Do We “do”?
Version of Record online: 11 FEB 2010
© 2005 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.
Volume 29, Issue 1, pages 5–39, January-February 2005
How to Cite
Sloman, S. A. and Lagnado, D. A. (2005), Do We “do”?. Cognitive Science, 29: 5–39. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog2901_2
- Issue online: 11 FEB 2010
- Version of Record online: 11 FEB 2010
- Received 10 June 2003; received in revised form 20 May 2004; accepted 24 May 2004
- Causal models;
- Causal reasoning;
- Bayes nets
A normative framework for modeling causal and counterfactual reasoning has been proposed by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993; cf. Pearl, 2000). The framework takes as fundamental that reasoning from observation and intervention differ. Intervention includes actual manipulation as well as counterfactual manipulation of a model via thought. To represent intervention, Pearl employed the do operator that simplifies the structure of a causal model by disconnecting an intervened-on variable from its normal causes. Construing the do operator as a psychological function affords predictions about how people reason when asked counterfactual questions about causal relations that we refer to as undoing, a family of effects that derive from the claim that intervened-on variables become independent of their normal causes. Six studies support the prediction for causal (A causes B) arguments but not consistently for parallel conditional (if A then B) ones. Two of the studies show that effects are treated as diagnostic when their values are observed but nondiagnostic when they are intervened on. These results cannot be explained by theories that do not distinguish interventions from other sorts of events.