We thank André Berger, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Rudolf Müller, Seyyed Hossein Naeemi, and Maria Polukarov for very helpful discussions. We also thank Jacob Leshno, Scott Kominers as well as the editor and two anonymous referees for useful comments. Dov Monderer thanks the Israeli Science Foundation (ISF) and the Fund for the Promotion of Research at the Technion. Itai Ashlagi and Avinatan Hassidim acknowledge support from Microsoft Research, where they were consultant researchers during this project.
Monotonicity and Implementability
Article first published online: 12 OCT 2010
© 2010 The Econometric Society
Volume 78, Issue 5, pages 1749–1772, September 2010
How to Cite
Ashlagi, I., Braverman, M., Hassidim, A. and Monderer, D. (2010), Monotonicity and Implementability. Econometrica, 78: 1749–1772. doi: 10.3982/ECTA8882
- Issue published online: 12 OCT 2010
- Article first published online: 12 OCT 2010
- Manuscript received October, 2009; final revision received March, 2010.
- cyclic monotonicity;
- dominant strategies
Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.