications for the business activities of other applicants. However, such consequences were not resulting directly from the Regulation and concerned, moreover, their factual, and not their legal, situation. In addition, Article 3.1 of Regulation 1007/2009 had to be complemented by implementation measures in order to be fully applicable. Thus, Article 3.1 could not have had direct effect on these applicants.

The Court subsequently held that only four of the applicants were active in placing seal products on the EU market and thus were directly concerned by Regulation 1007/2009. The Court then proceeded to examine whether these four applicants were also individually concerned. It found that these applicants were concerned by the Regulation ‘like any other trader who places seal products on the market’.24 There were no attributes peculiar to them or by reason of a factual situation, which differentiated them from all other persons. As they were therefore not individually concerned, their application was inadmissible. The General Court thus declared the action as inadmissible.25

The Appeal Procedure

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Interim Measures
  5. The Main Action
  6. The Appeal Procedure
  7. Trade, Environmental and Animal Welfare Interests
  8. Access to the EU Courts
  9. Biography

In November 2011, the applicants appealed against this Order to the Court of Justice.26 No decision has yet been taken on this appeal. As the submissions by the parties in proceedings before the European Courts are not public, information on the appeal stems from a short information note issued by the Court of Justice.27 According to that note, the arguments raised by the appeal are as follows:

  1. The General Court erred in law by considering that Regulation 1007/2009 was not a regulatory act. It also erred in law by interpreting the terms ‘directly and individually concerned’ in an overly restrictive way.
  2. The General Court had not given reasons for its refusal to give a broad interpretation to Article 263.4 TFEU, contrary to the requirements of Article 47 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights – these last provisions also being general principles of EU law.
  3. The General Court had interpreted the term ‘regulatory act’ on the basis of two claims that the appellants allegedly made but in reality failed to do so. This constituted a manifest error of assessment.

Trade, Environmental and Animal Welfare Interests

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Interim Measures
  5. The Main Action
  6. The Appeal Procedure
  7. Trade, Environmental and Animal Welfare Interests
  8. Access to the EU Courts
  9. Biography

It is not yet known when the Court of Justice will decide on the appeal. Here I will not try to assess the value of the appellants' arguments. It is, nonetheless, worthy to point out that already the EU Courts have delivered six decisions on this subject without addressing the core of this dispute – that is, whether the EU is entitled to ban the trade in seal products. From this viewpoint, the fact that the applicants claim to be concerned about the Inuit exception in Regulation 1007/2009 – which they consider to be too narrow – is itself subject to further questions: Why have Canada, Greenland or Norway – countries and regions that are interested in allowing the large-scale killing of seals – not taken action against the EU? Why has Canada – a member of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) – not taken any action against the United States and Mexico – the two other NAFTA members – on the basis that these countries have prohibited the trade in seal products since 1972 and 2006, respectively, independently of the question of whether seals were an endangered species or not? The Inuit community itself did not take any court action against either of these countries in order to have the trade ban lifted.

Seals in Canada (and Greenland) are not an endangered species. The general principle of public international law that each State has the sovereign right to exploit its resources pursuant to its own environmental and development principles28 applies also to seals. However, States are entitled to attach importance to animal welfare considerations, according to their cultural, religious and socio-economic traditions and policies. These animal welfare aspects may have an influence on economic, social and environmental policies, including matters concerning seals that are as Recital 1 of Regulation 1007/2009 put it, ‘sentient beings, capable of suffering pain, distress, fear and other forms of suffering’.

Marine mammals are protected by legislation in many countries around the world. The EU has not yet adopted comprehensive legislation in this regard, which is a remarkable and regrettable omission – all the more as the EU legislation on some marine mammals is insufficiently enforced and often not respected.29 The core question here, nonetheless, is whether a State has the right to consider marine mammals an essential part of wildlife and ensure its protection, independently from the question whether sections of the marine mammals are endangered in their existence or not. This right would be the counterpart to the right of States to exploit its own ‘natural resources’ mentioned above, which is a right encompassed also by the Stockholm and Rio Declarations on the environment.30

In other words, nobody contests that the Inuit community should have the right to continue to kill seals for their own subsistence purposes. This is explicitly recognized in Recital 14 of Regulation 1007/2009 and is the raison d'être of Article 3 of that Regulation.31 However, it appears far-fetched and disproportionate to conclude from this that all States in the world, including the EU Member States, should be obliged to provide free trade in seal products, including meat, oil, blubber, organs, fur skins and other articles made from seals. Here, the principle of free trade meets the sovereign right of States to legislate on animal welfare and animal protection.

