United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May 1992; in force 21 March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’).
The Global Climate-Change Regime: A Defence’, in: D. Helm and C. Hepburn (eds.), The Economics and Politics of Climate Change (Oxford University Press, 2009), 433, at 439–443; and , ‘ Great Expectations: Understanding Why the UN Climate Negotiations Seem to Fail, FIIA Briefing Paper 109 (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2012), at 6–7. and ,
Decision 1/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012).
Beyond “Dangerous” Climate Change: Emission Scenarios for a New World’, 369 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A (2011), 20, at 41; and , ‘ et al., ‘Emission Pathways Consistent with a 2°C Global Temperature Limit’, 1:8 Nature Climate Change (2011), 413, at 413.
UNFCCC, 1 above, Article 2.
Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancún Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011), at paragraph 4. For analyses of the emission reduction pledges made in the climate negotiations against the benchmark of limiting global average temperature increases to 2°C see, e.g., et al., ‘Copenhagen Pledges are Paltry’ 464:7292 Nature (2010), 1126; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Emissions Gap Report: Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to Limit Global Warming to 2°C or 1.5°C? A Preliminary Assessment (UNEP, 2010); UNEP, Bridging the Emissions Gap (UNEP, 2011).
The term ‘regime complex’ was coined by Raustiala and Victor, who define it as ‘an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area’. The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’, 58:2 International Organization (2004), 277, at 279. and , ‘See also The Regime Complex for Climate Change’, 9:1 Perspective on Politics (2011), 7. and , ‘
See also Addressing the Challenge of Global Climate Mitigation: An Assessment of Existing Venues and Institutions (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011), at 48; and , Multilateral Climate Efforts beyond the UNFCCC (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2011), at 16. ,
On ‘minilateralism’ generally, see Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action’, Foreign Policy (July/August 2009), 5. , ‘On minilateralism in international climate policy, see Exclusive Minilateralism: An Emerging Discourse within International Climate Change Governance?’, 8:3 Portal – Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies (2011), 1; , ‘ Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?’, 12:2 Global Environmental Politics (2012), 24. , ‘
This special issue does not specifically examine private initiatives outside of the UNFCCC. For good recent discussions, see, e.g., Beyond the Public and Private Divide: Remapping Transnational Climate Governance in the 21st Century’, 8:4 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2008), 367; and , ‘ Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto (Oxford University Press, 2011); , The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’, 30:4 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy (2012), 571. , ‘
See, e.g., UNFCCC, 1 above, Article 3.3 (‘[e]fforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties’); and various clauses under Article 4.1. Furthermore, the Convention specifies that climate finance can be provided ‘through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels’. Ibid., Article 11.5.
See, e.g., Decision 13/CP.8, Cooperation with Other Conventions (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1, 28 March 2003).
Although they also have an important role to play, bilateral institutions are outside the scope of this special issue.
UNFCCC, 1 above, Article 3.1.
See, e.g., Advancing the Climate Agenda: Exploiting Material and Institutional Linkages to Develop a Menu of Policy Options’, 14:3 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 255; , and , ‘ Harnessing International Institutions to Address Climate Change (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010); and , 8 above; and , 8 above; , R. Rayfuse and S.V. Scott (eds.), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (Edward Elgar, 2012).
See, e.g., The Climate Change Regime: Interactions with ICAO, IMO and the EU Burden-sharing Agreement’, in: S. Oberthür and T. Gehring (eds.), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance. Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies (MIT Press, 2006), 53; , ‘ Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law’, 30:4 Law and Policy (2008), 423; , and , ‘ The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis’, 9:4 Global Environmental Politics (2009), 14; , , , and , ‘ Beyond the Intergovernmental Regime: Recent Trends in Global Carbon Governance’, 2:4 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 284; , ‘ 10 above; , 7 above; and , Climate Change Law and Regime Interaction’, 4:2 Carbon and Climate Law Review (2011), 147; , ‘ The Fragmentation of the Global Climate Governance Architecture’, 2:2 WIREs Climate Change (2011), 255; , ‘ 10 above. ,
The Kyoto Protocol sets targets for its developed country parties for the period 2008–2012. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto, 11 December 1997; in force 16 February 2005) (‘Kyoto Protocol’), Article 3.1.
Decision 1/CP.16, 6 above. See also The Cancun Climate Change Agreements: Reading the Text, Subtext and Tealeaves’, 60:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2011), 499. , ‘
Decision 1/CMP.7, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at Its Sixteenth Session (UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1, 15 March 2012), at paragraph 1.
Decision 1/CP.17, 3 above, at paragraph 6.
Ibid., at paragraphs 7–8.
Decision 1/CP.17 calls for ‘a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the [UNFCCC] applicable to all Parties’. Ibid., at paragraph 2.
