We are grateful to Amanda Friedenberg, Matthew Jackson, Philippe Mongin, and three anonymous referees for useful comments which greatly improved the paper. All errors are our own.
Preference Aggregation With Incomplete Information
Article first published online: 1 APR 2014
© 2014 The Econometric Society
Volume 82, Issue 2, pages 589–599, March 2014
How to Cite
Chambers, C. P. and Hayashi, T. (2014), Preference Aggregation With Incomplete Information. Econometrica, 82: 589–599. doi: 10.3982/ECTA11612
- Issue published online: 1 APR 2014
- Article first published online: 1 APR 2014
- Manuscript received May, 2013; final revision received December, 2013.
- Social choice;
- incomplete information;
- Harsanyi's theorem
We show in an environment of incomplete information that monotonicity and the Pareto property applied only when there is common knowledge of Pareto dominance imply (i) there must exist a common prior over the smallest common knowledge event, and (ii) aggregation must be ex ante and ex post utilitarian with respect to that common prior and individual von Neumann–Morgenstern utility indices.