The EU has a considerable set of legal rules concerning animal welfare. Article 13 TFEU states:

In formulating and implementing the Union's agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.

Over the years, a number of secondary legislation on animal welfare has been adopted, including the ban on the trade in seal pup products,32 the ban on leg-hold traps and products derived from 13 animal species hunted in countries which practice inhumane hunting methods,33 the protection of animals used for scientific purposes34 and the keeping of animals in zoos.35 Concerning animal protection beyond that of wild animals, Regulation 1523/2007 can also be mentioned, which provides for an import ban of cat and dog furs,36 because ‘(i)n the perception of EU citizens, cats and dogs are considered to be pet animals and therefore it is not acceptable to use their fur or products containing such fur’.37 This comprehensive legislation shows that animal welfare considerations form a significant feature of EU trade policy. Although Canada might have a different animal welfare policy, there is no reason why the EU should have to accept to trade in products that its own public considers inacceptable.

Canada has brought the issue of the trade ban in seal products before the World Trade Organization (WTO), claiming that the EU has breached several provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.38 To date, the Panel under the dispute settlement procedure of the WTO has not yet been composed. Since the WTO is, in this author's opinion, generally more inclined to listen to trade than to environmental and/or animal welfare arguments, it might be that the WTO will rule against the EU on this issue.

Such a finding would add to the number of cases where trade rules stand in conflict with environmental rules at the international level. This type of case law seems to increase with time, at least with regard to EU-related cases. These include disputes over the ban on trade in tropical timber that does not derive from sustainable production,39 the trade in biofuels with respect to which the EU fixed strict conditions for the production in third countries,40 the equipment of tankers with double hulls,41 and ship recycling in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, where the EU tries to stop the unacceptable social and environmental practices of ship dismantling.42 Global agreements to address such issues seem out of reach as the meagre results of Rio+20 in 2012 demonstrated once more. It is therefore not surprising that the EU, comprising 27 industrialized countries, tries to find ways to protect the environment outside of its borders.

Access to the EU Courts

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Interim Measures
  5. The Main Action
  6. The Appeal Procedure
  7. Trade, Environmental and Animal Welfare Interests
  8. Access to the EU Courts
  9. Biography

The question of whether the EU has the right to adopt a ban on the trade in seal products for animal welfare reasons is an issue that the present case has not yet decided. The other issue is more formal and refers to EU procedural law in general – that is, to what extent are individuals and NGOs entitled to tackle EU legislation before the European Courts?

The EU General Court and the Court of Justice are composed of 27 judges each – one judge from each EU Member State. This is a very small judiciary considering the size of the Union, which encompasses almost 500 million persons and a full range of sophisticated economic, social, environmental and general legislation. Laws in the EU are often different from one Member State to the other, but these have to align with the legislation that the EU sets, which may be broad framework provisions but often enough also legislation that goes into considerable detail, creating difficulties of interpretation, alignment and other coordination problems. Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that the EU Courts try to restrict the access to the judiciary to the strict minimum by interpreting the provisions on access to justice restrictively.

It is a basic question whether a legislative act, adopted by a national parliament according to the procedures laid down in national law, should be capable of being tackled in court by natural and legal persons. Numerous States decided that this should not be possible, others – among them the United States and Germany – have decided in favour of such a possibility. In the EU, Article 263.4 TFEU was originally mainly conceived as not allowing such legal action, especially because in the beginning EU ‘legislation’ was adopted by the Council of Ministers where the governments of the Member States were represented.

Article 263.4 TFEU, which allows natural and legal persons to bring an action to the EU courts once they are directly and individually concerned by a legislative act, was always narrowly interpreted by the EU Court of Justice. As early as 1963, the Court of Justice developed the so-called ‘Plaumann doctrine’ that stated:

Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be individually concerned, if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of those factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed. [This is not the case, if a person is affected] by reason of a commercial activity which may at any time be practiced by any person.43