Unconstructive Ambiguity in the Durban Climate Deal of COP 17/CMP 7’, 12:2 Sustainable Development Law and Policy (2012), 6; , ‘ The Durban Platform on Enhanced Action and the Future of the Climate Regime’, 61:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2012), 501. , ‘
See, e.g., Time to Ditch Kyoto’, 449:25 Nature (2007), 973, at 974; and , ‘ Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet (Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 210–215. ,
See, e.g., 24 above, at 974; and , Why We Disagree about Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 311–315; , How to Eat an Elephant: A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy’, 10:6 Climate Policy (2010), 615. While authors tend to contrast ‘bottom-up’ with ‘top-down’ approaches, these approaches do not have to exclude each other. , ‘See, e.g., Beyond Copenhagen: Next Steps’, 10:6 Climate Policy (2010), 593, at 594–596; and , ‘ Connect the Dots: Managing the Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance’, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies (2012, forthcoming). and , ‘
See 2 above, at 443. and ,
See, e.g., Domestic Politics and Global Climate Policy’, in: U. Luterbacher and D. Sprinz (eds.), International Relations and Global Climate Change (MIT Press, 2001), 67, at 67–68. and , ‘
A full analysis of the causes of, and remedies for, the relatively slow pace of progress in the UNFCCC negotiations is beyond the scope of this article. We introduce some of the main arguments here for background purposes and to highlight the relevance and limits of the various approaches presented by the articles in this special issue.
See, e.g., Linkages between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols: Enhancing Synergies between Protecting the Ozone Layer and the Global Climate’, 1:3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 357; , ‘ UNEP Assessment Panel on the Environmental Effects of Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, Environmental Effects of Ozone Depletion and Its Interactions with Climate Change: 2002 Assessment (UNEP, 2002).
Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna, 22 March 1985; in force 22 September 1988).
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal, 16 September 1987; in force 1 January 1989).
et al., ‘The Importance of the Montreal Protocol in Protecting Climate’, 104:12 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2007), 4814, at 4814.
Decision XIX/6, Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol with Regard to Annex C, Group I, Substances (Hydrochlorofluorocarbons) (UN Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.19/7, 21 September 2007).
Managing Policy Contradictions between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols: The Case of Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases’, in: S. Oberthür and O.S. Stokke (eds.), Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change (MIT Press, 2011), 115, at 128–129. , and , ‘
Multilateral Efforts to Reduce Black Carbon Emissions: A Lifeline for the Warming Arctic?’, 20:1 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2011), 3. and ‘
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (Geneva, 13 November 1979; in force 16 March 1983).
Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone (Gothenburg, 30 November 1999; in force 17 May 2005).
See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), ‘Parties to UNECE Air Pollution Convention Approve New Emission Reduction Commitments for Main Air Pollutants by 2020’ (4 May 2012), found at: <http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=29858>.
Reducing Air Pollution from Marine Vessels to Mitigate Arctic Warming: Is it Time to Target Black Carbon?’, 6:1 Carbon and Climate Law Review (2012), 13. , ‘See also 35 above, at 8–9. and ,
See, e.g., Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Interlinkages Between Biological Diversity and Climate Change: Advice on the Integration of Biodiversity Considerations into the Implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol, CBD Technical Series 10 (Secretariat of the CBD, 2003); Secretariat of the CBD, Connecting Biodiversity and Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation: Report of the Second Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change, CBD Technical Series 41 (Secretariat of the CBD, 2009).
Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992; in force 29 December 1992).
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar, 2 February 1971; in force 21 December 1975).
Estimates indicate that tropical deforestation and forest degradation accounts for about 12–20% of global carbon dioxide emissions. et al., ‘CO2 Emissions from Forest Loss’, 2:11 Nature Geoscience (2009), 737, at 737.
See further Integrating Biodiversity in the Climate Regime's Forest Rules: Options and Tradeoffs in Greening REDD Design’, 20:2 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 139; , ‘ Far Away, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the Increasing Interactions between the Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law’, 2:1 Climate Law, 85; , ‘ A Pale Reflection of Political Reality: Integration of Global Climate, Wetland and Biodiversity Agreements’, 1:3 Climate Law (2011), 343. , ‘
No Need to Reinvent the Wheel for a Human Rights-based Approach to Tackling Climate Change: The Contribution of International Biodiversity Law’, in: E.J. Hollo , K. Kulovesi and M. Mehling (eds.), Climate Change and the Law (Springer, 2012, forthcoming). , ‘
Decision X/33, Biodiversity and Climate Change (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27, 20 January 2011), at paragraph 8(w). See also 45 above, at 95–98. ,
See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007); World Bank, World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change (World Bank, 2010).
United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council (UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/15, 20 July 2011).
Decision 1/CP.16, 6 above, at paragraph 98.
See, e.g., World Bank, 48 above, at Chapter 6.
