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xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Douglas H. Frank, Tomasz Obloj</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-21T11:48:05.320835-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2148</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2148</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2148</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" id="smj2148-para-0001" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper explores conflicting implications of firm-specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a <i>productivity effect</i> that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting <i>agency effect</i>: FSHC may facilitate more-sophisticated “gaming” of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points <i>lower</i> for high-FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high-FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits.</p></div>
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This paper explores conflicting implications of firm-specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more-sophisticated “gaming” of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high-FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high-FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2149" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>From autonomous strategic behavior to emergent strategy</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2149</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">From autonomous strategic behavior to emergent strategy</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Laurent Mirabeau, Steve Maguire</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-21T11:41:43.468763-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2149</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2149</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2149</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" id="smj2149-para-0001" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This study develops a model of emergent strategy formation at a large telecommunications firm. It integrates prominent traditions in strategy process research – strategy as patterned action; as iterated resource allocation; and as practice – to show how emergent strategy originates as a project through autonomous strategic behavior then subsequently becomes realized as a consequence of mobilizing wider support to provide impetus; manipulating strategic context to legitimate the project by constructing it as consonant with the prevailing concept of strategy; and altering structural context to embed it within organizational units, routines and objectives. The study theorizes the role of ‘practices of strategy articulation’ in emergent strategy formation, and explains why some autonomous strategic behavior becomes ‘ephemeral’ and disappears rather than enduring to become emergent strategy.</p></div>
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This study develops a model of emergent strategy formation at a large telecommunications firm. It integrates prominent traditions in strategy process research – strategy as patterned action; as iterated resource allocation; and as practice – to show how emergent strategy originates as a project through autonomous strategic behavior then subsequently becomes realized as a consequence of mobilizing wider support to provide impetus; manipulating strategic context to legitimate the project by constructing it as consonant with the prevailing concept of strategy; and altering structural context to embed it within organizational units, routines and objectives. The study theorizes the role of ‘practices of strategy articulation’ in emergent strategy formation, and explains why some autonomous strategic behavior becomes ‘ephemeral’ and disappears rather than enduring to become emergent strategy.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2147" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The diffusion of foreign divestment from Burma</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2147</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The diffusion of foreign divestment from Burma</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Sarah A. Soule, Anand Swaminathan, Laszlo Tihanyi</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T12:11:55.089635-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2147</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2147</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2147</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" id="smj2147-para-0001" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We examine variation in the rate of divestment by multinational firms from Burma. We argue that in addition to a set of firm-level characteristics known to impact divestment decisions, firms’ are also influenced by characteristics of their home country, and the divestment patterns of others. Using data on firms operating in Burma during 1996–2002, we model these multiple influences on firms to divest. Our results show that beyond firm-level concerns, firms divest in response to the political characteristics of their home country, including protest, the level of political freedom, and transparency of institutions. We also find that the centrality of their home country in the network of intergovernmental organizations impacts divestment patterns in interesting ways.</p></div>
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We examine variation in the rate of divestment by multinational firms from Burma. We argue that in addition to a set of firm-level characteristics known to impact divestment decisions, firms’ are also influenced by characteristics of their home country, and the divestment patterns of others. Using data on firms operating in Burma during 1996–2002, we model these multiple influences on firms to divest. Our results show that beyond firm-level concerns, firms divest in response to the political characteristics of their home country, including protest, the level of political freedom, and transparency of institutions. We also find that the centrality of their home country in the network of intergovernmental organizations impacts divestment patterns in interesting ways.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2146" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>When bad news is sugar-coated: Information distortion, organizational search and the behavioral theory of the firm</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2146</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">When bad news is sugar-coated: Information distortion, organizational search and the behavioral theory of the firm</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Christina Fang, Ji-Hyun (Jason) Kim, Frances J. Milliken</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-13T12:32:53.959132-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2146</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2146</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2146</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" id="smj2146-para-0001" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Most work in strategy and organization theory assumes that performance feedback is straightforward to interpret and truthfully reported. We raise the following question: How might the systematic distortion of negative performance information affect organizational learning and future performance? We formulate a model where (1) members do not always report the truth about what they know about their performance level, especially when performance is below aspiration and (2) their propensity to distort information is subject to social influence. We find that organizations that are characterized by a high level of information distortion tend to perform more poorly, but that the effect of a low rate of sugar-coating may, in some conditions, be more benign than the literatures seem to suggest.</p></div>
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Most work in strategy and organization theory assumes that performance feedback is straightforward to interpret and truthfully reported. We raise the following question: How might the systematic distortion of negative performance information affect organizational learning and future performance? We formulate a model where (1) members do not always report the truth about what they know about their performance level, especially when performance is below aspiration and (2) their propensity to distort information is subject to social influence. We find that organizations that are characterized by a high level of information distortion tend to perform more poorly, but that the effect of a low rate of sugar-coating may, in some conditions, be more benign than the literatures seem to suggest.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2145" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Concurrent sourcing, governance mechanisms, and performance outcomes in industrial value chains</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2145</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Concurrent sourcing, governance mechanisms, and performance outcomes in industrial value chains</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Jan B. Heide, Alok Kumar, Kenneth H. Wathne</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-13T12:22:38.308144-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2145</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2145</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2145</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" id="smj2145-para-0001" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We examine transaction governance in the context of concurrent sourcing, where a manufacturer relies on sourcing from external suppliers and in-house production simultaneously. Our focus is on (1) a buyer's use of particular safeguards or governance mechanisms vis-à-vis an external supplier, and (2) how the effects of these mechanisms on various performance outcomes are influenced by the joint presence of an internal manufacturing branch. We conduct two studies in the apparel industry, and show that performance outcomes are a joint function of (1) the individual governance mechanisms that are deployed in a particular relationship, and (2) the larger sourcing context (concurrent or singular).</p></div>
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We examine transaction governance in the context of concurrent sourcing, where a manufacturer relies on sourcing from external suppliers and in-house production simultaneously. Our focus is on (1) a buyer's use of particular safeguards or governance mechanisms vis-à-vis an external supplier, and (2) how the effects of these mechanisms on various performance outcomes are influenced by the joint presence of an internal manufacturing branch. We conduct two studies in the apparel industry, and show that performance outcomes are a joint function of (1) the individual governance mechanisms that are deployed in a particular relationship, and (2) the larger sourcing context (concurrent or singular).
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2144" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>How capital structure influences diversification performance: A transaction cost perspective</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2144</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">How capital structure influences diversification performance: A transaction cost perspective</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Jonathan P. O'Brien, Parthiban David, Toru Yoshikawa, Andrew Delios</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-10T08:06:16.210023-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2144</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2144</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2144</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification, but predict opposing performance consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental effects of debt are exacerbated for R&amp;D intensive firms, and that debt is not necessarily harmful to firms that are either contracting or managing a stable portfolio of markets.</p></div>
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Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification, but predict opposing performance consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental effects of debt are exacerbated for R&amp;D intensive firms, and that debt is not necessarily harmful to firms that are either contracting or managing a stable portfolio of markets.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2143" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Knowledge worth having in ‘excess’: The value of tacit and firm-specific human resource slack</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2143</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Knowledge worth having in ‘excess’: The value of tacit and firm-specific human resource slack</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">J.Ramon Lecuona, Markus Reitzig</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-09T10:40:53.112465-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2143</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2143</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2143</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Whether holding resources in excess of what is needed to sustain routine operations (i.e., having slack) increases or decreases firm performance is a question of ongoing interest to management scholars. We contribute to existing theory by arguing that human resource slack generally decreases a firm's performance, but that holding excess numbers of employees who possess important tacit knowledge that is specific to firms may benefit the firm. We find that the value of these excess resources increases as firms face competitive pressures and decreases when firms’ operational choices facilitate the standardization of workflows. We obtain initial empirical evidence for our predictions by testing them on a novel dataset comprising six years of data for 4,070 manufacturing plants in Mexico.</p></div>
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Whether holding resources in excess of what is needed to sustain routine operations (i.e., having slack) increases or decreases firm performance is a question of ongoing interest to management scholars. We contribute to existing theory by arguing that human resource slack generally decreases a firm's performance, but that holding excess numbers of employees who possess important tacit knowledge that is specific to firms may benefit the firm. We find that the value of these excess resources increases as firms face competitive pressures and decreases when firms’ operational choices facilitate the standardization of workflows. We obtain initial empirical evidence for our predictions by testing them on a novel dataset comprising six years of data for 4,070 manufacturing plants in Mexico.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2142" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>When hubs forget, lie, and play favorites: Interpersonal network structure, information distortion, and organizational learning</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2142</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">When hubs forget, lie, and play favorites: Interpersonal network structure, information distortion, and organizational learning</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Melissa A. Schilling, Christina Fang</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-06T12:08:51.179156-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2142</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2142</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2142</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The interpersonal network structure of an organization directly influences the diffusion and recombination of ideas, and can thus facilitate or impede organizational learning. Most interpersonal networks have “ hubs ” – individuals that have significantly more connections than does the average member. This raises important questions about how hubs influence organizational learning outcomes. Does the presence of hubs improve or impair performance? What happens if hubs forget or misrepresent information that is transmitted through the network? Using simulation models, we find that moderately hubby networks outperform both very hubby and democratic networks. We also find that moderate amounts of information omission or misrepresentation can be surprisingly beneficial to performance, though the patterns of their effects are strikingly different.</p></div>
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The interpersonal network structure of an organization directly influences the diffusion and recombination of ideas, and can thus facilitate or impede organizational learning. Most interpersonal networks have “ hubs ” – individuals that have significantly more connections than does the average member. This raises important questions about how hubs influence organizational learning outcomes. Does the presence of hubs improve or impair performance? What happens if hubs forget or misrepresent information that is transmitted through the network? Using simulation models, we find that moderately hubby networks outperform both very hubby and democratic networks. We also find that moderate amounts of information omission or misrepresentation can be surprisingly beneficial to performance, though the patterns of their effects are strikingly different.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2141" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Agglomeration and clustering over the industry life cycle: Towards a dynamic model of geographic concentration</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2141</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Agglomeration and clustering over the industry life cycle: Towards a dynamic model of geographic concentration</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Liang Wang, Anoop Madhok, Stan Xiao Li</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-30T02:11:51.994441-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2141</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2141</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2141</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Research on agglomeration finds that either a higher survival rate of incumbent firms or a higher founding rate of new entrants, or both, can sustain an industry cluster. The conditioning effects of time on the two distinct mechanisms of survival and founding are, however, rarely examined. We argue that the forces driving geographic concentration vary across the industry life cycle. Data from Ontario's winery industry (1865–1974) demonstrates a dynamic model of geographic concentration: agglomeration attracts more new entry in the growth stage <i>only</i>, whereas it contributes to firm survival in the mature stage <i>only</i>. The results not only establish the importance of understanding the temporal dynamics underlying agglomeration externalities, but also provide a possible explanation for the mixed empirical results found in previous studies.</p></div>
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Research on agglomeration finds that either a higher survival rate of incumbent firms or a higher founding rate of new entrants, or both, can sustain an industry cluster. The conditioning effects of time on the two distinct mechanisms of survival and founding are, however, rarely examined. We argue that the forces driving geographic concentration vary across the industry life cycle. Data from Ontario's winery industry (1865–1974) demonstrates a dynamic model of geographic concentration: agglomeration attracts more new entry in the growth stage only, whereas it contributes to firm survival in the mature stage only. The results not only establish the importance of understanding the temporal dynamics underlying agglomeration externalities, but also provide a possible explanation for the mixed empirical results found in previous studies.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2140" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Global integration and innovation: Multi-country knowledge generation within MNCs</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2140</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Global integration and innovation: Multi-country knowledge generation within MNCs</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Heather Berry</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-26T12:17:35.942144-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2140</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2140</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2140</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper examines both conditions that can enable collaborative and combinative knowledge generation within MNCs and benefits that firms can achieve from these types of innovation. I posit that more basic relationships that have been established through manufacturing integration can enable multi-country collaborative innovations and that these innovations will bring together diverse knowledge that is likely to spawn further innovation within firms. Empirical analysis of a panel that includes comprehensive and confidential data on the worldwide operations of US MNCs and their worldwide patents reveal robust support for these arguments. Overall, this paper broadens extant research on knowledge generation within MNCs by exploring both the antecedents and benefits of multi-country collaborative innovations.</p></div>
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This paper examines both conditions that can enable collaborative and combinative knowledge generation within MNCs and benefits that firms can achieve from these types of innovation. I posit that more basic relationships that have been established through manufacturing integration can enable multi-country collaborative innovations and that these innovations will bring together diverse knowledge that is likely to spawn further innovation within firms. Empirical analysis of a panel that includes comprehensive and confidential data on the worldwide operations of US MNCs and their worldwide patents reveal robust support for these arguments. Overall, this paper broadens extant research on knowledge generation within MNCs by exploring both the antecedents and benefits of multi-country collaborative innovations.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2139" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Last dance or second chance? Firm performance, ceo career horizon, and the separation of board leadership roles</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2139</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Last dance or second chance? Firm performance, ceo career horizon, and the separation of board leadership roles</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ryan Krause, Matthew Semadeni</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-26T12:05:23.100239-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2139</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2139</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2139</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In recent years, many firms have chosen to separate their CEO and Board Chair positions. Prior research has demonstrated that there are three forms that a CEO-Board Chair separation can take: apprentice, departure, and demotion. In this paper, we examine the antecedents of these three types. Our results show that the three types of separation each have different profiles in terms of the prior performance of the firm, the independence of the board, and the career horizon of the incumbent CEO. The findings in this paper provide unique insights into the factors that drive boards’ structural choices. As questions about board leadership structure become more nuanced and more relevant in both scholarship and practice, a full understanding of these factors will only become more important.</p></div>
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In recent years, many firms have chosen to separate their CEO and Board Chair positions. Prior research has demonstrated that there are three forms that a CEO-Board Chair separation can take: apprentice, departure, and demotion. In this paper, we examine the antecedents of these three types. Our results show that the three types of separation each have different profiles in terms of the prior performance of the firm, the independence of the board, and the career horizon of the incumbent CEO. The findings in this paper provide unique insights into the factors that drive boards’ structural choices. As questions about board leadership structure become more nuanced and more relevant in both scholarship and practice, a full understanding of these factors will only become more important.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2138" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>When the mirror gets misted up: Modularity and technological change</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2138</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">When the mirror gets misted up: Modularity and technological change</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Andrea Furlan, Anna Cabigiosu, Arnaldo Camuffo</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-25T12:08:06.235705-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2138</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2138</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2138</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This study investigates how component technological change affects the relationship between product modularity and organizational modularity (the across-firm mirroring hypothesis). Studying the air conditioning industry, we show that the across-firm mirroring hypothesis does not hold for technologically dynamic components and the associated supply relationships. In this case, the mirror gets ‘misted up’ with buyers and suppliers having recourse to information sharing even in the presence of highly modular components. Our study contributes to the debate on the organizational implications of modularity and its ramifications for the theory of the firm.</p></div>
