The First Review of European Union Antidumping Reviews


  • We are grateful to an anonymous referee, to participants of the ETSG Conference in Leuven and to James DeVault and Kara Reynolds for useful suggestions. All remaining errors are our own. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the GRASP Collaborative Project funded by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme for Research (Contract no. 244725). The database used in this paper is available on Maurizio Zanardi's personal homepage.


The literature on antidumping (AD) has documented various aspects of this protectionist tool. However, a peculiar feature of AD has not received much attention: these measures are endogenous to the behaviour of the exporting firms, which can adjust the dumping margin by changing their export price and ask the authority to amend the AD measures accordingly. The objective of this paper is to fill part of this gap in the literature by analysing the AD reviews conducted by the European Union for affirmative petitions initiated in 1980–2009. To this end, a novel data set of all such reviews has been assembled. Summary statistics reveal that more than a third of all petitions concluded with the imposition of AD measures are reviewed at least once before their expiration, and most reviews lead to lower AD duties (although, almost 20 per cent of the firms investigated through interim reviews see their duties increase). There are significant differences in the outcome of the reviews depending on the party requesting them (i.e. reviews lodged by European producers are less likely to lead to lower duties). These conclusions are confirmed by the econometric analysis, which also shows that Chinese firms see their duties reduced significantly less than those of firms from other countries.