Ibid., at Table 6.2
Investing in Sustainable Energy Futures (World Resources Institute, 2010). and ,
See, e.g., Power, Responsibility and Accountability: Rethinking the Legitimacy of Institutions for Climate Finance’, 1:2 Climate Law (2010), 261; , , and , ‘ Harnessing the Power Shift: Governance Options for International Climate Financing (Oxfam, 2010). ,
See, e.g., Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Motivate State Action on Climate Change through the World Trade Organization’, 13:1 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2004), 85; , ‘ Global Warming and the World Trading System (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009); , and , et al., Trade and Climate Change: A Report by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Trade Organization (WTO Secretariat, 2009); Reconciling Trade and Climate: How the WTO can Help Address Climate Change (Edward Elgar, 2010); and , The Overlap Between the UN Climate Regime and the World Trade Organization: Lessons for Post-2012 Climate Governance’, in: F. Biermann , P. Pattberg and F. Zelli (eds.), Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency and Adaptation (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79. and , ‘
Cf. The Big Chill: The WTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, 4:2 Global Environmental Politics (2004), 24. , ‘
See, e.g., Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the United States: The Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border’, 4:3 Climate Policy (2005), 289; and , ‘ Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments?: An Analysis vis-à-vis WTO Law’, 15:2 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2006), 131; , ‘ Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading’, 24:2 European Journal of Law and Economics (2007), 137; and , ‘ US Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law (Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy, 2007); , The Legal Interface between Carbon Border Measures and Trade Rules’, 11:5 Climate Policy (2011), 1202. , ‘For a discussion of the measures proposed in the EU and the United States, see Addressing Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns in Climate Policy: An Analysis of Border Adjustment Measures in the US and the EU’, 38:1 Energy Policy (2010), 42. and , ‘
See, e.g., 57 above, at 45. and ,
Governing Clean Energy Subsidies: What, Why and How Legal? (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 2012). and ,
Trade Rules and Climate Change Subsidies’, 5:3 World Trade Review (2006), 377, at 381; , ‘ Will the “Friends of Climate” Emerge in the WTO? The Prospects of Applying the “Fisheries Subsidies” Model to Energy Subsidies’, 2:1 Carbon and Climate Law Review (2008), 78. , ‘
Pittsburgh Summit Declaration, found at: <http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/eng/pittsburgh.pdf>, at paragraph 24.
These take place under the Doha Round of trade negotiations. See Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001), at paragraph 31(iii).
See, e.g., 9 above. ,
Kyoto Protocol, 17 above, Article 2.2.
Directive 2008/101 of the European Parliament and of the European Council Amending Directive 2003/87 so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community,  OJ L8/3.
See, e.g., The WTO Legality of the Application of the EU's Emission Trading System to Aviation’, 23:2 European Journal of International Law (2012), 429; , ‘ EU Climate Change Unilateralism’, 23:2 European Journal of International Law (2012), 469. and , ‘
On climate ‘clubs’, see, e.g., Plan B for Copenhagen’, 461:7262 Nature (2009), 342; , ‘ 24 above, at 242–243. , Existing club proposals have been criticized by, e.g., 9 above, , and 9 above. , For a discussion of how the trade negotiations model of minilateralism could work in international climate policy, see Making Climate Look Like Trade? Questions on Incentives, Flexibility and Credibility (Centre for Policy Research, 2010), at 3–4. ,
ICTSD, Fostering Low Carbon Growth: The Case for a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (ICTSD, November 2011).
Germany Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), World in Transition: A Social Contract for Sustainability (WBGU, 2011).
See 16 above, at 73. ,
See 7 above, at 298. and ,
See, e.g., From UN-ity to Diversity? The UNFCCC, the Asia-Pacific Partnership and the Future of International Law on Climate Change’, 1:1 Carbon and Climate Law Review (2007), 17; , ‘ The Role of the Asia-Pacific Partnership in Discursive Contestation of the International Climate Regime’, 9:3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2009), 213; and , ‘ Friendly Neighbor or Trojan Horse? Assessing the Interaction of Soft Law Initiatives and the UN Climate Regime’, 9:3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2009), 239. , ‘
See 8 above.
See Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Country Partners, found at: <http://www.unep.org/ccac/Actors/CountryPartners.aspx>.
See 66 above. and , Similar arguments have been made with respect to the use of border carbon adjustments. See Climate-change-related Trade Measures and Article XX: Defining Discrimination in Light of the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’, 45:3 Journal of World Trade (2011), 653; , ‘ Border Carbon Adjustments, WTO-law and the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’, 12:1 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2012), 63. , ‘
For example, parties in Durban called for the organization of a workshop on ‘equitable access to sustainable development’. See Decision 2/CP.17, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012), paragraph 4. Some observers believe that the principle is evolving slowly towards a greater level of symmetry between developed and developing countries. For recent discussions, see, e.g., 18 above; , and 23 above. ,
See Decision 8/CP/17, Forum and Work Programme on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.2, 15 March 2012), at paragraph 3.