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This study investigates how component technological change affects the relationship between product modularity and organizational modularity (the across-firm mirroring hypothesis). Studying the air conditioning industry, we show that the across-firm mirroring hypothesis does not hold for technologically dynamic components and the associated supply relationships. In this case, the mirror gets ‘misted up’ with buyers and suppliers having recourse to information sharing even in the presence of highly modular components. Our study contributes to the debate on the organizational implications of modularity and its ramifications for the theory of the firm.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2137" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Positive and negative synergies between the ceo's and the corporate board's human and social capital:A study of bio-technology firms</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2137</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Positive and negative synergies between the ceo's and the corporate board's human and social capital:A study of bio-technology firms</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Chamu Sundaramurthy, Kuntara Pukthuanthong, Yasemin Kor</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-24T12:21:19.44517-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2137</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2137</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2137</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by developing and testing theory regarding positive and negative synergies between the CEO’s and the board's human and social capital. Using a sample of 360 biotechnology firms that went public between 1995 and 2010, we demonstrate that <i>accumulated</i> public company board experiences of the CEO and the board have positive synergistic effects on IPO performance whereas the <i>current</i> board appointments have negative effects. While scientific educational backgrounds have positive synergies, industry-specific experiences produce either positive or counter-productive effects depending on the age and profitability of the firm. Thus, our paper contributes to the corporate governance and human and social capital literatures by describing the <i>costs and benefits</i> of specific <i>types and combinations</i> of CEO and board capital.</p></div>
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This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by developing and testing theory regarding positive and negative synergies between the CEO’s and the board's human and social capital. Using a sample of 360 biotechnology firms that went public between 1995 and 2010, we demonstrate that accumulated public company board experiences of the CEO and the board have positive synergistic effects on IPO performance whereas the current board appointments have negative effects. While scientific educational backgrounds have positive synergies, industry-specific experiences produce either positive or counter-productive effects depending on the age and profitability of the firm. Thus, our paper contributes to the corporate governance and human and social capital literatures by describing the costs and benefits of specific types and combinations of CEO and board capital.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2132" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>New product deployment: The moderating influence of economic institutional context</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2132</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">New product deployment: The moderating influence of economic institutional context</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">George A. Shinkle, Brian T. McCann</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-18T06:46:16.163867-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2132</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2132</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2132</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research notes and commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We compare the determinants of new product deployment across transition and non-transition economy environments to show the importance of variance in economic institutional context. We argue that the expected positive relationships of institutional development, resource levels, and competitive pressure to new product deployment all weaken in transition economy contexts. Hypotheses are tested with survey data of over 7,000 firms in 7 industries from 33 countries.</p></div>
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We compare the determinants of new product deployment across transition and non-transition economy environments to show the importance of variance in economic institutional context. We argue that the expected positive relationships of institutional development, resource levels, and competitive pressure to new product deployment all weaken in transition economy contexts. Hypotheses are tested with survey data of over 7,000 firms in 7 industries from 33 countries.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2136" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The perils of endogeneity and instrumental variables in strategy research: Understanding through simulations</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2136</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The perils of endogeneity and instrumental variables in strategy research: Understanding through simulations</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Matthew Semadeni, Michael C. Withers, S. Trevis Certo</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-18T05:50:25.081253-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2136</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2136</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2136</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research notes and commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In this paper we use simulations to examine how endogeneity biases the results reported by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In addition, we examine how instrumental variable techniques help to alleviate such bias. Our results demonstrate severe bias at even low levels of endogeneity. Our results also illustrate how instrumental variables produce unbiased coefficient estimates, but instrumental variables are associated with extremely low levels of statistical power. Finally, our simulations highlight how stronger instruments improve statistical power and that endogenous instruments can report results that are inferior to those reported by OLS regression. Based on our results, we provide a series of recommendations for scholars dealing with endogeneity.</p></div>
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In this paper we use simulations to examine how endogeneity biases the results reported by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In addition, we examine how instrumental variable techniques help to alleviate such bias. Our results demonstrate severe bias at even low levels of endogeneity. Our results also illustrate how instrumental variables produce unbiased coefficient estimates, but instrumental variables are associated with extremely low levels of statistical power. Finally, our simulations highlight how stronger instruments improve statistical power and that endogenous instruments can report results that are inferior to those reported by OLS regression. Based on our results, we provide a series of recommendations for scholars dealing with endogeneity.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2133" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Does evidence of network effects in pooled cross-section support prescriptions for network strategy?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2133</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Does evidence of network effects in pooled cross-section support prescriptions for network strategy?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Joel A.C. Baum, Robin Cowan, Nicolas Jonard</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-17T14:12:44.454085-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2133</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2133</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2133</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Strategic prescriptions drawn from pooled cross-sectional evidence of firm performance effects are not necessarily warranted. This is because firm characteristics can in influence both the mean and variance of firm performance. Strategic inferences are warranted if empirically observed effects reflect increases in mean firm performance. If they reflect increases in firm performance variance, however, such inferences are war-ranted only if the increased odds of achieving high performance compensate sufficiently for the concomitantly increased risk of realizing poor performance. Our simulation study, which contrasts firm performance effects in pooled cross-section and within-firm over time, counsels caution when basing strategic prescriptions on pooled cross-section studies of firm performance in general, and in the case of network effects in particular. (115 words)</p></div>
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Strategic prescriptions drawn from pooled cross-sectional evidence of firm performance effects are not necessarily warranted. This is because firm characteristics can in influence both the mean and variance of firm performance. Strategic inferences are warranted if empirically observed effects reflect increases in mean firm performance. If they reflect increases in firm performance variance, however, such inferences are war-ranted only if the increased odds of achieving high performance compensate sufficiently for the concomitantly increased risk of realizing poor performance. Our simulation study, which contrasts firm performance effects in pooled cross-section and within-firm over time, counsels caution when basing strategic prescriptions on pooled cross-section studies of firm performance in general, and in the case of network effects in particular. (115 words)
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2135" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The role of external knowledge sources and organizational design in the process of opportunity exploitation</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2135</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The role of external knowledge sources and organizational design in the process of opportunity exploitation</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Nicolai J. Foss, Jacob Lyngsie, Shaker A. Zahra</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-17T13:14:23.931751-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2135</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2135</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2135</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Research highlights the role of external knowledge sources in the recognition of strategic opportunities, but is less forthcoming with respect to the role of such sources during the process of exploiting or realizing opportunities. We build on the knowledge-based view to propose that realizing opportunities often involves significant interactions with external knowledge sources. Organizational design can facilitate a firm's interactions with these sources, while achieving coordination among organizational members engaged in opportunity exploitation. Our analysis of a double-respondent survey involving 536 Danish firms shows that the use of external knowledge sources is positively associated with opportunity exploitation, but the strength of this association is significantly influenced by organizational designs that enable the firm to access external knowledge during the process of exploiting opportunities.</p></div>
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Research highlights the role of external knowledge sources in the recognition of strategic opportunities, but is less forthcoming with respect to the role of such sources during the process of exploiting or realizing opportunities. We build on the knowledge-based view to propose that realizing opportunities often involves significant interactions with external knowledge sources. Organizational design can facilitate a firm's interactions with these sources, while achieving coordination among organizational members engaged in opportunity exploitation. Our analysis of a double-respondent survey involving 536 Danish firms shows that the use of external knowledge sources is positively associated with opportunity exploitation, but the strength of this association is significantly influenced by organizational designs that enable the firm to access external knowledge during the process of exploiting opportunities.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2134" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Learning by supplying</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2134</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Learning by supplying</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Juan Alcacer, Joanne Oxley</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-17T13:14:02.976857-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2134</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2134</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2134</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Outsourcing in many industries has advanced beyond simple component supply to encompass manufacturing of entire products, often by suppliers in emerging economies. Understanding the evolving role and capabilities of suppliers in global supply chains is thus a pressing strategic issue for suppliers and customers alike. We analyze a novel panel dataset of supply relationships in the mobile telecommunications industry to answer the following questions: What factors contribute to a supplier's ability to build technological and market capabilities? Does it matter <i>to whom</i> the firm supplies? Is involvement in product design important, or is manufacturing the key to learning? Do the same types of relationships that support technological innovation also facilitate successful introduction of own-brand products, or does this require a different ‘locus’ of learning?</p></div>
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Outsourcing in many industries has advanced beyond simple component supply to encompass manufacturing of entire products, often by suppliers in emerging economies. Understanding the evolving role and capabilities of suppliers in global supply chains is thus a pressing strategic issue for suppliers and customers alike. We analyze a novel panel dataset of supply relationships in the mobile telecommunications industry to answer the following questions: What factors contribute to a supplier's ability to build technological and market capabilities? Does it matter to whom the firm supplies? Is involvement in product design important, or is manufacturing the key to learning? Do the same types of relationships that support technological innovation also facilitate successful introduction of own-brand products, or does this require a different ‘locus’ of learning?
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2126" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Cleaning house or jumping ship? Understanding board upheaval following financial fraud</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2126</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Cleaning house or jumping ship? Understanding board upheaval following financial fraud</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Jeremy J. Marcel, Amanda P. Cowen</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-01T11:04:56.405629-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2126</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2126</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2126</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research notes and commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
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<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Boards experience elevated levels of turnover among outside directors following financial fraud. Scholars have proposed two mechanisms that may drive this turnover. The first views turnover as part of a board's efforts to repair organizational legitimacy and avert resource withdrawal. The second argues that turnover is a byproduct of individual directors’ efforts to safeguard their own reputations and mitigate professional devaluation. We use data on director departures following 63 fraud events to explore the relative importance of these two mechanisms. The results clarify our understanding of responses to governance failures and the challenges of reconstituting board membership following financial improprieties.</p></div>
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Boards experience elevated levels of turnover among outside directors following financial fraud. Scholars have proposed two mechanisms that may drive this turnover. The first views turnover as part of a board's efforts to repair organizational legitimacy and avert resource withdrawal. The second argues that turnover is a byproduct of individual directors’ efforts to safeguard their own reputations and mitigate professional devaluation. We use data on director departures following 63 fraud events to explore the relative importance of these two mechanisms. The results clarify our understanding of responses to governance failures and the challenges of reconstituting board membership following financial improprieties.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2125" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Expatriation and its effect on headquarters attention in the multinational enterprise</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2125</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Expatriation and its effect on headquarters attention in the multinational enterprise</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Yves Plourde, Simon C. Parker, Jean-Louis Schaan</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-30T11:38:17.319176-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2125</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2125</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2125</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research notes and commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We explore the circumstances under which expatriates can help their host-subsidiary capture headquarters attention. Our central contention is that expatriates will be particularly helpful in situations where a subsidiary or its market is showing signs of growth, allowing headquarters to recognize information signaling opportunities for the firm that could otherwise go unnoticed. We test this contention using a robust instrumental variable approach in a single multinational enterprise. Our results show that subsidiaries hosting expatriates and experiencing growth at the subsidiary or market level have a higher probability of capturing headquarters attention.</p></div>
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We explore the circumstances under which expatriates can help their host-subsidiary capture headquarters attention. Our central contention is that expatriates will be particularly helpful in situations where a subsidiary or its market is showing signs of growth, allowing headquarters to recognize information signaling opportunities for the firm that could otherwise go unnoticed. We test this contention using a robust instrumental variable approach in a single multinational enterprise. Our results show that subsidiaries hosting expatriates and experiencing growth at the subsidiary or market level have a higher probability of capturing headquarters attention.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2124" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The influence of lead indicator strength on the use of nonfinancial measures in performance evaluation: Evidence from CEO compensation schemes</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2124</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The influence of lead indicator strength on the use of nonfinancial measures in performance evaluation: Evidence from CEO compensation schemes</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Vincent O'Connell, Don O'Sullivan</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-28T11:16:57.852649-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2124</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2124</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2124</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Nonfinancial measures (NFMs) are a common feature of strategic performance management frameworks. We examine the role of one widely used NFM: customer satisfaction, in one aspect of strategic performance management: CEO compensation schemes. Drawing on agency theory precepts, we hypothesize that the extent to which firms link CEO compensation to customer satisfaction is influenced by satisfaction's ability to act as a leading indicator of future profitability (lead indicator strength). We further hypothesize that the extent to which customer satisfaction's lead indicator strength influences the weighting of satisfaction in CEO compensation schemes has a positive influence on future shareholder value. Our empirical results offer strong support for both hypotheses and extend research on the use and efficacy of NFMs in CEO compensation schemes.</p></div>
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Nonfinancial measures (NFMs) are a common feature of strategic performance management frameworks. We examine the role of one widely used NFM: customer satisfaction, in one aspect of strategic performance management: CEO compensation schemes. Drawing on agency theory precepts, we hypothesize that the extent to which firms link CEO compensation to customer satisfaction is influenced by satisfaction's ability to act as a leading indicator of future profitability (lead indicator strength). We further hypothesize that the extent to which customer satisfaction's lead indicator strength influences the weighting of satisfaction in CEO compensation schemes has a positive influence on future shareholder value. Our empirical results offer strong support for both hypotheses and extend research on the use and efficacy of NFMs in CEO compensation schemes.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2123" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Structural equality at the top of the corporation: Mandated quotas for women directors</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2123</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Structural equality at the top of the corporation: Mandated quotas for women directors</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Bruce Kogut, Jordi Colomer, Mariano Belinky</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-27T11:20:53.109337-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2123</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2123</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2123</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research notes and commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We propose a concept of structural equality as a compromise between competing policy preferences of equality and individual liberty to address a stunning property of the governance of corporations, namely, the paucity of female directors in corporate boards. An argument for imposing a quota for women directors on boards is the need to disrupt structural impediments to permit endogenous mechanisms to sustain female recruitment beyond a critical mass. Using estimates from the Norwegian experiment, we apply an agent-based model to American board data to show that modest numerical quotas generate well-connected networks of women directors who attain equality in their centrality and influence. The analysis demonstrates the utility of computational social science for identifying policies that generate alternative and possible worlds of greater structural equality.</p></div>
