I am grateful to a co-editor and anonymous referees for helpful comments. I also thank Arthur J. Chiang for detailed comments and editing assistance. This research was partially supported by MEXT of the Japanese government, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (c) 21530165.
Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring
Article first published online: 4 MAY 2011
© 2011 The Econometric Society
Volume 79, Issue 3, pages 877–892, May 2011
How to Cite
Kandori, M. (2011), Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring. Econometrica, 79: 877–892. doi: 10.3982/ECTA8480
- Issue published online: 4 MAY 2011
- Article first published online: 4 MAY 2011
- Manuscript received March, 2009; final revision received October, 2010.
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