We thank the editor and four anonymous referees for detailed comments that led to numerous improvements in the paper. We are also thankful to D. Bergemann, P. Jehiel, A. Kajii, T. Kunimoto, E. Maskin, N. Vieille, and seminar participants at Paris School of Economics, the EEA meeting in Budapest, Princeton University, the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, Rutgers University, McGill University, the World Congress of Game Theory at Northwestern, the Workshop on New Topics in Mechanism Design in Madrid, GRIPS Workshop on Global Games in Tokyo, the PSE-Northwestern joint workshop, and the Recent Developments in Mechanism Design conference held in Princeton. We are especially grateful to S. Morris for helpful remarks and discussions at various stages of this research. Joint authorship of O. Tercieux with D. Bergemann and S. Morris has greatly improved this version; in particular, the notion of interim rationalizable monotonicity was developed in discussions between D. Bergemann, S. Morris, and O. Tercieux. Finally, O. Tercieux thanks the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton for financial support through the Deutsche Bank membership. He is also grateful to the Institute for its hospitality.
Article first published online: 25 JUL 2012
© 2012 The Econometric Society
Volume 80, Issue 4, pages 1605–1637, July 2012
How to Cite
Oury, M. and Tercieux, O. (2012), Continuous Implementation. Econometrica, 80: 1605–1637. doi: 10.3982/ECTA8577
- Issue published online: 25 JUL 2012
- Article first published online: 25 JUL 2012
- Manuscript received May, 2009; final revision received October, 2011.
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