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We propose a concept of structural equality as a compromise between competing policy preferences of equality and individual liberty to address a stunning property of the governance of corporations, namely, the paucity of female directors in corporate boards. An argument for imposing a quota for women directors on boards is the need to disrupt structural impediments to permit endogenous mechanisms to sustain female recruitment beyond a critical mass. Using estimates from the Norwegian experiment, we apply an agent-based model to American board data to show that modest numerical quotas generate well-connected networks of women directors who attain equality in their centrality and influence. The analysis demonstrates the utility of computational social science for identifying policies that generate alternative and possible worlds of greater structural equality.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2121" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Takeover defenses as drivers of innovation and value-creation</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2121</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Takeover defenses as drivers of innovation and value-creation</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Mark Humphery-Jenner</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-21T13:40:49.07619-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2121</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2121</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2121</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The desirability of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) is a contentious issue. ATPs might enable managerial empire building by insulating managers from disciplinary takeovers. However, some companies, such as ‘hard-to-value’ (HTV) companies, might trade at a discount due to valuation difficulties, thereby exposing HTV companies to opportunistic takeovers, and creating agency conflicts of managerial risk-aversion. ATPs might ameliorate such managerial risk aversion by inhibiting opportunistic takeovers. This paper analyzes acquisitions made by HTV firms, focusing on whether the acquirer (not the target) is entrenched in order to examine the impact of entrenchment managerial decision-making. The results show that HTV firms that are entrenched make acquisitions that generate more shareholder wealth and are more likely to increase corporate innovation, suggesting that ATPs can be beneficial in some firms.</p></div>
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The desirability of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) is a contentious issue. ATPs might enable managerial empire building by insulating managers from disciplinary takeovers. However, some companies, such as ‘hard-to-value’ (HTV) companies, might trade at a discount due to valuation difficulties, thereby exposing HTV companies to opportunistic takeovers, and creating agency conflicts of managerial risk-aversion. ATPs might ameliorate such managerial risk aversion by inhibiting opportunistic takeovers. This paper analyzes acquisitions made by HTV firms, focusing on whether the acquirer (not the target) is entrenched in order to examine the impact of entrenchment managerial decision-making. The results show that HTV firms that are entrenched make acquisitions that generate more shareholder wealth and are more likely to increase corporate innovation, suggesting that ATPs can be beneficial in some firms.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2120" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Performance of acquirers of divested assets: evidence from the U.S. Software industry</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2120</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Performance of acquirers of divested assets: evidence from the U.S. Software industry</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Tomi Laamanen, Matthias Brauer, Olli Junna</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-14T15:37:07.172136-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2120</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2120</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2120</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research notes and commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We provide a comparative analysis of acquirer returns in acquisitions of public firms, private firms, and divested assets. On the basis of a sample of 5079 acquisitions by U.S. software industry companies during 1988–2008, we find that acquisitions of divested assets outperform acquisitions of privately held firms, which in turn outperform acquisitions of publicly held firms. While the higher returns for acquisitions of divested assets relative to stand-alone acquisition targets can be explained by market efficiency arguments, seller distress and improved asset fit further enhance the positive returns of acquirers of divested assets consistent with the relative bargaining power explanation. Finally, we find that the effects of these buyer bargaining advantages are mutually strengthening and that they also hold for longer-term acquirer performance.</p></div>
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We provide a comparative analysis of acquirer returns in acquisitions of public firms, private firms, and divested assets. On the basis of a sample of 5079 acquisitions by U.S. software industry companies during 1988–2008, we find that acquisitions of divested assets outperform acquisitions of privately held firms, which in turn outperform acquisitions of publicly held firms. While the higher returns for acquisitions of divested assets relative to stand-alone acquisition targets can be explained by market efficiency arguments, seller distress and improved asset fit further enhance the positive returns of acquirers of divested assets consistent with the relative bargaining power explanation. Finally, we find that the effects of these buyer bargaining advantages are mutually strengthening and that they also hold for longer-term acquirer performance.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2107" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Resource allocation strategy for innovation portfolio management</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2107</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Resource allocation strategy for innovation portfolio management</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ronald Klingebiel, Christian Rammer</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-15T12:17:29.274428-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2107</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2107</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2107</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Our study demonstrates empirically that the choice of resource allocation strategy affects innovation performance. Allocating resources to a broader range of innovation projects increases new product sales, an effect that appears to outweigh that of resource intensity. In addition, we find that the performance benefit of breadth is higher for firms that allocate resources selectively at later stages of the innovation process. This breadth-selectiveness effect is greatest for firms intending to create relatively more novel products, departing further from their knowledge base. Based on these results, we theorize that breadth increases performance because it spreads firms’ bets on unproven innovative endeavors. Limiting resource commitments by selecting out deteriorating projects prevents an escalation in the costs of breadth. This advantage increases with the uncertainty implicit in greater innovative intent. The paper thus contributes to theory of how resource allocation strategies influence performance outcomes of innovation project portfolios.</p></div>
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Our study demonstrates empirically that the choice of resource allocation strategy affects innovation performance. Allocating resources to a broader range of innovation projects increases new product sales, an effect that appears to outweigh that of resource intensity. In addition, we find that the performance benefit of breadth is higher for firms that allocate resources selectively at later stages of the innovation process. This breadth-selectiveness effect is greatest for firms intending to create relatively more novel products, departing further from their knowledge base. Based on these results, we theorize that breadth increases performance because it spreads firms’ bets on unproven innovative endeavors. Limiting resource commitments by selecting out deteriorating projects prevents an escalation in the costs of breadth. This advantage increases with the uncertainty implicit in greater innovative intent. The paper thus contributes to theory of how resource allocation strategies influence performance outcomes of innovation project portfolios.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2106" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Media coverage and location choice</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2106</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Media coverage and location choice</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Elena Kulchina</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-15T11:29:32.501918-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2106</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2106</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2106</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Emphasizing the importance of informed location choice, prior strategy research has examined how private information about locations affects foreign direct investment. Publicly available media information has received little attention, however, perhaps because its impact on location choice is expected to be trivial. This study examines the relationship between the extent of a location's media coverage and the number of entering foreign firms in Russia, using a novel instrumental variable for media coverage, a major anniversary of a city's establishment date. The results suggest that extensive foreign media coverage of a city increases the number of foreign entrants. This effect is stronger for firms with less private information about Russian cities, i.e., more socially and geographically distant firms and foreign entrepreneurs.</p></div>
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Emphasizing the importance of informed location choice, prior strategy research has examined how private information about locations affects foreign direct investment. Publicly available media information has received little attention, however, perhaps because its impact on location choice is expected to be trivial. This study examines the relationship between the extent of a location's media coverage and the number of entering foreign firms in Russia, using a novel instrumental variable for media coverage, a major anniversary of a city's establishment date. The results suggest that extensive foreign media coverage of a city increases the number of foreign entrants. This effect is stronger for firms with less private information about Russian cities, i.e., more socially and geographically distant firms and foreign entrepreneurs.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2088" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The influence of relative values of outside director stock options on firm strategic risk from a multi-agent perspective</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2088</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The influence of relative values of outside director stock options on firm strategic risk from a multi-agent perspective</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Elizabeth N. K. Lim, Brian T. Mccann</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-01T03:08:34.823296-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2088</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2088</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2088</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Prior work has examined the effects of absolute levels of outside director stock option grants on risk behavior without recognizing that relative stock option values could differentially affect risk-taking. Drawing from the house money effect perspective, we extend this literature by examining how positive deviation from prior outside director option grants values influence firm strategic risk. Additionally we draw from the behavioral agency model and the power literature to develop a multi-agent contingency framework suggesting the effect of positive director pay deviation depends on the incentives and power of CEOs reflected in CEO stock ownership and CEO duality respectively. Our empirical results indicate positive pay deviation has a positive effect on firm risk-taking while high ownership and duality independently and jointly weaken this base relationship.</p></div>
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Prior work has examined the effects of absolute levels of outside director stock option grants on risk behavior without recognizing that relative stock option values could differentially affect risk-taking. Drawing from the house money effect perspective, we extend this literature by examining how positive deviation from prior outside director option grants values influence firm strategic risk. Additionally we draw from the behavioral agency model and the power literature to develop a multi-agent contingency framework suggesting the effect of positive director pay deviation depends on the incentives and power of CEOs reflected in CEO stock ownership and CEO duality respectively. Our empirical results indicate positive pay deviation has a positive effect on firm risk-taking while high ownership and duality independently and jointly weaken this base relationship.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2061" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Assignment of Call Option Rights between Partners in International Joint Ventures</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2061</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Assignment of Call Option Rights between Partners in International Joint Ventures</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Tony W. Tong, Sali Li</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-28T08:56:04.588192-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2061</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2061</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2061</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We examine call option rights as a contractual clause in international joint ventures (IJVs) and propose that the assignment of the call option right in an IJV is determined by certain ex ante asymmetries between the partners.  Results show that between the two partners in an IJV, the firm with greater complementarity with the venture and greater prior IJV experience is more likely to hold the call option right; in addition, the firm's contractual choice on the call option right and its ownership choice on a greater initial equity stake are substitutive.  Our focus on explicit call options advances the real options theory of collaborative agreements and our results also highlight that option rights be considered an important part of alliance design.</p></div>
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We examine call option rights as a contractual clause in international joint ventures (IJVs) and propose that the assignment of the call option right in an IJV is determined by certain ex ante asymmetries between the partners.  Results show that between the two partners in an IJV, the firm with greater complementarity with the venture and greater prior IJV experience is more likely to hold the call option right; in addition, the firm's contractual choice on the call option right and its ownership choice on a greater initial equity stake are substitutive.  Our focus on explicit call options advances the real options theory of collaborative agreements and our results also highlight that option rights be considered an important part of alliance design.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2045" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Vertical integration, innovation and alliance portfolio size: Implications for firm performance1</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2045</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Vertical integration, innovation and alliance portfolio size: Implications for firm performance1</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Nandini Lahiri, Sriram Narayanan</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-25T11:56:21.256199-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2045</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2045</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2045</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In this paper, we examine the consequences of alliance portfolio configuration. In particular, we focus on understanding contingencies that affect the impact of alliance portfolio size on both financial and innovation performance. While increasing alliance portfolio size is expected to positively impact both innovation and financial performance, we propose that at high levels of innovation of the focal firm, increasing alliance portfolio size has a dampening effect on financial performance. We also propose that firm boundaries moderate the impact of alliance portfolio size on innovation performance and financial performance, differently. Specifically, vertically integrated firms are better able to leverage increasing alliance portfolio size towards financial performance compared to their vertically specialized counterparts. In contrast, vertically integrated firms benefit less than their vertically specialized counterparts in innovation performance from increasing alliance portfolio size. Our analysis suggests that both vertical scope and innovation levels of the firm play an important role in understanding how alliance portfolios impact performance.</p></div>
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In this paper, we examine the consequences of alliance portfolio configuration. In particular, we focus on understanding contingencies that affect the impact of alliance portfolio size on both financial and innovation performance. While increasing alliance portfolio size is expected to positively impact both innovation and financial performance, we propose that at high levels of innovation of the focal firm, increasing alliance portfolio size has a dampening effect on financial performance. We also propose that firm boundaries moderate the impact of alliance portfolio size on innovation performance and financial performance, differently. Specifically, vertically integrated firms are better able to leverage increasing alliance portfolio size towards financial performance compared to their vertically specialized counterparts. In contrast, vertically integrated firms benefit less than their vertically specialized counterparts in innovation performance from increasing alliance portfolio size. Our analysis suggests that both vertical scope and innovation levels of the firm play an important role in understanding how alliance portfolios impact performance.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2122" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Weak links and the management of reputational interdependencies</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2122</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Weak links and the management of reputational interdependencies</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Emmanuelle Fauchart, Robin Cowan</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-21T10:40:49.267883-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2122</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2122</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2122</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This paper builds on a growing literature that takes into account the fact that firms in an industry may be interdependent with regard to their corporate reputations, thus sharing a “reputation commons.” We argue that the theory of public goods can help us to understand the interdependencies that link corporate reputations and to frame the contexts and requirements for collective action that they induce. In particular, we suggest that more and more frequently these interdependencies make industry reputation a “weak link” public good. We show that this raises new challenges for the strategic management of industry reputation by communities of firms. The discussion of these challenges is based on the case study of the collective action of the European chlorine companies towards restoring their reputation after being accused of not being safe, and on a model of the production of reputation by companies</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This paper builds on a growing literature that takes into account the fact that firms in an industry may be interdependent with regard to their corporate reputations, thus sharing a “reputation commons.” We argue that the theory of public goods can help us to understand the interdependencies that link corporate reputations and to frame the contexts and requirements for collective action that they induce. In particular, we suggest that more and more frequently these interdependencies make industry reputation a “weak link” public good. We show that this raises new challenges for the strategic management of industry reputation by communities of firms. The discussion of these challenges is based on the case study of the collective action of the European chlorine companies towards restoring their reputation after being accused of not being safe, and on a model of the production of reputation by companies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2108" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Toward more accurate contextualization of the CEO effect on firm performance</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2108</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Toward more accurate contextualization of the CEO effect on firm performance</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Donald C. Hambrick, Timothy J. Quigley</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-17T12:07:14.938769-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2108</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2108</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2108</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We introduce multiple refinements to the standard method for assessing CEO effects on performance, variance partitioning methodology, more accurately contextualizing CEOs' contributions. Based on a large 20-year sample, our new ‘CEO in Context’ technique points to a much larger aggregate CEO effect than is obtained from typical approaches. As a validation test, we show that our technique yields estimates of CEO effects more in line with what would be expected from accepted theory about CEO influence on performance. We do this by examining the CEO effects in subsamples of low-, medium-, and high-discretion industries. Finally, we show that our technique generates substantially different—and we argue more logical—estimates of the effects of many individual CEOs than are obtained through customary analyses</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We introduce multiple refinements to the standard method for assessing CEO effects on performance, variance partitioning methodology, more accurately contextualizing CEOs' contributions. Based on a large 20-year sample, our new ‘CEO in Context’ technique points to a much larger aggregate CEO effect than is obtained from typical approaches. As a validation test, we show that our technique yields estimates of CEO effects more in line with what would be expected from accepted theory about CEO influence on performance. We do this by examining the CEO effects in subsamples of low-, medium-, and high-discretion industries. Finally, we show that our technique generates substantially different—and we argue more logical—estimates of the effects of many individual CEOs than are obtained through customary analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2114" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Beating competitors to international markets: The value of geographically balanced networks for innovation</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2114</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Beating competitors to international markets: The value of geographically balanced networks for innovation</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Pankaj C. Patel, Stephanie A. Fernhaber, Patricia P. McDougall-Covin, Robert P. van der Have</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-17T12:06:26.239421-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2114</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2114</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2114</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Being able to launch new products internationally is critical for technology-based ventures to recoup the high costs of R&amp;D and to exploit their innovations fully. Despite the widely recognized importance of networks within the innovation development process, there appear to be contrasting viewpoints as to whether local or foreign network partners contribute more in the race to internationalize. Drawing on the theoretical underpinnings of comparative advantage, we propose and empirically confirm that ventures pursuing a balance of local</em> and <em>foreign network connections for the development of an innovation are able to bring the product more rapidly into the international marketplace. Furthermore, both innovation complexity and industry clockspeed heighten the importance of geographic network balance to the speed of product internationalization</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Being able to launch new products internationally is critical for technology-based ventures to recoup the high costs of R&amp;D and to exploit their innovations fully. Despite the widely recognized importance of networks within the innovation development process, there appear to be contrasting viewpoints as to whether local or foreign network partners contribute more in the race to internationalize. Drawing on the theoretical underpinnings of comparative advantage, we propose and empirically confirm that ventures pursuing a balance of local and foreign network connections for the development of an innovation are able to bring the product more rapidly into the international marketplace. Furthermore, both innovation complexity and industry clockspeed heighten the importance of geographic network balance to the speed of product internationalization. