In no particular order.
Version of Record online: 16 JUL 2013
© 2013 Stiftelsen Theoria
Volume 80, Issue 1, pages 100–103, February 2014
How to Cite
Sahlin, N.-E. and Weirich, P. (2014), Unsharp Sharpness. Theoria, 80: 100–103. doi: 10.1111/theo.12025
- Issue online: 12 JAN 2014
- Version of Record online: 16 JUL 2013
- imprecise probabilities;
- sequential choice;
- rational choice
In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga ((2010) argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's (1980, 1988), Gärdenfors and Sahlin's (1982), and Kyburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.