Testing the Effects of Striker Replacement and Employer Implementation of Final Offers on Employer and Union Bargaining Power
Article first published online: 3 JUN 2013
© 2013 Immanuel Ness and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 253–268, June 2013
How to Cite
Dannin, E., Wagar, T., Singh, G. and Dean, M. (2013), Testing the Effects of Striker Replacement and Employer Implementation of Final Offers on Employer and Union Bargaining Power. WorkingUSA, 16: 253–268. doi: 10.1111/wusa.12041
- Issue published online: 3 JUN 2013
- Article first published online: 3 JUN 2013
- collective bargaining;
- experimental economics;
- labor law;
- bargaining power;
Some important issues affecting the workplace cannot be studied directly for a number of reasons. For example, they may subject humans to unacceptable risks; theories may be tested before investing the time and money required for a full study; or funding may be more readily available for a novel investigation after investigators can show that an issue merits study. Simulations were used to compress time and collect enough data to permit robust statistical analysis. In this case, simulations were used to compress time and collect enough data to. Simulations are not without problems, the most important of which is how accurately they capture the collective bargaining issues being studied. This article examines whether the views and actions of the participants in our bargaining simulations reasonably reflect the conduct of actual bargainers. It finds that the participants in the simulation did take on their assigned roles. As a result, not only can this method be useful in exploring issues such as collective bargaining, but it can also potentially be useful for other social science issues.