The authors are grateful to the editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions that led to the present version of the paper. We have also benefited from conversations with Bhaskar Dutta, Matt Jackson, Eric Maskin, and Roberto Serrano. Jihong Lee acknowledges financial support from a Korea Research Foundation Grant funded by the Korean Government (KRF-2008-327-B00103).
Efficient Repeated Implementation
Article first published online: 22 NOV 2011
© 2011 The Econometric Society
Volume 79, Issue 6, pages 1967–1994, November 2011
How to Cite
Lee, J. and Sabourian, H. (2011), Efficient Repeated Implementation. Econometrica, 79: 1967–1994. doi: 10.3982/ECTA8859
- Issue published online: 22 NOV 2011
- Article first published online: 22 NOV 2011
- Manuscript received October, 2009; final revision received April, 2011.
- Repeated implementation;
- Nash implementation;
- mixed strategies
This paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function (SCF) with infinitely lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period. An SCF is repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of (possibly history-dependent) mechanisms such that its Nash equilibrium set is nonempty and every equilibrium outcome path results in the desired social choice at every possible history of past play and realizations of uncertainty. We show, with minor qualifications, that in the complete information environment an SCF is repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium if and only if it is efficient. We also discuss several extensions of our analysis.