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2105" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Reciprocity and R&amp;D search: Applying the behavioral theory of the firm to a communitarian context</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2105</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Reciprocity and R&amp;D search: Applying the behavioral theory of the firm to a communitarian context</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Jonathan P. O'Brien, Parthiban David</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-15T11:29:56.40222-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2105</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2105</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2105</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We propose that the behavioral theory of the firm perspective on R&amp;D search requires modification when applied to “communitarian” cultures such as Japan because reciprocity and embeddedness can influence the search decision. When performance exceeds aspirations, communitarian-oriented firms are more inclined to use their privileged position to help their less fortunate stakeholders by engaging in additional R&amp;D search that should yield greater payoffs for these stakeholders in the future. Our results indicate that while Japanese firms engage in “problemistic” search in a manner similar to what has been found in other contexts, they respond differently when performance exceeds expectations. We find that as performance rises above aspirations, communitarian-oriented firms raise R&amp;D search to a greater extent than do firms that lack a communitarian orientation</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>We propose that the behavioral theory of the firm perspective on R&amp;D search requires modification when applied to “communitarian” cultures such as Japan because reciprocity and embeddedness can influence the search decision. When performance exceeds aspirations, communitarian-oriented firms are more inclined to use their privileged position to help their less fortunate stakeholders by engaging in additional R&amp;D search that should yield greater payoffs for these stakeholders in the future. Our results indicate that while Japanese firms engage in “problemistic” search in a manner similar to what has been found in other contexts, they respond differently when performance exceeds expectations. We find that as performance rises above aspirations, communitarian-oriented firms raise R&amp;D search to a greater extent than do firms that lack a communitarian orientation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2096" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Integrated market and nonmarket strategies: Political campaign contributions around merger and acquisition events in the energy sector</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2096</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Integrated market and nonmarket strategies: Political campaign contributions around merger and acquisition events in the energy sector</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Guy L. F. Holburn, Richard G. Vanden Bergh</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-15T11:29:39.533411-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2096</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2096</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2096</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We examine how firms use political strategies to protect economic rents created by mergers and acquisitions against dissipation by regulators. In regulated industries, regulators can impose costly merger conditions, for instance consumer rate reductions in the utilities sector, thereby reducing shareholder gains. We investigate empirically whether and how firms use election campaign contributions to politicians as a method of influencing regulatory merger approvals. In a statistical analysis of campaign contributions by all electric utilities from 1998 to 2006, we find that utilities increased their contributions in the year before they announced a merger and that merging utilities increased their contributions more in states with greater political party competition. Our findings contribute to political strategy research by providing novel evidence that firms integrate market and nonmarket strategies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd</em>.</p></div>
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We examine how firms use political strategies to protect economic rents created by mergers and acquisitions against dissipation by regulators. In regulated industries, regulators can impose costly merger conditions, for instance consumer rate reductions in the utilities sector, thereby reducing shareholder gains. We investigate empirically whether and how firms use election campaign contributions to politicians as a method of influencing regulatory merger approvals. In a statistical analysis of campaign contributions by all electric utilities from 1998 to 2006, we find that utilities increased their contributions in the year before they announced a merger and that merging utilities increased their contributions more in states with greater political party competition. Our findings contribute to political strategy research by providing novel evidence that firms integrate market and nonmarket strategies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2104" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Chief strategy officers: Contingency analysis of their presence in top management teams</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2104</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Chief strategy officers: Contingency analysis of their presence in top management teams</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Markus Menz, Christine Scheef</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-11T10:46:23.551738-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2104</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2104</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2104</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Drawing upon contingency theory, we analyze the antecedents and performance consequences of chief strategy officer (CSO) presence in top management teams (TMTs). We argue that strategic and structural complexity affects the decision to have a CSO in the TMT and its effect on firm performance. The results of a sample of S&amp;P 500 firms over a five-year period reveal that diversification, acquisition activity, and TMT role interdependence are positively associated with CSO presence. However, we also find that the structural choice to have a CSO in the TMT does not significantly affect a firm's financial performance. This first systematic analysis of CSO presence informs research on CSOs and contributes to the emerging literature on TMT structure</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Drawing upon contingency theory, we analyze the antecedents and performance consequences of chief strategy officer (CSO) presence in top management teams (TMTs). We argue that strategic and structural complexity affects the decision to have a CSO in the TMT and its effect on firm performance. The results of a sample of S&amp;P 500 firms over a five-year period reveal that diversification, acquisition activity, and TMT role interdependence are positively associated with CSO presence. However, we also find that the structural choice to have a CSO in the TMT does not significantly affect a firm's financial performance. This first systematic analysis of CSO presence informs research on CSOs and contributes to the emerging literature on TMT structure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2119" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Risk abatement as a strategy for R&amp;D investments in family firms</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2119</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Risk abatement as a strategy for R&amp;D investments in family firms</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Pankaj C. Patel, James J. Chrisman</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-10T11:31:31.83472-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2119</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2119</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2119</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>The behavioral agency model suggests family firms invest less in R&amp;D than nonfamily firms to protect their socioemotional wealth. Studies support this contention but do not explain how family firms make R&amp;D investments. We hypothesize that when performance exceeds aspirations, family firms manage socioemotional and economic objectives by making exploitative R&amp;D investments that lead to more reliable and less risky sales levels. However, performance below aspirations leads to exploratory R&amp;D investments that result in potentially higher but less reliable sales levels. Using a risk abatement model, our analyses of 847 firms over 10 years supports our hypotheses</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>The behavioral agency model suggests family firms invest less in R&amp;D than nonfamily firms to protect their socioemotional wealth. Studies support this contention but do not explain how family firms make R&amp;D investments. We hypothesize that when performance exceeds aspirations, family firms manage socioemotional and economic objectives by making exploitative R&amp;D investments that lead to more reliable and less risky sales levels. However, performance below aspirations leads to exploratory R&amp;D investments that result in potentially higher but less reliable sales levels. Using a risk abatement model, our analyses of 847 firms over 10 years supports our hypotheses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2118" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Strategic rationale for responding to extra-jurisdictional regulation: Evidence from firm adoption of renewable power in the US</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2118</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Strategic rationale for responding to extra-jurisdictional regulation: Evidence from firm adoption of renewable power in the US</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Adam R. Fremeth, J. Myles Shaver</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-10T11:30:49.414053-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2118</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2118</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2118</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>It is well documented that firms respond to regulations in their home jurisdictions. We present hypotheses that firms also respond to regulations in jurisdictions where they do not operate. We examine renewable-power provision in the U.S. electric utility sector between 2001 and 2006, and find that firms adopt more renewable-power generation when their peers (i.e., firms in the same regulatory jurisdiction) face greater renewable-power standards in other jurisdictions. The underlying mechanism is that forward-looking firms assess when extrajurisdictional regulations foreshadow regulatory changes where they operate. Our analyses support this mechanism versus plausible alternatives. We demonstrate firms acting strategically to respond to extrajurisdictional regulations and show that the central conduit motivating this response is the extrajurisdictional footprint of firms operating in the same jurisdiction as a focal firm</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>It is well documented that firms respond to regulations in their home jurisdictions. We present hypotheses that firms also respond to regulations in jurisdictions where they do not operate. We examine renewable-power provision in the U.S. electric utility sector between 2001 and 2006, and find that firms adopt more renewable-power generation when their peers (i.e., firms in the same regulatory jurisdiction) face greater renewable-power standards in other jurisdictions. The underlying mechanism is that forward-looking firms assess when extrajurisdictional regulations foreshadow regulatory changes where they operate. Our analyses support this mechanism versus plausible alternatives. We demonstrate firms acting strategically to respond to extrajurisdictional regulations and show that the central conduit motivating this response is the extrajurisdictional footprint of firms operating in the same jurisdiction as a focal firm. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2115" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Surviving bear hugs: Firm capability, large partner alliances, and growth</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2115</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Surviving bear hugs: Firm capability, large partner alliances, and growth</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ramin Vandaie, Akbar Zaheer</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-10T11:30:27.722827-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2115</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2115</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2115</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>In exploring the downsides of partnering with large firms, extant literature has typically focused on the external perspective and the alliance characteristics of small firms. We argue that jointly considering the internal dimension of firm capability together with the external perspective promises to yield a fuller understanding of the nature and consequences of a small firm's relationships with large partners. We analyze a longitudinal dataset on the alliance activities and growth of small, independent studios in the U.S. motion picture industry during 1990–2010. Our findings indicate that small firms that engage in higher levels of alliance activity with large partners, i.e., the major studios, realize lower growth benefits from their internal capability</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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In exploring the downsides of partnering with large firms, extant literature has typically focused on the external perspective and the alliance characteristics of small firms. We argue that jointly considering the internal dimension of firm capability together with the external perspective promises to yield a fuller understanding of the nature and consequences of a small firm's relationships with large partners. We analyze a longitudinal dataset on the alliance activities and growth of small, independent studios in the U.S. motion picture industry during 1990–2010. Our findings indicate that small firms that engage in higher levels of alliance activity with large partners, i.e., the major studios, realize lower growth benefits from their internal capability. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2116" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Unmixed signals: How reputation and status affect alliance formation</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2116</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Unmixed signals: How reputation and status affect alliance formation</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ithai Stern, Janet M. Dukerich, Edward Zajac</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-10T11:00:15.64322-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2116</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2116</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2116</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We analyze how incumbents in technology-driven industries are influenced by founders' reputation and status when considering strategic alliances with newly emerging firms. We theorize that reputation and status represent two distinct components of perceived quality that exert independent and interdependent effects on alliance formation. Using literature on impression formation processes to derive predictions of signal congruence, we argue that the independent effects of reputation and status are amplified when the two are congruent, and that the effect of negative congruence (both reputation and status are low) is stronger than positive congruence (both are high). We find support for our arguments based on panel data on alliances between pharma and biotech firms, using data on biotech scientists' research output (reputation) and university attended (status)</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We analyze how incumbents in technology-driven industries are influenced by founders' reputation and status when considering strategic alliances with newly emerging firms. We theorize that reputation and status represent two distinct components of perceived quality that exert independent and interdependent effects on alliance formation. Using literature on impression formation processes to derive predictions of signal congruence, we argue that the independent effects of reputation and status are amplified when the two are congruent, and that the effect of negative congruence (both reputation and status are low) is stronger than positive congruence (both are high). We find support for our arguments based on panel data on alliances between pharma and biotech firms, using data on biotech scientists' research output (reputation) and university attended (status). Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2097" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Knowing when to leap: Transitioning between exploitative and explorative R&amp;D</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2097</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Knowing when to leap: Transitioning between exploitative and explorative R&amp;D</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ram Mudambi, Tim Swift</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-07T09:34:26.140211-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2097</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2097</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2097</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>A common perspective is that consistent R&amp;D investment facilitates innovation, while volatile spending implies myopic decision making. However, the benefits to exploiting extant competencies eventually erode, so firms must disrupt their R&amp;D function and explore for new competitive advantage. We suggest that high-performing firms recognize when extant competencies decline and increase exploratory R&amp;D to develop new competencies at the appropriate time. We find that changes in R&amp;D expenditure away from the firm's historic trend, in either direction, are indicative of transitions between exploitative and exploratory R&amp;D and are associated with increased firm performance. Increases in R&amp;D expenditure above the trend are associated with an increased likelihood of highly cited patents, suggesting that firms are making the leap between R&amp;D-based exploitation and exploration</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>A common perspective is that consistent R&amp;D investment facilitates innovation, while volatile spending implies myopic decision making. However, the benefits to exploiting extant competencies eventually erode, so firms must disrupt their R&amp;D function and explore for new competitive advantage. We suggest that high-performing firms recognize when extant competencies decline and increase exploratory R&amp;D to develop new competencies at the appropriate time. We find that changes in R&amp;D expenditure away from the firm's historic trend, in either direction, are indicative of transitions between exploitative and exploratory R&amp;D and are associated with increased firm performance. Increases in R&amp;D expenditure above the trend are associated with an increased likelihood of highly cited patents, suggesting that firms are making the leap between R&amp;D-based exploitation and exploration. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2127" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Difference in degrees: CEO characteristics and firm environmental disclosure</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2127</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Difference in degrees: CEO characteristics and firm environmental disclosure</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ben W. Lewis, Judith L. Walls, Glen W. S. Dowell</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-07T09:34:20.706855-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2127</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2127</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2127</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We contribute to the literature on firms' responses to institutional pressures and environmental information disclosure. We hypothesize that CEO characteristics such as education and tenure will influence firms' likelihood to voluntarily disclose environmental information. We test our hypotheses by examining firms' responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms led by newly appointed CEOs and CEOs with MBA degrees are more likely to respond to the CDP, while those led by lawyers are less likely to respond. Our results have implications for research on strategic responses to institutional pressures and corporate environmental performance</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We contribute to the literature on firms' responses to institutional pressures and environmental information disclosure. We hypothesize that CEO characteristics such as education and tenure will influence firms' likelihood to voluntarily disclose environmental information. We test our hypotheses by examining firms' responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms led by newly appointed CEOs and CEOs with MBA degrees are more likely to respond to the CDP, while those led by lawyers are less likely to respond. Our results have implications for research on strategic responses to institutional pressures and corporate environmental performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2102" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2102</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Francisco J. Mas-Ruiz, Felipe Ruiz-Moreno, Antonio Ladrón de Guevara Martínez</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-07T09:32:48.552839-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2102</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2102</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2102</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Our study examines asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups defined according to the size of their members. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group-level effects, including switching costs and efficiency, strategic groups comprising large firms expect to experience a large amount of retaliation from firms within their group and accommodation from the group comprising smaller firms. Small firms, on the other hand, expect to experience a small amount of retaliation from the group comprising large firms and no reaction from the other firms in their group. We estimate the effect of group-level strategic interactions on firm performance. Our analysis reveals that the rivalry behavior within and between groups is asymmetric, which supports the dominant-fringe relation between firms, as described in our hypothesis</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Our study examines asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups defined according to the size of their members. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group-level effects, including switching costs and efficiency, strategic groups comprising large firms expect to experience a large amount of retaliation from firms within their group and accommodation from the group comprising smaller firms. Small firms, on the other hand, expect to experience a small amount of retaliation from the group comprising large firms and no reaction from the other firms in their group. We estimate the effect of group-level strategic interactions on firm performance. Our analysis reveals that the rivalry behavior within and between groups is asymmetric, which supports the dominant-fringe relation between firms, as described in our hypothesis. