The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support from the Chinese National Social Science Foundation Project (Grant 11BJY142), the Chinese Ministry of Education Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities (Grant 13JJD790005), the Shu Guang Project of Shanghai Education Development Foundation (Grant 11SG10), the 985 Third Period Project of Fudan University (Grant 2011SHKXZD002) and the Project of Improving Scientific Research Ability of Fudan Youth Teachers (Grant 20520132060). The authors would also like to thank the two anonymous referees and the editor for their valuable comments, which have led to a substantial improvement in the original paper.
Article first published online: 10 DEC 2013
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The World Economy
Volume 37, Issue 1, pages 86–105, January 2014
How to Cite
Shen, G. and Fu, X. (2014), The Trade Effects of US Anti-dumping Actions against China Post-WTO Entry. World Economy, 37: 86–105. doi: 10.1111/twec.12125
- Issue published online: 13 JAN 2014
- Article first published online: 10 DEC 2013
- Chinese National Social Science Foundation. Grant Number: 11BJY142
- Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences. Grant Number: 13JJD790005
- Shanghai Education Development Foundation. Grant Number: 11SG10
- Fudan University. Grant Number: 2011SHKXZD002
- Fudan Youth Teachers. Grant Number: 20520132060
Since China's entry into the WTO, US anti-dumping (AD) actions against China have increased, particularly with respect to multiple petitions. Distinguishing between US single and multiple petitions, we examine the trade effects of US AD actions against China based on an unbalanced panel of quarterly trade data. The results show that a US single petition investigation greatly restrains US imports of the filed products from China but also causes more significant import diversion from non-named countries. In the short run, a preliminary AD duty imposed on China via a US multiple petition not only restrains US imports of the filed products from China but also prevents trade diversion from non-named countries. In the long run, a final AD duty on China resulting from a US multiple petition creates a larger destructive effect on China and causes US import diversion from non-named countries. Thus, a final AD duty imposed on China following a US multiple petition not only harms China's exports but also fails to help the US achieve import substitution. Furthermore, we have been able to reveal the negative trade effect of a preliminary AD duty even in cases where the ultimate decision is not to impose a final duty.