The authors thank three anonymous referees for very helpful comments. We would also like to thank Debraj Ray, Dolors Berga, the seminar participants at the Conference of the Society for Economic Design in Maastricht 2009, and the seminar participants at the 10th Social Choice and Welfare Conference in Moscow 2010 for very helpful comments. Financial support from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Article first published online: 3 OCT 2012
Copyright © 2012 Alexander Reffgen and Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Volume 7, Issue 3, pages 663–688, September 2012
How to Cite
Reffgen, A. and Svensson, L.-G. (2012), Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods. Theoretical Economics, 7: 663–688. doi: 10.3982/TE909
- Issue published online: 3 OCT 2012
- Article first published online: 3 OCT 2012
- Submitted 2010-12-7. Final version accepted 2011-8-25. Available online 2011-8-25.
- Multiple public goods;
- voting under constraints;
- additive preferences;
- separable preferences
In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A1×⋯×Am of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A.