SEARCH

SEARCH BY CITATION

References

  • Bennett, J. (2003) A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Comesaña, J. (2005) “Unsafe Knowledge.” Synthese 146: 395404.
  • Dretske, F. (2000) “Conclusive Reasons.” In F. Dretske , Perception, Knowledge and Belief, pp. 329. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Fogelin, R. (1994) Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Goldman, A. I. (1976) “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.” Journal of Philosophy 73: 771791.
  • Heller, M. (1999) “The Proper Role of Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology.” Philosophical Perspectives 13: 115129.
  • Hiller, A. and Neta, R. (2007) “Safety and Epistemic Luck.” Synthese 158: 303313.
  • Kirkham, R. L. (1984) “Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?Mind 93: 501513.
  • Kripke, S. (2011) “Nozick on Knowledge.” In S. Kripke , Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers, Volume I, pp. 162224. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Kvanvig, J. L. (2004) “Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge.” Philosophical Issues 14: 201218.
  • Lackey, J. (2006) “Pritchard's Epistemic Luck.” Philosophical Quarterly 56: 284289.
  • Lehrer, K. (1965) “Knowledge, Truth and Evidence.” Analysis 25: 168175.
  • Lewis, D. (1973) Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Pritchard, D. (2005) Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Pritchard, D. (2007) “Anti-Luck Epistemology.” Synthese 158: 277297.
  • Pritchard, D. (2008) “Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology.” In J. Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, pp. 437455. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Pritchard, D. (2009) “Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?Journal of Philosophical Research 34: 3445.
  • Pritchard, D. (2012) “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.” Journal of Philosophy 109: 247279.
  • Russell, B. (1948) Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits. London: George Allen and Unwin.
  • Sosa, E. (2000) “Scepticism and Contextualism.” Philosophical Issues 10: 118.
    Direct Link:
  • Sosa, E. (2007) Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. I: A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Stalnaker, R. (1978) “A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.” In W. L. Harper , R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce (eds), Ifs, pp. 87104. Dordrecht: Reidel.
  • Unger, P. (1968) “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge.” Journal of Philosophy 65: 157170.
  • Vogel, J. (2007) “Subjunctivitis.” Philosophical Studies 134: 7388.
  • Williamson, T. (2000) Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Zagzebski, L. (1994) “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.” Philosophical Quarterly 44: 6573.