Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring


  • Michihiro Kandori

    1. Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan; kandori@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
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    • I am grateful to a co-editor and anonymous referees for helpful comments. I also thank Arthur J. Chiang for detailed comments and editing assistance. This research was partially supported by MEXT of the Japanese government, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (c) 21530165.


Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have a wide range of applications, but a complete characterization of all equilibria in this class of games has yet to be obtained. The existing literature has identified a relatively tractable subset of equilibria. The present paper introduces the notion of weakly belief-free equilibria for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This is a tractable class which subsumes, as a special case, a major part of the existing literature (the belief-free equilibria). It is shown that this class can outperform the equilibria identified by the previous work.