The authors appreciate the comments of Mostafa Beshkar, Rick Bond, Kaz Miyagiwa, an anonymous referee, and participants at the Midwest International Economics Meetings. Hartigan thanks LICOS of the Katholic University of Leuven in Belgium, where this paper was initiated, for its hospitality. He also thanks the National University of Singapore, where parts were written. Vandenbussche is grateful for financial support from UCLouvain-ARC 09/14-019 and KU Leuven-PF 10/003.
Disfavored Nations: Anti-Dumping at the WTO
Article first published online: 22 JAN 2013
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Review of Development Economics
Volume 17, Issue 1, pages 105–116, February 2013
How to Cite
Hartigan, J. C. and Vandenbussche, H. (2013), Disfavored Nations: Anti-Dumping at the WTO. Review of Development Economics, 17: 105–116. doi: 10.1111/rode.12018
- Issue published online: 22 JAN 2013
- Article first published online: 22 JAN 2013
- UCLouvain-ARC. Grant Number: 09/14-019
- KU Leuven-PF. Grant Number: 10/003
The proliferation of Anti-Dumping actions may be explained by the Most Favored Nation rule of safeguards, the advantages of unilateral retaliatory measures as an alternative to formal dispute resolution, and the exercising of discipline in a risk-sharing agreement. Use of unilateralism is attractive to developing members that are constrained by legal capacity. The expression of the Anti-Dumping Agreement appears to be a hybrid of rules and standards. However, a lack of interpretive guidance from the WTO and the opportunities for discretion in the implementation of rules render them standards in a shroud of rules. This is due to the presence of large proxy spaces, or the domestic investigative authority being substantially the arbiter of satisfaction with the agreement.