See R. Eckersley, 9 above.
On this concern, see generally The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’, 60:2 Stanford Law Review (2007), 595; and , ‘ The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity’, 7:1 Perspectives on Politics (2009), 65. , ‘
See 24 above, at 211–212. ,
See 2 above, at 447. Some countries and observers have proposed solutions to this problem. See Letter dated 26 May 2011 from Papua New Guinea and Mexico Addressed to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (26 May 2011), found at: <http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/notifications/application/pdf/nv_parties_20110603.pdf>; and , Strengthening Global Climate Change Negotiations: Improving the Efficiency of the UNFCCC Process (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2012). and ,
A variety of approaches have been advanced for rethinking the concept of CBDRRC, for instance by focusing on differentiation with respect to the implementation and review of commitments and financial and technological assistance. See, e.g., Evolving Responsibility: The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the UNFCCC’, 6 Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist (2010), 1. and , ‘
See also 9 above, at 33–34. ,
See 2 above, at 6–7. and ,
For instance, a Clean Development Mechanism rulebook was developed to assist interested parties in navigating the extensive and detailed rules of the mechanism. See <http://www.cdmrulebook.org/>.
Decision 18/CP.17, Programme Budget for the Biennium 2012–2013 (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.2, 15 March 2012).
Fact Sheet: UNFCCC Secretariat (February 2011), found at: <http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/unfccc_secretariat.pdf>. See also 8 above, at 20. and ,
See 25 above. and ,
Cf. International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New Order’. 81:3 Georgetown Law Journal (1993), 675, at 697. , ‘
For a similar argument related to the legitimacy of the WTO, see The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Challenges of the Environment, Legitimacy and Fragmentation (Kluwer Law International, 2011). , A counter-argument is that a plurality of institutions could actually further the legitimacy of each institution, for instance, because institutions act as each other's safety net, or because they appeal to and involve different groups of stakeholders. In the context of natural resource management at the national level, this argument of ‘redundancy’ has been made by Redundancy and Diversity: Do They Influence Optimal Management?’, in: F. Berkes , J. Colding and C. Folke (eds.), Navigating Social-ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 83. , , and , ‘For a similar argument in the context of international environmental governance, see Addressing the Global Governance Deficit’, 4:4 Global Environmental Politics (2004), 1, at 3. , ‘
et al., Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (United Nations, 2010); European Commission, Scaling up International Climate Finance after 2012 (European Commission, 2011); UNEP, Innovative Climate Finance: Examples from the UNEP Bilateral Finance Institutions Climate Change Working Group (UNEP, 2011); World Bank Group, Mobilizing Climate Finance: A Paper Prepared at the Request of G20 Finance Ministers (World Bank, 2011).
Cf. Legal and Political Approaches in Interplay Management: Dealing with the Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance’, in S. Oberthür and O.S. Stokke , 34 above, 59, at 75–77. , ‘
Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (United Nations University Press, 2008), at 66–67; , International Environmental Governance: Managing Fragmentation through Institutional Connection’, 12:1 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2011), 177, at 192–200. , ‘
Decision 12/CP.2, Memorandum of Understanding between the Conference of the Parties and the Council of the Global Environment Facility (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, 29 October 1996).
See, e.g., H. van Asselt, J. Gupta and F. Biermann, 15 above, at 264.
Overlap Management in the World Trade Organization: Secretariat Influence on Trade-environment Politics’, 10:2 Global Environmental Politics (2010), 64, at 67–68. , ‘
Cf. 72 above, at 26. , See also Guidelines for Reporting Information on Climate Finance (World Resources Institute, 2010), in which the authors argue that multilateral development banks could be asked to report to the UNFCCC on the climate finance they provide so as to achieve more comprehensive and harmonized reporting of the support provided to developing countries. , , and ,
See, e.g., The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work?, FNI Report 10/2001 (Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2001), at 20–23; , 93 above, at 146. ,
See, e.g., Building International Climate Cooperation: Lessons from the Weapons and Trade Regime for Achieving International Climate Goals (World Resources Institute, 2012). and (eds.),
Cf. the ‘facilitative model’ of international law described by The Durban Platform Negotiations: Goals and Options (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements Viewpoints, July 2012), at 11. , In this way, the UNFCCC could possibly act as an ‘orchestrator’ of international climate policy. Cf. International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration’, 5:3 Review of International Organizations (2010), 315; and , ‘ Orchestration: Global Governance through Intermediaries (6 August 2012), found at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125452&download=yes>. , , and ,
For an overview of such governance functions, ranging from agenda setting and research to implementation and monitoring and reporting, see P. Haas, 90 above, at 8–9.