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2103" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Strategic repertoire variety and new venture growth: The moderating effects of origin and industry dynamism</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2103</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Strategic repertoire variety and new venture growth: The moderating effects of origin and industry dynamism</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Bárbara Larrañeta, Shaker A. Zahra, José Luis Galán González</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-06T08:32:50.406698-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2103</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2103</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2103</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>New ventures (companies eight years or younger) face an important choice in attempting to achieve growth: Should they follow “strategic simplicity” by relying on a few similar competitive actions, or emphasize “strategic variety” by implementing multiple different competitive actions? Data from 140 new ventures in Spain suggest that new ventures benefit from pursuing strategic variety, especially when their industries are highly dynamic. Further, although new ventures in general gain from strategic variety in highly dynamic industries, independently owned ventures achieve higher growth rates than their corporate counterparts</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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New ventures (companies eight years or younger) face an important choice in attempting to achieve growth: Should they follow “strategic simplicity” by relying on a few similar competitive actions, or emphasize “strategic variety” by implementing multiple different competitive actions? Data from 140 new ventures in Spain suggest that new ventures benefit from pursuing strategic variety, especially when their industries are highly dynamic. Further, although new ventures in general gain from strategic variety in highly dynamic industries, independently owned ventures achieve higher growth rates than their corporate counterparts. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2099" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>On the contingent value of dynamic capabilities for competitive advantage: The nonlinear moderating effect of environmental dynamism</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2099</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">On the contingent value of dynamic capabilities for competitive advantage: The nonlinear moderating effect of environmental dynamism</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Oliver Schilke</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-06T06:57:58.164282-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2099</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2099</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2099</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This article suggests that dynamic capabilities can give the firm competitive advantage, but this effect is contingent on the level of dynamism of the firm's external environment. A nonlinear, inverse U-shaped moderation is proposed, implying that the relationship between dynamic capabilities and competitive advantage is strongest under intermediate levels of dynamism but comparatively weaker when dynamism is low or high. This proposition is tested using data on alliance management capability and new product development capability, two specific dynamic capabilities widely recognized in prior research. Results based on longitudinal key informant data from 279 firms support the account that these dynamic capabilities are more strongly associated with competitive advantage in moderately dynamic than in stable or highly dynamic environments</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This article suggests that dynamic capabilities can give the firm competitive advantage, but this effect is contingent on the level of dynamism of the firm's external environment. A nonlinear, inverse U-shaped moderation is proposed, implying that the relationship between dynamic capabilities and competitive advantage is strongest under intermediate levels of dynamism but comparatively weaker when dynamism is low or high. This proposition is tested using data on alliance management capability and new product development capability, two specific dynamic capabilities widely recognized in prior research. Results based on longitudinal key informant data from 279 firms support the account that these dynamic capabilities are more strongly associated with competitive advantage in moderately dynamic than in stable or highly dynamic environments. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2131" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Corporate social responsibility and access to finance</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2131</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Corporate social responsibility and access to finance</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Beiting Cheng, Ioannis Ioannou, George Serafeim</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-29T04:37:21.011832-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2131</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2131</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2131</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We investigate whether superior performance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies leads to better access to finance. We hypothesize that better access to finance can be attributed to (1) reduced agency costs due to enhanced stakeholder engagement and (2) reduced informational asymmetry due to increased transparency. Using a large cross-section of firms, we find that firms with better CSR performance face significantly lower capital constraints. We provide evidence that both better stakeholder engagement and transparency around CSR performance are important in reducing capital constraints. The results are further confirmed using several alternative measures of capital constraints, a paired analysis based on a ratings shock to CSR performance, an instrumental variables approach, and a simultaneous equations approach. Finally, we show that the relation is driven by both the social and environmental dimension of CSR</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We investigate whether superior performance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies leads to better access to finance. We hypothesize that better access to finance can be attributed to (1) reduced agency costs due to enhanced stakeholder engagement and (2) reduced informational asymmetry due to increased transparency. Using a large cross-section of firms, we find that firms with better CSR performance face significantly lower capital constraints. We provide evidence that both better stakeholder engagement and transparency around CSR performance are important in reducing capital constraints. The results are further confirmed using several alternative measures of capital constraints, a paired analysis based on a ratings shock to CSR performance, an instrumental variables approach, and a simultaneous equations approach. Finally, we show that the relation is driven by both the social and environmental dimension of CSR. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2101" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Learning and product entry: How diversification patterns differ over firm age and knowledge domains in U.S. generic drug industry</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2101</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Learning and product entry: How diversification patterns differ over firm age and knowledge domains in U.S. generic drug industry</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Xuanli Xie, Hugh M. O'Neill</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-29T04:18:32.706907-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2101</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2101</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2101</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This study uses learning theory to show how knowledge domains affect product extension decisions and how these product decisions change as firms age. Faced with the choice of new product-markets, a firm might decide to introduce a similar product, by leveraging existing firm knowledge, or to experiment with a less familiar product, which requires new knowledge. Using data on new drug introductions in the US generic pharmaceutical industry, the analyses showed clear support for heterogeneous product-market entry patterns across knowledge domains as the firm ages. Across time, the form of learning shifts from exploration to exploitation</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This study uses learning theory to show how knowledge domains affect product extension decisions and how these product decisions change as firms age. Faced with the choice of new product-markets, a firm might decide to introduce a similar product, by leveraging existing firm knowledge, or to experiment with a less familiar product, which requires new knowledge. Using data on new drug introductions in the US generic pharmaceutical industry, the analyses showed clear support for heterogeneous product-market entry patterns across knowledge domains as the firm ages. Across time, the form of learning shifts from exploration to exploitation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2093" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Rewarding value-creating ideas in organizations: The power of low-powered incentives</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2093</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Rewarding value-creating ideas in organizations: The power of low-powered incentives</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Oliver Baumann, Nils Stieglitz</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-29T04:11:24.006724-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2093</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2093</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2093</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Ideas from employees are a major source of value creation in firms, yet the merits of rewards for incentivizing the generation of ideas are highly contested. Using a computational model, we show that firms can improve performance by offering low-powered rewards for the selection and implementation of employee ideas. Low-powered incentives provide a sufficient stream of good ideas, but few exceptional ones. Higher-powered incentives, in contrast, do not systematically translate into exceptional ideas either, but generate an excessive number of good ideas. Performance-based rewards thus appear to be a blunt tool to harness the long tail of innovation. We develop propositions to guide empirical research and discuss their implications for strategy and organizational design</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Ideas from employees are a major source of value creation in firms, yet the merits of rewards for incentivizing the generation of ideas are highly contested. Using a computational model, we show that firms can improve performance by offering low-powered rewards for the selection and implementation of employee ideas. Low-powered incentives provide a sufficient stream of good ideas, but few exceptional ones. Higher-powered incentives, in contrast, do not systematically translate into exceptional ideas either, but generate an excessive number of good ideas. Performance-based rewards thus appear to be a blunt tool to harness the long tail of innovation. We develop propositions to guide empirical research and discuss their implications for strategy and organizational design. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2098" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Make, buy, organize: The interplay between research, external knowledge, and firm structure</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2098</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Make, buy, organize: The interplay between research, external knowledge, and firm structure</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ashish Arora, Sharon Belenzon, Luis A. Rios</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-29T04:10:26.377304-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2098</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2098</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2098</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We bridge current streams of innovation research to explore the interplay between R&amp;D, external knowledge, and organizational structure—three elements of a firm's innovation strategy, which we argue should logically be studied together. Using within-firm patent assignment patterns, we develop a novel measure of structure for a large sample of American firms. We find that centralized firms invest more in research, and patent more per R&amp;D dollar, than decentralized firms. Both types access technology via mergers and acquisitions, but their acquisitions differ in terms of frequency, size, and integration. Consistent with our framework, their sources of value creation differ: while centralized firms derive more value from internal R&amp;D, decentralized firms rely more on external knowledge. We discuss how these findings should stimulate more integrative work on theories of innovation</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We bridge current streams of innovation research to explore the interplay between R&amp;D, external knowledge, and organizational structure—three elements of a firm's innovation strategy, which we argue should logically be studied together. Using within-firm patent assignment patterns, we develop a novel measure of structure for a large sample of American firms. We find that centralized firms invest more in research, and patent more per R&amp;D dollar, than decentralized firms. Both types access technology via mergers and acquisitions, but their acquisitions differ in terms of frequency, size, and integration. Consistent with our framework, their sources of value creation differ: while centralized firms derive more value from internal R&amp;D, decentralized firms rely more on external knowledge. We discuss how these findings should stimulate more integrative work on theories of innovation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2095" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Explaining post-IPO venture performance through a knowledge-based view typology</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2095</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Explaining post-IPO venture performance through a knowledge-based view typology</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Richard J. Arend, Pankaj C. Patel, Haemin Dennis Park</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-29T03:05:23.353156-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2095</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2095</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2095</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We extend the knowledge-based view with a new typology and its application to post-IPO firm performance. The typology categorizes knowledge development activity along the dimensions of familiarity (whether the firm has experience with the knowledge or it is new) and source (whether the firm creates it independently or with partners). We use this typology to determine direct and interaction effects of knowledge development activity on survival, RoA, and Tobin's q of newly public firms. Using a sample of 1,056 high-technology manufacturing IPOs in 1990–2005, we find that focused, internal knowledge development correlates with higher performance. We also find a positive interaction effect in combining focused, internal and diversifying, alliance-based knowledge development, and a negative interaction effect in combining diversifying, internal and alliance-based knowledge development</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We extend the knowledge-based view with a new typology and its application to post-IPO firm performance. The typology categorizes knowledge development activity along the dimensions of familiarity (whether the firm has experience with the knowledge or it is new) and source (whether the firm creates it independently or with partners). We use this typology to determine direct and interaction effects of knowledge development activity on survival, RoA, and Tobin's q of newly public firms. Using a sample of 1,056 high-technology manufacturing IPOs in 1990–2005, we find that focused, internal knowledge development correlates with higher performance. We also find a positive interaction effect in combining focused, internal and diversifying, alliance-based knowledge development, and a negative interaction effect in combining diversifying, internal and alliance-based knowledge development. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2091" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Antecedents of M&amp;A success: The role of strategic complementarity, cultural fit, and degree and speed of integration</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2091</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Antecedents of M&amp;A success: The role of strategic complementarity, cultural fit, and degree and speed of integration</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Florian Bauer, Kurt Matzler</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-26T06:50:47.931008-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2091</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2091</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2091</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>In this paper, we develop a comprehensive model of M&amp;A success. We integrate fundamental constructs of different schools and discuss their interdependencies with M&amp;A success. Our theoretical framework was tested empirically across a sample of 106 SME transactions in the machinery, electronic, and logistic industries in the German-speaking part of Central Europe. The results of our study support the demand for an integrative perspective and theory on M&amp;A. M&amp;A success is a function of strategic complementarity, cultural fit, and the degree of integration. Strategic complementarity also positively influences cultural fit and the degree of integration. Cultural fit positively influences M&amp;A success, but surprisingly has a negative impact on the speed and degree of integration. The degree of integration is positively related to speed of integration</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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In this paper, we develop a comprehensive model of M&amp;A success. We integrate fundamental constructs of different schools and discuss their interdependencies with M&amp;A success. Our theoretical framework was tested empirically across a sample of 106 SME transactions in the machinery, electronic, and logistic industries in the German-speaking part of Central Europe. The results of our study support the demand for an integrative perspective and theory on M&amp;A. M&amp;A success is a function of strategic complementarity, cultural fit, and the degree of integration. Strategic complementarity also positively influences cultural fit and the degree of integration. Cultural fit positively influences M&amp;A success, but surprisingly has a negative impact on the speed and degree of integration. The degree of integration is positively related to speed of integration. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2090" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Inside the black box of the corporate staff: Social networks and the implementation of corporate strategy</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2090</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Inside the black box of the corporate staff: Social networks and the implementation of corporate strategy</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Adam M. Kleinbaum, Toby E. Stuart</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-26T06:49:17.533648-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2090</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2090</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2090</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>In multidivisional firms, the corporate staff is central to the implementation of corporate-level strategy, but empirical evidence on its function is limited. We examine one corporate staff through e-mail analysis. We find sharp cross-sectional differences in communication patterns: staff members have networks that are larger, more integrative, and richer in structural holes. However, much of this difference is attributed to sorting processes, rather than being caused by employment in the corporate staff</em> <i>per se</i>. <em>Further, once people receive the ‘corporate imprimatur,’ they retain aspects of it even when they move back to the line organization. These results imply that the literature's emphasis on structure as a means to achieve coordination undervalues a selection process in which individuals with broad networks match to coordination-focused jobs in the corporate staff</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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In multidivisional firms, the corporate staff is central to the implementation of corporate-level strategy, but empirical evidence on its function is limited. We examine one corporate staff through e-mail analysis. We find sharp cross-sectional differences in communication patterns: staff members have networks that are larger, more integrative, and richer in structural holes. However, much of this difference is attributed to sorting processes, rather than being caused by employment in the corporate staff per se. Further, once people receive the ‘corporate imprimatur,’ they retain aspects of it even when they move back to the line organization. These results imply that the literature's emphasis on structure as a means to achieve coordination undervalues a selection process in which individuals with broad networks match to coordination-focused jobs in the corporate staff. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2084" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Where do firms' recombinant capabilities come from? Intraorganizational networks, knowledge, and firms' ability to innovate through technological recombination</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2084</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Where do firms' recombinant capabilities come from? Intraorganizational networks, knowledge, and firms' ability to innovate through technological recombination</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Gianluca Carnabuci, Elisa Operti</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-26T06:49:06.095172-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2084</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2084</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2084</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>A firm's innovativeness is driven by its ability to recombine existing technologies. Elaborating on this argument, we contend that there exist two distinct types of recombinant capabilities. First, firms may innovate through recombinant creation, i.e., by creating technological combinations new to the firm. Second, they may innovate through recombinant reuse; i.e., by reconfiguring combinations already known to the firm. We study what drives each type of capability by examining two factors: the degree of integration of a firm's intraorganizational network and the diversity of its knowledge base. We test our theoretical predictions using data on 126 semiconductor firms between 1984 and 2003. Our analyses indicate that factors that favor recombinant creation generally hinder recombinant reuse and vice versa; however, combining an integrated collaboration network and a diverse knowledge base may concurrently enhance both recombinant capabilities</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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A firm's innovativeness is driven by its ability to recombine existing technologies. Elaborating on this argument, we contend that there exist two distinct types of recombinant capabilities. First, firms may innovate through recombinant creation, i.e., by creating technological combinations new to the firm. Second, they may innovate through recombinant reuse; i.e., by reconfiguring combinations already known to the firm. We study what drives each type of capability by examining two factors: the degree of integration of a firm's intraorganizational network and the diversity of its knowledge base. We test our theoretical predictions using data on 126 semiconductor firms between 1984 and 2003. Our analyses indicate that factors that favor recombinant creation generally hinder recombinant reuse and vice versa; however, combining an integrated collaboration network and a diverse knowledge base may concurrently enhance both recombinant capabilities. