Can Indispensability-Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists?
Version of Record online: 19 JUL 2013
© 2013 Stiftelsen Theoria
Volume 80, Issue 2, pages 153–173, May 2014
How to Cite
Baron, S. (2014), Can Indispensability-Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists?. Theoria, 80: 153–173. doi: 10.1111/theo.12031
- Issue online: 7 APR 2014
- Version of Record online: 19 JUL 2013
- Australian Research Council's Discovery Projects. Grant Number: DP120102871
- John Templeton Foundation
In this article I consider what it would take to combine a certain kind of mathematical Platonism with serious presentism. I argue that a Platonist moved to accept the existence of mathematical objects on the basis of an indispensability argument faces a significant challenge if she wishes to accept presentism. This is because, on the one hand, the indispensability argument can be reformulated as a new argument for the existence of past entities and, on the other hand, if one accepts the indispensability argument for mathematical objects then it is hard to resist the analogous argument for the existence of the past.