The doctrine is still in use at present and was, de facto, also used by the General Court in the Inuit case. Whether it is still the most appropriate formula to decide on the admissibility of actions against EU provisions by private persons is doubtful to me. My view is based on three points, which will only briefly be mentioned here. First, the EU has developed from an economic integration Community to a European Union with a directly elected Parliament, citizens' rights and a state of affairs that interferes to a large extent into all parts of citizens' lives. In short, the EU is much less of an intergovernmental organization than it was fifty years ago. Second, the EU adopted a Charter on Fundamental Rights and thereby committed itself to adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This general approach must have some impact on the way in which access to justice is granted against the breach of EU law. The third reason is specific to the protection of the environment, which did not play a role at all in EU affairs only fifty years ago. The environment is of general EU interest and cannot and must not remain unprotected: somebody must be able to defend it against the ‘insolence of office’, as Shakespeare's Hamlet called it. Administrative inertia and private pollution lead to slow but progressive environmental degradation and there is little hope of stopping environmental degradation when the environment cannot go to court.

The present case, which was brought by some Inuit associations and some associations representing Inuit interests, is not an environmental case. The key question concerning this case is the access to the EU market for seal products – not the protection of the environment. Therefore, in the appeal procedure, the Court of Justice will have to weigh the interests in maintaining the Plaumann doctrine against enlarged access to the EU Courts. It is clear, though, that if the Court declares the action admissible, it will set a very important precedent and will open the door to allowing almost every piece of secondary EU law to be tackled by private persons before the Courts.

  1. 1

    In the public discussion, also the words ‘hunting’, ‘fishing’, ‘catching’, and ‘harvesting’ are used.

  2. 2

    The quota was 275,000 animals in 2002 and 400,000 in 2012.

  3. 3

    See Article 33.1 of the Canadian Marine Mammals Regulation, SOR/93-56: ‘Subject to subsection (2), no person shall, except under the authority of a seal fishery observation licence issued by the Minister, approach within one-half nautical mile of a person who is fishing for seals.’ One nautical mile is 1,852 kilometres.

  4. 4

    Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1776 of 2006 (17 November 2006), found at: <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/EREC1776.htm>.

  5. 5

    Opinion of the European Parliament of 12 October 2006, [2006] OJ C306E/194.

  6. 6

    European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA), ‘Animal Welfare Aspects of the Killing and Skinning of Seals: Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Animal Health and Welfare of 6 December 2007’, 610 EFSA Journal (2007), 1 .

  7. 7

    See Recommendation 1776 of 2006, 4 above. Germany was not mentioned in that Recommendation, but quoted by the applicants in Case T-18/10R, 9 below.

  8. 8

    Regulation 1007/2009 of 16 September 2009 on Trade in Seal Products, [2009] OJ L286/36.

  9. 9

    General Court 11 January 2010, Case T-18/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council .

  10. 10

    General Court 11 February 2010, Case T-18/10R, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. Commission ; General Court 28 July 2010, Case T-18/10RII, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. Commission. One of the applicants in the main case, T-18/10, had not applied for interim measures in case T-18/10RII.

  11. 11

    General Court, Rules of Procedure, [1991] OJ L136/1, as amended, Article 104.2.

  12. 12

    Regulation 1007/2009, 8 above, Articles 3.1, 3.4, 5 and Recitals 14 and 17.

  13. 13

    Case T-18/10R, 10 above, Order of the President of the General Court of 30 April 2010.

  14. 14

    General Court, Case T-18/10/RII/INTP, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council, Order of the President of the General Court of 19 October 2010.

  15. 15

    One applicant, who had applied in the main case and in the first interim application, did not apply in this second application.

  16. 16

    Commission Regulation 737/2010 Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Regulation 1007/2009/EC on Trade in Seal Products, [2010] OJ L216/1.

  17. 17

    Case T-18/10RII, 10 above, Order of the President of the General Court of 19 August 2010.

  18. 18

    According to Regulation 737/2010, 16 above, Article 3, the persons who wanted to continue to market seal products in the EU had to prove that: seal hunting was conducted by Inuit or other indigenous communities which had a tradition of seal hunting in the community and in the geographical region; the products of the seal hunt were at least partly used, consumed or processed within the communities according to their traditions; and hunting contributed to the subsistence of the community.

  19. 19

    Case T-18/10RII, 10 above, Order of the President of the General Court of 25 October 2010.

  20. 20

    Case T-18/10, 9 above, Order of 6 September 2011.

  21. 21

    CJEU, Case C-605/10P(R), Order of the President of the Court of Justice of 27 October 2011.