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2089" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders with heterogeneous motives</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2089</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders with heterogeneous motives</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Flore Bridoux, J. W. Stoelhorst</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-26T06:48:56.299869-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2089</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2089</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2089</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Instrumental stakeholder theory proposes a positive relationship between fairness toward stakeholders and firm performance. Yet, some firms are successful with an arms-length approach to stakeholder management, based on bargaining power rather than fairness. We address this puzzle by relaxing the assumption that all stakeholders care about fairness. Empirical evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology suggests that firms face a population of potential stakeholders that consists not only of so-called ‘reciprocators,’ who do care about fairness, but also of self-regarding stakeholders, who do not. We propose that a fairness approach is more effective in attracting, retaining, and motivating reciprocal stakeholders to create value, while an arms-length approach is more effective in motivating self-regarding stakeholders and in attracting and retaining self-regarding stakeholders with high bargaining power</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>Instrumental stakeholder theory proposes a positive relationship between fairness toward stakeholders and firm performance. Yet, some firms are successful with an arms-length approach to stakeholder management, based on bargaining power rather than fairness. We address this puzzle by relaxing the assumption that all stakeholders care about fairness. Empirical evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology suggests that firms face a population of potential stakeholders that consists not only of so-called ‘reciprocators,’ who do care about fairness, but also of self-regarding stakeholders, who do not. We propose that a fairness approach is more effective in attracting, retaining, and motivating reciprocal stakeholders to create value, while an arms-length approach is more effective in motivating self-regarding stakeholders and in attracting and retaining self-regarding stakeholders with high bargaining power. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2083" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Technological overlap, technological capabilities, and resource recombination in technological acquisitions</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2083</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Technological overlap, technological capabilities, and resource recombination in technological acquisitions</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Joshua Sears, Glenn Hoetker</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-26T06:12:19.561386-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2083</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2083</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2083</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>The performance of technological acquisitions depends heavily on the overlap between the knowledge bases of the target and acquirer. We argue that overlap is best viewed as two distinct constructs: target overlap, the proportion of the target's knowledge base that the acquirer already possesses, and acquirer overlap, the proportion of the acquirer's knowledge base duplicated by the target. Each affects the value created from the firms' technological capabilities differently due to absorptive capacity, knowledge redundancy, and organizational disruption. Further, the low quantity of innovations observed in acquisitions with low target overlap may conceal an offsetting increase in their novelty</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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The performance of technological acquisitions depends heavily on the overlap between the knowledge bases of the target and acquirer. We argue that overlap is best viewed as two distinct constructs: target overlap, the proportion of the target's knowledge base that the acquirer already possesses, and acquirer overlap, the proportion of the acquirer's knowledge base duplicated by the target. Each affects the value created from the firms' technological capabilities differently due to absorptive capacity, knowledge redundancy, and organizational disruption. Further, the low quantity of innovations observed in acquisitions with low target overlap may conceal an offsetting increase in their novelty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2100" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Whose experience matters in the boardroom? The effects of experiential and vicarious learning on emerging market entry</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2100</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Whose experience matters in the boardroom? The effects of experiential and vicarious learning on emerging market entry</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Anja Tuschke, WM. Gerard Sanders, Exequiel Hernandez</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-24T06:35:28.343139-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2100</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2100</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2100</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Using an organizational learning perspective, we develop arguments about vicarious learning through board interlocks and its relation to experiential learning. Although it is well established that firms learn from board interlocks, little attention has focused on which types of interlocks are most consequential and why. We distinguish between the relative advantages of various tie attributes such as experience, authority, and credibility and argue that these distinctions lead to measureable differences in learning outcomes. We further demonstrate that whether vicarious learning substitutes or complements focal firm experiential learning depends upon the type of interlock involved. After accounting for the endogeneity of ties, we find support for our framework in a longitudinal analysis of foreign investments by German firms in emerging economies between 1990 and 2003</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Using an organizational learning perspective, we develop arguments about vicarious learning through board interlocks and its relation to experiential learning. Although it is well established that firms learn from board interlocks, little attention has focused on which types of interlocks are most consequential and why. We distinguish between the relative advantages of various tie attributes such as experience, authority, and credibility and argue that these distinctions lead to measureable differences in learning outcomes. We further demonstrate that whether vicarious learning substitutes or complements focal firm experiential learning depends upon the type of interlock involved. After accounting for the endogeneity of ties, we find support for our framework in a longitudinal analysis of foreign investments by German firms in emerging economies between 1990 and 2003. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2064" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Executive preferences for governance modes and exchange partners: An information economics perspective</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2064</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Executive preferences for governance modes and exchange partners: An information economics perspective</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Jeffrey J. Reuer, Tony W. Tong, Beverly B. Tyler, Africa Ariño</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-23T09:33:08.797037-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2064</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2064</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2064</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This study investigates how executives address information asymmetry and adverse selection surrounding international joint ventures (IJVs) and acquisitions. We argue that executives can address such exchange hazards not only through their governance decisions, as prior research indicates, but also through their selection of exchange partners. Our experimental design complements prior research on firms' governance choices in three ways: (1) by incorporating multiple potential exchange partners rather than taking a single partner as given for a realized transaction; (2) by accommodating multiple potential entry modes to address interdependencies across governance structures; and (3) by providing direct evidence on executives' assessments of IJVs and acquisitions. We join together organizational governance research and decision-making research on IJV partner selection, two literatures that have largely developed separately. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This study investigates how executives address information asymmetry and adverse selection surrounding international joint ventures (IJVs) and acquisitions. We argue that executives can address such exchange hazards not only through their governance decisions, as prior research indicates, but also through their selection of exchange partners. Our experimental design complements prior research on firms' governance choices in three ways: (1) by incorporating multiple potential exchange partners rather than taking a single partner as given for a realized transaction; (2) by accommodating multiple potential entry modes to address interdependencies across governance structures; and (3) by providing direct evidence on executives' assessments of IJVs and acquisitions. We join together organizational governance research and decision-making research on IJV partner selection, two literatures that have largely developed separately. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2129" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Competing technologies and industry evolution: The benefits of making mistakes in the flat panel display industry</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2129</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Competing technologies and industry evolution: The benefits of making mistakes in the flat panel display industry</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">J. P. Eggers</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-19T06:25:10.360558-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2129</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2129</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2129</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This article investigates the post-entry implications of pre-entry technological choices made during the uncertain period before a dominant design. Building on work on technological dynamics and organizational inertia, I argue that too early commitments to the winning technology may impede the ability to bring the best product to market, but delaying investment too long limits the ability to accumulate useful knowledge. Using data from the evolution of the flat panel display industry from 1965 to 2005, the study shows empirical support for the two theoretical mechanisms and offers the surprising result that firms starting in the losing technology before switching outperform other firms in terms of product value. Switching, while difficult behaviorally in recovering from failure, both delays difficult-to-reverse technological commitments and develops market knowledge</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This article investigates the post-entry implications of pre-entry technological choices made during the uncertain period before a dominant design. Building on work on technological dynamics and organizational inertia, I argue that too early commitments to the winning technology may impede the ability to bring the best product to market, but delaying investment too long limits the ability to accumulate useful knowledge. Using data from the evolution of the flat panel display industry from 1965 to 2005, the study shows empirical support for the two theoretical mechanisms and offers the surprising result that firms starting in the losing technology before switching outperform other firms in terms of product value. Switching, while difficult behaviorally in recovering from failure, both delays difficult-to-reverse technological commitments and develops market knowledge. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2130" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>How symmetrical assumptions advance strategic management research</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2130</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">How symmetrical assumptions advance strategic management research</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Nicolai J. Foss, Niklas L. Hallberg</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-19T06:02:12.308779-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2130</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2130</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2130</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We develop the case for symmetrical assumptions in strategic management theory. Assumptional symmetry obtains when assumptions made about certain actors and their interactions in one of the application domains of a theory are also made about this set of actors and their interactions in other application domains of the theory. We argue that assumptional symmetry leads to theoretical advancement by promoting the development of theory with greater falsifiability and stronger ontological grounding. Thus, strategic management theory may be advanced by systematically searching for asymmetrical assumptions in existing theory in order to identify the instances where new and useful insights can be derived from adopting symmetrical assumptions</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We develop the case for symmetrical assumptions in strategic management theory. Assumptional symmetry obtains when assumptions made about certain actors and their interactions in one of the application domains of a theory are also made about this set of actors and their interactions in other application domains of the theory. We argue that assumptional symmetry leads to theoretical advancement by promoting the development of theory with greater falsifiability and stronger ontological grounding. Thus, strategic management theory may be advanced by systematically searching for asymmetrical assumptions in existing theory in order to identify the instances where new and useful insights can be derived from adopting symmetrical assumptions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2038" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Search behavior of the diversified firm: The impact of fit on innovation</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2038</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Search behavior of the diversified firm: The impact of fit on innovation</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Sang Kyun Kim, Jonathan D. Arthurs, Arvin Sahaym, John B. Cullen</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-19T05:54:59.232404-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2038</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2038</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2038</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This paper provides a new approach to account for the relationship between diversification and innovation by integrating insights concerning strategic fit. We argue that the type of diversification strategy leads to greater innovation output when the appropriate technological search strategy is employed. Using a longitudinal study of the patenting activity of 258 manufacturing firms, we find that strategic fit is important for innovation output. More specifically, a related diversification strategy leads to greater innovation when firms use a narrow technological search strategy. In contrast, an unrelated diversification strategy leads to greater innovation when a broader technological search strategy is used. Implications for future research are discussed</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This paper provides a new approach to account for the relationship between diversification and innovation by integrating insights concerning strategic fit. We argue that the type of diversification strategy leads to greater innovation output when the appropriate technological search strategy is employed. Using a longitudinal study of the patenting activity of 258 manufacturing firms, we find that strategic fit is important for innovation output. More specifically, a related diversification strategy leads to greater innovation when firms use a narrow technological search strategy. In contrast, an unrelated diversification strategy leads to greater innovation when a broader technological search strategy is used. Implications for future research are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2092" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Are collective political actions and private political actions substitutes or complements? Empirical evidence from China's private sector</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2092</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Are collective political actions and private political actions substitutes or complements? Empirical evidence from China's private sector</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Nan Jia</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-19T05:47:07.044172-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2092</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2092</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2092</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This paper examines the circumstances under which collective and private corporate political actions are more likely to be substitutes or complements. Using data based on a series of nationwide surveys conducted on privately owned firms in China, I find that firms that are engaged in collective political actions are more likely to pursue private political actions. This positive relationship is stronger in less economically developed provinces and when there are greater opportunities for the state to redistribute economic resources in product and capital markets. Meanwhile, this relationship is weaker in the presence of heavier regulatory burdens and for firms in which the state has some equity or owned by individuals who had prior political careers. These findings contribute to the corporate political action literature</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This paper examines the circumstances under which collective and private corporate political actions are more likely to be substitutes or complements. Using data based on a series of nationwide surveys conducted on privately owned firms in China, I find that firms that are engaged in collective political actions are more likely to pursue private political actions. This positive relationship is stronger in less economically developed provinces and when there are greater opportunities for the state to redistribute economic resources in product and capital markets. Meanwhile, this relationship is weaker in the presence of heavier regulatory burdens and for firms in which the state has some equity or owned by individuals who had prior political careers. These findings contribute to the corporate political action literature. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2128" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Chicken, or the egg, or both? The interrelationship between a firm's inventor specialization and scope of technologies</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2128</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Chicken, or the egg, or both? The interrelationship between a firm's inventor specialization and scope of technologies</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Puay Khoon Toh</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-19T05:35:21.062531-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2128</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2128</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2128</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Firms with different scope of technologies experience different firm growth. Understanding such heterogeneity requires knowing not only what drives technologies' scope but also why these drivers remain different across firms. I propose inventor specialization as a driver of technologies' scope: firms with more specialized inventors create narrower scope technologies. I also propose that these narrower scope technologies themselves in turn induce these firms' inventors to remain more specialized. I empirically demonstrate this two-way interrelationship in the U.S. communication equipment industry using policy shocks as natural experiments and a new measure of scope. This interrelationship has important implications for why resources and organization appear isomorphic within a firm but heterogeneous across firms</em>. t © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Firms with different scope of technologies experience different firm growth. Understanding such heterogeneity requires knowing not only what drives technologies' scope but also why these drivers remain different across firms. I propose inventor specialization as a driver of technologies' scope: firms with more specialized inventors create narrower scope technologies. I also propose that these narrower scope technologies themselves in turn induce these firms' inventors to remain more specialized. I empirically demonstrate this two-way interrelationship in the U.S. communication equipment industry using policy shocks as natural experiments and a new measure of scope. This interrelationship has important implications for why resources and organization appear isomorphic within a firm but heterogeneous across firms. t © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2067" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Deregulation and differentiation: Incumbent investment in green technologies</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2067</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Deregulation and differentiation: Incumbent investment in green technologies</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Eun-Hee Kim</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-15T12:02:17.277706-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2067</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2067</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2067</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Integrating elements from industrial organization economics and the resource-based view—coupled with path dependence as firm resources evolve over time, this paper suggests that deregulation may not always provide greater opportunities for incumbents, and the extent to which incumbents differentiate on the green dimension may be constrained by their prior resources, in particular, capabilities with respect to brown technologies and experiences with green technologies. Using data on U.S. investor-owned electric utilities from 1992 to 2008, this paper finds that deregulation is associated with lower entry into the renewable generation market by incumbents compared to regulation. More capable firms using brown technologies, for example, coal-based generation, are less likely to enter the renewable generation market. Also, incumbents are responsive to actual, not latent, demand for renewable energy</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Integrating elements from industrial organization economics and the resource-based view—coupled with path dependence as firm resources evolve over time, this paper suggests that deregulation may not always provide greater opportunities for incumbents, and the extent to which incumbents differentiate on the green dimension may be constrained by their prior resources, in particular, capabilities with respect to brown technologies and experiences with green technologies. Using data on U.S. investor-owned electric utilities from 1992 to 2008, this paper finds that deregulation is associated with lower entry into the renewable generation market by incumbents compared to regulation. More capable firms using brown technologies, for example, coal-based generation, are less likely to enter the renewable generation market. Also, incumbents are responsive to actual, not latent, demand for renewable energy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2094" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Transactional hazards, institutional change, and capabilities: Integrating the theories of the firm</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2094</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Transactional hazards, institutional change, and capabilities: Integrating the theories of the firm</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Francisco Brahm, Jorge Tarziján</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-10T11:29:17.273893-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2094</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2094</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2094</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Using a detailed dataset from the Chilean construction industry, we explore how the predictions of the transaction cost and capabilities theories interact to explain building contractors' decisions to ‘make or buy’ the specialty trade activities needed to complete a construction project. We show that the contractor's productive capabilities strongly mediate the relationship between transaction hazards that originate from either temporal specificity or an exogenous change in the subcontracting law and the vertical integration decision. The inclusion of differential capabilities and its interaction with transactional hazards infuse contractors' boundary choices with systematic patterns of heterogeneity and contribute to the integration of these theoretical perspectives. Our analysis corrects for the endogeneity of the capabilities variable and provides a detailed assessment of the marginal effects in logit models</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Using a detailed dataset from the Chilean construction industry, we explore how the predictions of the transaction cost and capabilities theories interact to explain building contractors' decisions to ‘make or buy’ the specialty trade activities needed to complete a construction project. We show that the contractor's productive capabilities strongly mediate the relationship between transaction hazards that originate from either temporal specificity or an exogenous change in the subcontracting law and the vertical integration decision. The inclusion of differential capabilities and its interaction with transactional hazards infuse contractors' boundary choices with systematic patterns of heterogeneity and contribute to the integration of these theoretical perspectives. Our analysis corrects for the endogeneity of the capabilities variable and provides a detailed assessment of the marginal effects in logit models. