We thank Jose Apesteguia, Giuseppe Attanasi, Ghazala Azmat, Miguel A. Ballester, Maite Cabeza, Gary Charness, Vincent P. Crawford, Steffen Huck, Manuel Mosquera, Rosemarie Nagel, Joel Sobel, Karl Schlag, Carmit Segal, anonymous referees, and seminar audiences at Games World Congress, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, University College London, University of Copenhagen, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and University of Michigan, University of California at Berkeley and Maastricht University for their comments. We are grateful to Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Natalia Montinari for their help in running the experiments. Nagore Iriberri acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (ECO2011-25295) and Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2012-31626). Pedro Rey-Biel acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Grant ECO2009-07616), Ministerio de Educación (Grant ECO2012-31962) and Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant 2009SGR-169).
Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?
Article first published online: 18 NOV 2013
Copyright © 2013 Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel
Volume 4, Issue 3, pages 515–547, November 2013
How to Cite
Iriberri, N. and Rey-Biel, P. (2013), Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?. Quantitative Economics, 4: 515–547. doi: 10.3982/QE135
- Issue published online: 18 NOV 2013
- Article first published online: 18 NOV 2013
- Submitted January, 2011. Final version accepted November, 2012.
- Interdependent preferences;
- social welfare maximizing;
- inequity aversion;
- belief elicitation;
- social information;
- mixture-of-types models
Using data from modified dictator games and a mixture-of-types estimation technique, we find a clear relationship between a classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (selfish, social welfare maximizers, inequity averse, and competitive) and the beliefs subjects hold about others' distributive choices in a nonstrategic environment. In particular, selfish individuals fall into false-consensus bias more than other types, as they can hardly conceive that other individuals incur costs so as to change the distribution of payoffs. We also find that selfish individuals are the most robust preference type when repeating play, both when they learn about others' previous choices (social information) and when they do not, while other preference types are more unstable.