  22. 22

    Case T-18/10, n. 9 above, Order of 6 September 2011, paragraph 71.

  23. 23

    Ibid. paragraph 75.

  24. 24

    Ibid., paragraph 90.

  25. 25

    Ibid.

  26. 26

    Court of Justice, Case C-583/11P Inuit Tapirit Kanatami and Others v. Parliament and Council .

  27. 27

    See Appeal brought on 23 November 2011 by Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 6 September 2011 in Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v European Parliament, Council of the European Union, Kingdom of the Netherlands, European Commission, found at: <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119347&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1106732>.

  28. 28

    See Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, found in Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 16 June 1972), Action Taken by the Conference (‘Stockholm Declaration’) Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 16 June 1972, Principle 21; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, found in Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), 14 June 1992), Annex (‘Rio Declaration’), Principle 2.

  29. 29

    See L. Krämer, EU Environmental Law, 7th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 2011), at sections 5-22ss and 12-01ss.

  30. 30

    Stockholm Declaration, 28 above, Principles 2 and 4. Less clear, and more embedded in the catchword of ‘sustainable development’ is the Rio Declaration, 28 above, Principles 1, 3 and 4.

  31. 31

    Recital 14 of Regulation 1007/2009, 8 above, reads: ‘The fundamental economic and social interests of Inuit communities engaged in the hunting of seals as a means to ensure their subsistence should not be adversely affected. The hunt is an integral part of the culture and identity of the members of the Inuit society, and as such is recognized by the United Nations Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples. Therefore the placing on the market of seal products which result from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities and which contributes to their subsistence should be allowed.’

  32. 32

    Directive 83/129/EEC Concerning the Importation into Member States of Skins of Certain Seal Pups and Products Derived therefrom, [1983] OJ L91/30.

  33. 33

    Regulation 3254/91/EEC Prohibiting the Use of Leghold Traps in the Community and the Introduction into the Community of Pelts and Manufactured Goods of Certain Wild Animals Species Originating in Countries which Catch Them by Means of Leghold Traps or Trapping Methods which Do not Meet International Humane Trapping Standards, [1991] OJ L308/11.

  34. 34

    Directive 2010/63/EU on the Protection of Animals Used for Scientific Purposes, [2010] OJ L276/33.

  35. 35

    Directive 99/22/EC Relating to the Keeping of Wild Animals in Zoos, [1999] OJ L94/22.

  36. 36

    Regulation 1523/2007/EC Banning the Placing on the Market and the Import to, or Export from, the Community of Cat and Dog Fur, and Products Containing Such Fur, [2007] OJ L343/1.

  37. 37

    Ibid., Recital 1.

  38. 38

    See WTO DS369, European Communities: Certain Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, introduced on 25 September 2007; WTO DS400, European Communities: Certain Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, introduced on 2 November 2009. Also Norway filed a case against the EU, see WTO DS401, European Communities: Certain Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products introduced on 5 November 2009.

  39. 39

    See Regulation 2173/2005/EC on the Establishment of a FLEGT Licensing Scheme for Imports of Timber into the European Community, [2005] OJ L347/1; Regulation 995/2010/EU Laying Down the Obligations of Operators Who Place Timber and Timber Products on the Market, [2010] OJ L295/23, Article 4.

  40. 40

    Directive 2009/28/EC on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources, [2009] OJ L140/16, Article 17.

  41. 41

    Regulation 417/2002/EC on the Accelerated Phasing-in of Double-hull or Equivalent Design Requirements for Single-hull Oil Tankers, [2003] OJ L64/1; Regulation 530/2012/EC on the Accelerated Phasing-in of Double-hull or Equivalent Design Requirements for Single-hull Oil Tankers, [2012] OJ L172/3.

  42. 42

    Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on Ship Recycling, COM (2012)118.

  43. 43

    ECJ, Case C-25/62, Plaumann, 1963 ECR 199.

Biography

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Interim Measures
  5. The Main Action
  6. The Appeal Procedure
  7. Trade, Environmental and Animal Welfare Interests
  8. Access to the EU Courts
  9. Biography
  • Professor Dr Ludwig Krämer is a Visiting Professor at University College London Law Faculty and Director of ClientEarth‘s European Union Aarhus Centre. He was formerly a judge in Germany and worked for three decades for DG Environment of the European Commission in senior legal and policy roles. At present, he is running an environmental law consultancy, Derecho y Medio Ambiente, in Madrid.