We are indebted to five anonymous referees and the co-editor for very helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. We thank Guy Arie, Paul Grieco, Felix Kubler, Andrew McLennan, Walt Pohl, Mark Satterthwaite, Andrew Sommese, Jan Verschelde, and Layne Watson for helpful discussions on the subject. We are very grateful to Jonathan Hauenstein for providing us with many details on the software package Bertini and his patient explanations of the underlying mathematical theory. We are also grateful for comments from seminar audiences at the University of Chicago ICE workshops 2009–2011, the University of Zurich, ESWC 2010 in Shanghai, the University of Fribourg, and the Zurich ICE workshop 2011. Karl Schmedders gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Swiss Finance Institute.
Finding all pure-strategy equilibria in games with continuous strategies
Article first published online: 25 JUL 2012
Copyright © 2012 Kenneth L. Judd, Philipp Renner, and Karl Schmedders
Volume 3, Issue 2, pages 289–331, July 2012
How to Cite
Judd, K. L., Renner, P. and Schmedders, K. (2012), Finding all pure-strategy equilibria in games with continuous strategies. Quantitative Economics, 3: 289–331. doi: 10.3982/QE165
- Issue published online: 25 JUL 2012
- Article first published online: 25 JUL 2012
- Submitted May, 2011. Final version accepted November, 2011.
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