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2076" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Strength in numbers or guilt by association? Intragroup effects of female chief executive announcements</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2076</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Strength in numbers or guilt by association? Intragroup effects of female chief executive announcements</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Heather R. Dixon-Fowler, Alan E. Ellstrand, Jonathan L. Johnson</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-10T11:16:59.497797-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2076</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2076</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2076</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We predict that the media reports on female CEOs as a coherent group, whereas male CEOs are treated as individuals by the media. We also suggest that the resulting investors' perceptions of group entitativity of female-led firms may not only influence the succession event–performance relationship at the focal firm, but may also have a significant effect on the value of other female-led companies. Results of a text analysis and an event study of appointments of female CEOs to Fortune 1000 firms provide support for these predictions</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We predict that the media reports on female CEOs as a coherent group, whereas male CEOs are treated as individuals by the media. We also suggest that the resulting investors' perceptions of group entitativity of female-led firms may not only influence the succession event–performance relationship at the focal firm, but may also have a significant effect on the value of other female-led companies. Results of a text analysis and an event study of appointments of female CEOs to Fortune 1000 firms provide support for these predictions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2081" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>External coo/presidents as expert directors: A new look at the service role of boards</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2081</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">External coo/presidents as expert directors: A new look at the service role of boards</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ryan Krause, Matthew Semadeni, Albert A. Cannella</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-10T10:32:28.696446-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2081</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2081</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2081</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Much of the scholarship on boards of directors has examined either the control (i.e., monitoring) role or the resource dependence role that boards fill. Relatively little has examined the service role, wherein directors provide advice and guidance to management. This study builds on recent work exploring director expertise by asking how operational expertise on boards impacts firm performance. We find that having external <em>COO</em>/<em>p</em>residents on a board of directors positively impacts firm performance when the firm's operational efficiency is declining, but negatively impacts performance when the firm's operational efficiency is improving. We also find that other types of external executives serving as directors exhibit the opposite relationship, suggesting that the value of director expertise is context-dependent. We discuss the implications of these findings for director selection. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Much of the scholarship on boards of directors has examined either the control (i.e., monitoring) role or the resource dependence role that boards fill. Relatively little has examined the service role, wherein directors provide advice and guidance to management. This study builds on recent work exploring director expertise by asking how operational expertise on boards impacts firm performance. We find that having external COO/presidents on a board of directors positively impacts firm performance when the firm's operational efficiency is declining, but negatively impacts performance when the firm's operational efficiency is improving. We also find that other types of external executives serving as directors exhibit the opposite relationship, suggesting that the value of director expertise is context-dependent. We discuss the implications of these findings for director selection. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2065" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Relational configurations with information intermediaries: The effect of firm-investment bank ties on expected acquisition performance</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2065</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Relational configurations with information intermediaries: The effect of firm-investment bank ties on expected acquisition performance</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Alexander Sleptsov, Jaideep Anand, Gurneeta Vasudeva</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-08T07:05:48.283193-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2065</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2065</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2065</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Recognizing information-related problems in acquisition transactions, we study how the characteristics of acquiring firms' relationships with information brokers or intermediaries like investment banks affect firms' access to acquisition-related information, thus influencing expected acquisition performance. We propose that relational configurations that enhance the intermediaries' ability and willingness provide the most beneficial and appropriate information to acquiring firms. We find that acquirers' expected acquisition performance increases with the number of prior transactions with investment banks but decreases when relationships with banks become exclusive. Further, the positive effect of number of prior transactions becomes even stronger for less related acquisitions. Our study provides insights on the beneficial performance implications of competition in multiple but nonexclusive relationships with information intermediaries such as investment banks</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Recognizing information-related problems in acquisition transactions, we study how the characteristics of acquiring firms' relationships with information brokers or intermediaries like investment banks affect firms' access to acquisition-related information, thus influencing expected acquisition performance. We propose that relational configurations that enhance the intermediaries' ability and willingness provide the most beneficial and appropriate information to acquiring firms. We find that acquirers' expected acquisition performance increases with the number of prior transactions with investment banks but decreases when relationships with banks become exclusive. Further, the positive effect of number of prior transactions becomes even stronger for less related acquisitions. Our study provides insights on the beneficial performance implications of competition in multiple but nonexclusive relationships with information intermediaries such as investment banks. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2087" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Multinationality and downside risk: The roles of option portfolio and organization</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2087</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Multinationality and downside risk: The roles of option portfolio and organization</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">René Belderbos, Tony W. Tong, Shubin Wu</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-08T06:54:01.24002-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2087</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2087</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2087</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Multinational operations confer firms a portfolio of switching options that offer potential operating flexibility in the context of input cost variability, helping firms reduce downside risk. We suggest that two conditions may shape the relationship between multinationality and downside risk. When subadditivity is present in a firm's option portfolio, such as when the firm operates affiliates in host countries with similar labor cost developments, multinationality is less likely to reduce downside risk since less valuable opportunities exist for shifting operations. Multinationality is more likely to reduce downside risk if a firm's organization facilitates the coordination of cross-border activities, enabling the exploitation of the shifting opportunities. Analysis of a comprehensive panel dataset of Japanese manufacturing firms and their foreign manufacturing affiliates provides support for these conjectures</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Multinational operations confer firms a portfolio of switching options that offer potential operating flexibility in the context of input cost variability, helping firms reduce downside risk. We suggest that two conditions may shape the relationship between multinationality and downside risk. When subadditivity is present in a firm's option portfolio, such as when the firm operates affiliates in host countries with similar labor cost developments, multinationality is less likely to reduce downside risk since less valuable opportunities exist for shifting operations. Multinationality is more likely to reduce downside risk if a firm's organization facilitates the coordination of cross-border activities, enabling the exploitation of the shifting opportunities. Analysis of a comprehensive panel dataset of Japanese manufacturing firms and their foreign manufacturing affiliates provides support for these conjectures. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2080" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Beyond boundary spanners: The ‘collective bridge’ as an efficient interunit structure for transferring collective knowledge</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2080</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Beyond boundary spanners: The ‘collective bridge’ as an efficient interunit structure for transferring collective knowledge</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Zheng Jane Zhao, Jaideep Anand</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-04T09:25:02.415152-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2080</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2080</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2080</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This research introduces a framework for selecting efficient interunit structures in facilitating the transfer of knowledge with different levels of complexity. We argue that while the boundary spanner structure is efficient for transferring discrete knowledge, it is inadequate for transferring collectively held complex knowledge. We propose that the transfer of such knowledge requires a more decentralized interunit structure—collective bridge, which is a set of direct interunit ties connecting the members of the source and the recipient units, with the configuration of the interunit ties matching the complexity of knowledge to be transferred. We suggest that while a collective bridge is inefficient in transferring discrete knowledge relative to a boundary spanner structure, it is more efficient for transferring collective knowledge</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This research introduces a framework for selecting efficient interunit structures in facilitating the transfer of knowledge with different levels of complexity. We argue that while the boundary spanner structure is efficient for transferring discrete knowledge, it is inadequate for transferring collectively held complex knowledge. We propose that the transfer of such knowledge requires a more decentralized interunit structure—collective bridge, which is a set of direct interunit ties connecting the members of the source and the recipient units, with the configuration of the interunit ties matching the complexity of knowledge to be transferred. We suggest that while a collective bridge is inefficient in transferring discrete knowledge relative to a boundary spanner structure, it is more efficient for transferring collective knowledge. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2078" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The elephant in the room of dynamic capabilities: Bringing two diverging conversations together</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2078</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The elephant in the room of dynamic capabilities: Bringing two diverging conversations together</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Margaret Peteraf, Giada Di Stefano, Gianmario Verona</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-03T09:23:34.325615-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2078</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2078</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2078</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>A critical issue has been absent from the conversation on dynamic capabilities: the two seminal papers represent not only different but contradictory understandings of the construct's core elements. Here, we explore the reasons for this, using author cocitation analysis to inform our analysis. Our findings suggest that the field is being socially constructed on the basis of two separate domains of knowledge and that underlying structural impediments have impeded dialog across the domains. In light of this evidence, then, we take up the challenge to find a solution to this dilemma. By employing a contingency-based approach, we show that there are ways to unify the field that rely, paradoxically, on integrating the two contradictory views, while still preserving the assumptions that led to their differences</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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A critical issue has been absent from the conversation on dynamic capabilities: the two seminal papers represent not only different but contradictory understandings of the construct's core elements. Here, we explore the reasons for this, using author cocitation analysis to inform our analysis. Our findings suggest that the field is being socially constructed on the basis of two separate domains of knowledge and that underlying structural impediments have impeded dialog across the domains. In light of this evidence, then, we take up the challenge to find a solution to this dilemma. By employing a contingency-based approach, we show that there are ways to unify the field that rely, paradoxically, on integrating the two contradictory views, while still preserving the assumptions that led to their differences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2069" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Opportunity costs, industry dynamics, and corporate diversification: Evidence from the cardiovascular medical device industry, 1976–2004</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2069</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Opportunity costs, industry dynamics, and corporate diversification: Evidence from the cardiovascular medical device industry, 1976–2004</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Brian Wu</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-02T12:10:28.032675-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2069</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2069</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2069</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This paper examines how demand conditions across alternative markets impact diversification decisions and firm performance by influencing the opportunity costs of deploying non-scale free capabilities. Using data within the cardiovascular medical device industry, this study shows that: (1) firms with a larger stock of pre-entry innovation experience are more likely to diversify; (2) firms in a current market with greater relative demand maturity are more likely to diversify; (3) diversification is associated with a performance decrease in the current market; and (4) diversification is associated with a performance increase at the corporate level. These findings shed new light on the self-selection process of corporate scope, the conceptualization of firm capabilities, and the connection between industry dynamics and resource deployment</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This paper examines how demand conditions across alternative markets impact diversification decisions and firm performance by influencing the opportunity costs of deploying non-scale free capabilities. Using data within the cardiovascular medical device industry, this study shows that: (1) firms with a larger stock of pre-entry innovation experience are more likely to diversify; (2) firms in a current market with greater relative demand maturity are more likely to diversify; (3) diversification is associated with a performance decrease in the current market; and (4) diversification is associated with a performance increase at the corporate level. These findings shed new light on the self-selection process of corporate scope, the conceptualization of firm capabilities, and the connection between industry dynamics and resource deployment. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2079" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Product proliferation strategies and firm performance: The moderating role of product space complexity</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2079</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Product proliferation strategies and firm performance: The moderating role of product space complexity</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Alicia Barroso, Marco S. Giarratana</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-02T12:00:50.4117-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2079</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2079</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2079</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>In the Spanish automobile market between 1990 and 2000, significant reductions in tariff and nontariff protections increased the complexity of the product space, through the penetration of new car brands and models. Acknowledging these environmental dynamics, this study details conditions in which across-niche (product breadth or intraindustry diversification) and within-niche (product depth or versioning) product proliferation exerts a positive relationship on firm performance, as well as how key relationships change according to the complexity of the product space in the industry</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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In the Spanish automobile market between 1990 and 2000, significant reductions in tariff and nontariff protections increased the complexity of the product space, through the penetration of new car brands and models. Acknowledging these environmental dynamics, this study details conditions in which across-niche (product breadth or intraindustry diversification) and within-niche (product depth or versioning) product proliferation exerts a positive relationship on firm performance, as well as how key relationships change according to the complexity of the product space in the industry. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2037" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Resources as dual sources of advantage: Implications for valuing entrepreneurial-firm patents</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2037</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Resources as dual sources of advantage: Implications for valuing entrepreneurial-firm patents</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">David H. Hsu, Rosemarie H. Ziedonis</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-02T11:38:11.180074-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2037</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2037</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2037</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Why and how do resources provide sources of competitive advantage? This study sheds new light on this central question of resource-based theory by allowing a single resource—entrepreneurial-firm patents—to play distinctive roles in different competitive arenas. As rights to exclude others, patents serve a well-known role as legal safeguards in product markets. As quality signals, patents also could improve access and the terms of trade in factor input markets. Based on the financing activities of 370 venture-backed semiconductor start-ups, we provide new evidence that patents confer dual advantages in strategic factor markets, improved access and terms of trade, above and beyond their added product-market protection. The study has important implications for empirical tests of resource-based theory and the measurement of resource value</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Why and how do resources provide sources of competitive advantage? This study sheds new light on this central question of resource-based theory by allowing a single resource—entrepreneurial-firm patents—to play distinctive roles in different competitive arenas. As rights to exclude others, patents serve a well-known role as legal safeguards in product markets. As quality signals, patents also could improve access and the terms of trade in factor input markets. Based on the financing activities of 370 venture-backed semiconductor start-ups, we provide new evidence that patents confer dual advantages in strategic factor markets, improved access and terms of trade, above and beyond their added product-market protection. The study has important implications for empirical tests of resource-based theory and the measurement of resource value. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2086" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Performance impact of middle managers' adaptive strategy implementation: The role of social capital</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2086</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Performance impact of middle managers' adaptive strategy implementation: The role of social capital</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Michael Ahearne, Son K. Lam, Florian Kraus</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-02T11:25:25.666976-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2086</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2086</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2086</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This article reconciles mixed findings about the performance impact of middle managers' strategy involvement. We propose that the relationship between middle managers' adaptive strategy implementation—through upward and downward influence—and objective business performance can be curvilinear and contingent on formal and informal structures. Applying a multilevel perspective to social networks, we empirically show that reputational social capital enhances the performance impact of middle managers' upward influence while informational social capital elevates the performance impact of their downward influence. The size of a business unit or region has differential moderating effects. The curvilinear effects of middle managers' upward influence and reputational and informational social capital on business unit performance reflect paradoxes. We discuss the implications of these findings for strategy implementation research and practice</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This article reconciles mixed findings about the performance impact of middle managers' strategy involvement. We propose that the relationship between middle managers' adaptive strategy implementation—through upward and downward influence—and objective business performance can be curvilinear and contingent on formal and informal structures. Applying a multilevel perspective to social networks, we empirically show that reputational social capital enhances the performance impact of middle managers' upward influence while informational social capital elevates the performance impact of their downward influence. The size of a business unit or region has differential moderating effects. The curvilinear effects of middle managers' upward influence and reputational and informational social capital on business unit performance reflect paradoxes. We discuss the implications of these findings for strategy implementation research and practice. