Hörner's work on this project began when he was affiliated with Northwestern University.
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
Article first published online: 15 DEC 2008
© 2009 The Econometric Society
Volume 77, Issue 1, pages 29–69, January 2009
How to Cite
Hörner, J. and Vieille, N. (2009), Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons. Econometrica, 77: 29–69. doi: 10.3982/ECTA6917
- Issue published online: 15 DEC 2008
- Article first published online: 15 DEC 2008
- Manuscript received January, 2007; final revision received May, 2008.
- lemons problem
We study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values. Short-run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. When previous offers are observable, bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse. In contrast, when offers are hidden, agreement is always reached, although with delay.