Note: We have received extremely useful comments and suggestions from two anonymous referees. We acknowledge excellent research assistance from Jofrey Amanyise, Ben Dandi, Øystein V. Dvergsdal, Lars Engebredtsen, Maria Frengstad, Ole-Aleksander Greve, Cornel Jahari, Lucas Katera, Hilda Luusah, Khadijah Omer, Dennis Rweyemamu, Stein Svalestad, Sander van den Heuvel, and Jon Vassengen. We are also grateful to REPOA (Dar-Es-Salaam) and the University of Bergen for facilitating the experiments. Helpful comments were received from Amadou Boly on an earlier draft. Financial support from the Research Council of Norway (grant 172225/V10) and the research centre Equality, Social Organization, and Performance (ESOP) at the Department of Economics, University of Oslo is gratefully acknowledged. The project was administered by The Choice Lab, Norwegian School of Economics.
Do Non-Enforceable Contracts Matter? Evidence from an International Lab Experiment
Article first published online: 4 FEB 2014
© 2014 UNU-WIDER. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of International Association for Research in Income and Wealth.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
Review of Income and Wealth
Special Issue: Poverty, Development, and Behavioral Economics (Comprises Findings of UNU-WIDER Project New Approaches to Measuring Poverty and Vulnerability)
Volume 60, Issue 1, pages 100–113, March 2014
How to Cite
Cappelen, A. W., Hagen, R. J., Sørensen, E. Ø. and Tungodden, B. (2014), Do Non-Enforceable Contracts Matter? Evidence from an International Lab Experiment. Review of Income and Wealth, 60: 100–113. doi: 10.1111/roiw.12099
- Issue published online: 4 FEB 2014
- Article first published online: 4 FEB 2014
- Research Council of Norway. Grant Number: 172225/V10
- Equality, Social Organization, and Performance (ESOP) at the Department of Economics, University of Oslo
Figure A.1: Histograms of loan amount offered
Figure A.2: Loan acceptance rates
Figure A.3: Cumulative distribution functions of share repaid
Table A.1: Overview of experimental design
Table A.2: Distribution of situations by country of lender and borrower
Table A.3: Loan offers
Table A.4: Acceptance of loan offers
Table A.5: Share repaid of loan amount
Please note: Wiley Blackwell is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.