Public Disclosure, Reputation Sensitivity, and Labor Law Compliance: Evidence from Better Factories Cambodia

Authors


  • The authors thank Colin Fenwick, Kevin Kolben, Amy Luinstra, Chikako Oka, Arianna Rossi, David Weil, Sarah West, participants at the 2011 Regulating for Decent Work conference, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This paper is a substantial revision of Robertson, Raymond, Rajeev Dehejia, Drusilla Brown, and Debra Ang (2011) ‘Labor Law Compliance and Human Resource Management Innovation: Better Factories Cambodia’ Better Work discussion paper 1, International Labour Organisation, Geneva.

Tel: +1-651-696-6739; Fax: +1-651-696-6746; E-mail: robertson@macalester.edu.

Abstract

Public disclosure of labor conditions has been suggested as one way to encourage compliance with labor law and improvements in working conditions. Analyzing labor law compliance data in the apparel industry from Better Factories Cambodia, this paper finds that after the elimination of public disclosure of factory-level noncompliance the rate of increase in compliance slowed,but did not return to the baseline, even in the absence of a reputation sensitive buyer.

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