I thank the Canada Research Chairs programme and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding this research. I am grateful for several comments and suggestions from the editor and three anonymous referees. I also thank Bernard Lebrun, Ruqu Wang, and audiences at the University of Arizona, the University of Guelph, Queen's University, and the 10th SEAT conference. I thank A. Marcel Oestreich for research assistance.
A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
Version of Record online: 25 SEP 2012
© 2012 The Econometric Society
Volume 80, Issue 5, pages 2349–2364, September 2012
How to Cite
Kirkegaard, R. (2012), A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions. Econometrica, 80: 2349–2364. doi: 10.3982/ECTA9859
- Issue online: 25 SEP 2012
- Version of Record online: 25 SEP 2012
- Manuscript received February, 2011; final revision received December, 2011.
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