Optimal Taxes on Fossil Fuel in General Equilibrium

Authors

  • Mikhail Golosov,

    1. Dept. of Economics, Princeton University, 111 Fisher Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, U.S.A.; golosov@princeton.edu
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  • John Hassler,

    1. IIES, Stockholm University, SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden; john@hassler.se
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  • Per Krusell,

    1. IIES, Stockholm University, SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden; per.krusell@iies.su.se
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  • Aleh Tsyvinski

    1. Dept. of Economics, Yale, 28 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511, U.S.A.; a.tsyvinski@yale.edu
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    • We thank Lint Barrage, Jiali Cheng, Bill Nordhaus, Jonas Nycander, Tony Smith, Sjak Smulders, and seminar participants at ESSIM, EIEF, EUI, IIES, Mistra-SWECIA, Yale, UCL, CREI, the Environmental Macro Conference at ASU, the EEA Annual Meeting (Glasgow), Fudan University (Shanghai), the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Beijing University, Bonn, Zurich, Carlos III, REDg DGEM (Barcelona), Oxford, Princeton, and Stanford. Golosov and Tsyvinski thank NSF for support and EIEF for their hospitality; Krusell thanks ERC and Mistra-SWECIA for support, and Hassler thanks Mistra-SWECIA and the Swedish Research Council for support.


Abstract

We analyze a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) model with an externality—through climate change—from using fossil energy. Our central result is a simple formula for the marginal externality damage of emissions (or, equivalently, for the optimal carbon tax). This formula, which holds under quite plausible assumptions, reveals that the damage is proportional to current GDP, with the proportion depending only on three factors: (i) discounting, (ii) the expected damage elasticity (how many percent of the output flow is lost from an extra unit of carbon in the atmosphere), and (iii) the structure of carbon depreciation in the atmosphere. Thus, the stochastic values of future output, consumption, and the atmospheric CO2 concentration, as well as the paths of technology (whether endogenous or exogenous) and population, and so on, all disappear from the formula. We find that the optimal tax should be a bit higher than the median, or most well-known, estimates in the literature. We also formulate a parsimonious yet comprehensive and easily solved model allowing us to compute the optimal and market paths for the use of different sources of energy and the corresponding climate change. We find coal—rather than oil—to be the main threat to economic welfare, largely due to its abundance. We also find that the costs of inaction are particularly sensitive to the assumptions regarding the substitutability of different energy sources and technological progress.

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