. This paper was written when the author was visiting the Department of Economics, Harvard University, Littauer Center, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. Thanks are due to the Department of Economics at Harvard University for its hospitality, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments. The author remains solely responsible for any errors and omissions. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the National Institute of Economic Research.
Comparative Trade Policy
Article first published online: 17 FEB 2014
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Review of International Economics
Volume 22, Issue 2, pages 410–421, May 2014
How to Cite
Wiberg, M. (2014), Comparative Trade Policy. Review of International Economics, 22: 410–421. doi: 10.1111/roie.12088
- Issue published online: 1 APR 2014
- Article first published online: 17 FEB 2014
Current research has found ambiguous theoretical and empirical results with respect to the effects of the type of electoral regime on trade policy. The present paper aims to reconcile the different views within a theoretical model. It is shown that the equilibrium level of trade protection can be relatively higher, as well as lower, under a majoritarian electoral rule compared with proportional representation. Trade policy is more (less) protectionist under proportional electoral regimes, as compared with majoritarian institutions, if swing districts are populated by relatively more (less) factor owners with stakes in the exporting sector. It is also shown that politicians optimally apply a lower (higher) level of rent seeking under the majoritarian electoral rule if there are relatively more factor owners in the swing districts with stakes in the exporting (import-competing) sector.