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2063" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>How much to make and how much to buy? An analysis of optimal plural sourcing strategies</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2063</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">How much to make and how much to buy? An analysis of optimal plural sourcing strategies</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Phanish Puranam, Ranjay Gulati, Sourav Bhattacharya</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-02T11:12:00.400413-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2063</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2063</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2063</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>While many theories of the firm seek to explain when firms make rather than buy, in practice firms often make and buy the same input—they engage in plural sourcing. We argue that explaining the mix of external procurement and internal sourcing for the same input requires a consideration of complementarities across and constraints within modes of procurement. We create analytical foundations for making empirical predictions about when plural sourcing is likely to be optimal and why the optimal mix of internal and external sourcing may vary across situations. Our framework also proves useful for assessing the possible estimation biases in transaction level make-or-buy studies arising from ignoring complementarities and constraints</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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While many theories of the firm seek to explain when firms make rather than buy, in practice firms often make and buy the same input—they engage in plural sourcing. We argue that explaining the mix of external procurement and internal sourcing for the same input requires a consideration of complementarities across and constraints within modes of procurement. We create analytical foundations for making empirical predictions about when plural sourcing is likely to be optimal and why the optimal mix of internal and external sourcing may vary across situations. Our framework also proves useful for assessing the possible estimation biases in transaction level make-or-buy studies arising from ignoring complementarities and constraints. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2048" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Inherited agglomeration effects in hedge fund spawns</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2048</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Inherited agglomeration effects in hedge fund spawns</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Rui J. P. De Figueiredo, Philipp Meyer-Doyle, Evan Rawley</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-01T08:02:24.474316-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2048</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2048</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2048</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This paper studies inherited agglomeration effects, which we define as human capital that managers acquire while working in an industry hub that may be transferred to a spinoff. We test for inherited agglomeration effects in the hedge fund industry and find that hedge fund managers who previously worked in New York and London outperform their peers by about one percent per year. The results are driven by managers who worked in investment management positions previously, and are at least as large as traditional agglomeration effects that arise from being located in an industry hub contemporaneously. The evidence suggests that inherited agglomeration effects are an important, but as yet overlooked, factor influencing the performance of new firms</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>This paper studies inherited agglomeration effects, which we define as human capital that managers acquire while working in an industry hub that may be transferred to a spinoff. We test for inherited agglomeration effects in the hedge fund industry and find that hedge fund managers who previously worked in New York and London outperform their peers by about one percent per year. The results are driven by managers who worked in investment management positions previously, and are at least as large as traditional agglomeration effects that arise from being located in an industry hub contemporaneously. The evidence suggests that inherited agglomeration effects are an important, but as yet overlooked, factor influencing the performance of new firms. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2082" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Exploration or exploitation? Small firms' alliance strategies with large firms</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2082</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Exploration or exploitation? Small firms' alliance strategies with large firms</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Haibin Yang, Yanfeng Zheng, Xia Zhao</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-29T12:07:52.804971-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2082</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2082</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2082</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>How do small firms manage their alliance strategies with large firms? This study compares the relative impacts of exploration and exploitation alliances with large firms on small firms' valuation. Integrating the literatures on the exploration/exploitation paradigm and alliance governance, we argue that exploitation alliances with large firms will on average generate higher values for small firms than exploration alliances with large firms due to a heightened risk of appropriation in exploration alliances. However, if small firms can manage their alliances with large firms via proper alliance governance, they will increase their valuations from exploration alliances with large firms. Analyses of the U.S. biopharmaceutical industry from 1984 to 2006 largely support our hypotheses</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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How do small firms manage their alliance strategies with large firms? This study compares the relative impacts of exploration and exploitation alliances with large firms on small firms' valuation. Integrating the literatures on the exploration/exploitation paradigm and alliance governance, we argue that exploitation alliances with large firms will on average generate higher values for small firms than exploration alliances with large firms due to a heightened risk of appropriation in exploration alliances. However, if small firms can manage their alliances with large firms via proper alliance governance, they will increase their valuations from exploration alliances with large firms. Analyses of the U.S. biopharmaceutical industry from 1984 to 2006 largely support our hypotheses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2053" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>A theoretical and empirical investigation of property rights sharing in outsourced research, development, and engineering relationships</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2053</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">A theoretical and empirical investigation of property rights sharing in outsourced research, development, and engineering relationships</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Stephen J. Carson, George John</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-29T12:06:41.797982-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2053</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2053</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2053</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This article considers the use of property rights to structure ex post bargaining positions in client-sponsored RD&amp;E. By focusing on the positive externality created by uses of the technology not targeted by the client, the theory produces a novel set of predictions that diverge from standard transaction cost and property rights reasoning; that is, greater contractor property rights are associated with more transaction-specific investments by the client. Contractor property rights are also predicted to increase as environmental uncertainty increases and as more applications of the technology fall outside the client's intended fields of use. Contract-level data from 147 RD&amp;E agreements in technology-intensive settings provide support for these predictions. A secondary examination shows that clients who share property rights with their contractors face reduced opportunism during project execution</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This article considers the use of property rights to structure ex post bargaining positions in client-sponsored RD&amp;E. By focusing on the positive externality created by uses of the technology not targeted by the client, the theory produces a novel set of predictions that diverge from standard transaction cost and property rights reasoning; that is, greater contractor property rights are associated with more transaction-specific investments by the client. Contractor property rights are also predicted to increase as environmental uncertainty increases and as more applications of the technology fall outside the client's intended fields of use. Contract-level data from 147 RD&amp;E agreements in technology-intensive settings provide support for these predictions. A secondary examination shows that clients who share property rights with their contractors face reduced opportunism during project execution. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2075" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Does bribery in the home country promote or dampen firm exports?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2075</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Does bribery in the home country promote or dampen firm exports?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Seung-Hyun Lee, David H. Weng</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-28T08:46:48.182549-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2075</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2075</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2075</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This study examines the impact of bribery within the home country on firm exports by developing two contrasting hypotheses. On the one hand, preferential treatment resulting from government officials in exchange for bribes may promote exports by enhancing efficiency and enabling bribing firms to better compete in foreign markets. On the other hand, preferential treatment resulting from bribes may decrease exports by providing firms with more established positions within the domestic market diminishing the incentive to explore foreign markets. Adopting the three-stage least squares method, we test these competing arguments using a sample of firms operating within transition economies. We find that bribery within the home country decreases rather than increases firm exports. The implications of our findings are discussed</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This study examines the impact of bribery within the home country on firm exports by developing two contrasting hypotheses. On the one hand, preferential treatment resulting from government officials in exchange for bribes may promote exports by enhancing efficiency and enabling bribing firms to better compete in foreign markets. On the other hand, preferential treatment resulting from bribes may decrease exports by providing firms with more established positions within the domestic market diminishing the incentive to explore foreign markets. Adopting the three-stage least squares method, we test these competing arguments using a sample of firms operating within transition economies. We find that bribery within the home country decreases rather than increases firm exports. The implications of our findings are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2072" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Social network contingency, symbolic management, and boundary stretching</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2072</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Social network contingency, symbolic management, and boundary stretching</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Lívia Markóczy, Sunny Li Sun, Mike W. Peng, Weilei (Stone) Shi, Bing Ren</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-28T06:40:14.569812-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2072</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2072</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2072</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>A firm's structural position within corporate networks may affect the extent to which it engages in boundary stretching practices. Since social norms support low CEO compensation, offering high CEO compensation in China can be seen as a boundary stretching practice. Setting up a compensation committee (CC) may be viewed as a form of symbolic management in China. We argue that firms operating within central corporate network positions opt to pay higher CEO compensation without engaging in symbolic management. On the other hand, firms operating in structural hole positions tend to either pay lower CEO compensation or use CCs as a symbolic management tool in order to pay higher CEO compensation. Our hypotheses are largely supported based on 7,618 firm-year observations in China</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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A firm's structural position within corporate networks may affect the extent to which it engages in boundary stretching practices. Since social norms support low CEO compensation, offering high CEO compensation in China can be seen as a boundary stretching practice. Setting up a compensation committee (CC) may be viewed as a form of symbolic management in China. We argue that firms operating within central corporate network positions opt to pay higher CEO compensation without engaging in symbolic management. On the other hand, firms operating in structural hole positions tend to either pay lower CEO compensation or use CCs as a symbolic management tool in order to pay higher CEO compensation. Our hypotheses are largely supported based on 7,618 firm-year observations in China. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2071" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Creating incentives for innovation? The relationship between pay dispersion in R&amp;D groups and firm innovation performance</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2071</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Creating incentives for innovation? The relationship between pay dispersion in R&amp;D groups and firm innovation performance</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Yoshio Yanadori, Victor Cui</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-28T06:19:26.237666-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2071</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2071</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2071</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Innovation is a critical organizational outcome for its potential to generate competitive advantage. While the contribution of knowledge workers to the generation of innovation is widely recognized, little is known about how organizational incentive mechanisms stimulate or inhibit these workers' behaviors that promote innovation. This study examines the relationship between pay dispersion in R&amp;D groups and firm innovation using employee-level compensation data in US high-technology firms. The results show that (1) pay dispersion in R&amp;D groups is negatively related to firm innovation and (2) this negative relationship is alleviated in firms with greater financial slack. This study contributes to the innovation literature by illuminating the implications of organizational incentive systems for successful innovation</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Innovation is a critical organizational outcome for its potential to generate competitive advantage. While the contribution of knowledge workers to the generation of innovation is widely recognized, little is known about how organizational incentive mechanisms stimulate or inhibit these workers' behaviors that promote innovation. This study examines the relationship between pay dispersion in R&amp;D groups and firm innovation using employee-level compensation data in US high-technology firms. The results show that (1) pay dispersion in R&amp;D groups is negatively related to firm innovation and (2) this negative relationship is alleviated in firms with greater financial slack. This study contributes to the innovation literature by illuminating the implications of organizational incentive systems for successful innovation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2111" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Family firms and internationalization-governance relationships: Evidence of secondary agency issues</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2111</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Family firms and internationalization-governance relationships: Evidence of secondary agency issues</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Chitra Singla, Rajaram Veliyath, Rejie George</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-25T08:51:21.119823-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2111</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2111</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2111</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This article documents that blockholders with both ownership and management control in family firms have different goals compared to blockholders with only ownership (but no management) control. We theorize and find evidence that family controlled and family managed (FCFM) firms negatively moderate the relationships between internationalization and governance mechanisms, while family controlled and nonfamily managed (FCNFM) firms do not. The findings indicate that family owners in FCFM firms have greater opportunities to reap private benefits of control indicating the presence of secondary (principal-principal) agency problems, while these problems are mitigated in FCNFM firms. In emerging economies like India where family firms are ubiquitous, they highlight the need to recognize differing blockholder influences on internationalization-governance relationships and to develop more nuanced theorizing for understanding them</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This article documents that blockholders with both ownership and management control in family firms have different goals compared to blockholders with only ownership (but no management) control. We theorize and find evidence that family controlled and family managed (FCFM) firms negatively moderate the relationships between internationalization and governance mechanisms, while family controlled and nonfamily managed (FCNFM) firms do not. The findings indicate that family owners in FCFM firms have greater opportunities to reap private benefits of control indicating the presence of secondary (principal-principal) agency problems, while these problems are mitigated in FCNFM firms. In emerging economies like India where family firms are ubiquitous, they highlight the need to recognize differing blockholder influences on internationalization-governance relationships and to develop more nuanced theorizing for understanding them. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2070" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Financial resource availability and corporate social responsibility expenditures in a sub-saharan economy: The institutional difference hypothesis</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2070</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Financial resource availability and corporate social responsibility expenditures in a sub-saharan economy: The institutional difference hypothesis</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Scott D. Julian, Joseph C. Ofori-dankwa</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-25T08:25:55.438361-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2070</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2070</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2070</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Studies done in developed economies have demonstrated a positive relationship between financial resource availability and CSR. Arguments that we term the Institutional Difference Hypothesis (IDH) drawn from the institutional literature, however, suggest that institutional differences between developed and developing economies are likely to result in different CSR implications. Integrating the logic of IDH with insights from slack resources theory, we argue that there exists a negative relationship between financial resource availability and CSR expenditures for firms in Ghana, a sub-Saharan African emerging economy. We use lagged data from the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre and find that Return on Sales, Return on Equity, and Net Profitability  were consistently associated with lower CSR expenditures. We highlight the implications of our findings for research and managers</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Studies done in developed economies have demonstrated a positive relationship between financial resource availability and CSR. Arguments that we term the Institutional Difference Hypothesis (IDH) drawn from the institutional literature, however, suggest that institutional differences between developed and developing economies are likely to result in different CSR implications. Integrating the logic of IDH with insights from slack resources theory, we argue that there exists a negative relationship between financial resource availability and CSR expenditures for firms in Ghana, a sub-Saharan African emerging economy. We use lagged data from the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre and find that Return on Sales, Return on Equity, and Net Profitability  were consistently associated with lower CSR expenditures. We highlight the implications of our findings for research and managers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2058" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Parenting advantage in the MNC: An embeddedness perspective on the value added by headquarters</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2058</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Parenting advantage in the MNC: An embeddedness perspective on the value added by headquarters</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Phillip C. Nell, BjÖrn Ambos</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-25T08:20:36.731176-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2058</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2058</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2058</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>What determines the value an MNC's headquarters adds to its own affiliates? In this paper, we shed light on this question by linking the embeddedness view of the multinational corporation to the literature on parenting advantage. We test our hypotheses on an original dataset of 124 manufacturing subsidiaries located in Europe. Our results indicate that the external embeddedness of the MNC is an antecedent to headquarters' value creation. We find that headquarters' investments into their own relationships with the subsidiaries' contexts are positively related to the value added by headquarters. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger when the subsidiary itself is strongly embedded. We discuss implications for the MNC literature, embeddedness research, and the literature on parenting and headquarters' roles</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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What determines the value an MNC's headquarters adds to its own affiliates? In this paper, we shed light on this question by linking the embeddedness view of the multinational corporation to the literature on parenting advantage. We test our hypotheses on an original dataset of 124 manufacturing subsidiaries located in Europe. Our results indicate that the external embeddedness of the MNC is an antecedent to headquarters' value creation. We find that headquarters' investments into their own relationships with the subsidiaries' contexts are positively related to the value added by headquarters. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger when the subsidiary itself is strongly embedded. We discuss implications for the MNC literature, embeddedness research, and the literature on parenting and headquarters' roles. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2054" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Product and environmental social performance: Varying effect on firm performance</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2054</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Product and environmental social performance: Varying effect on firm performance</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Satish Jayachandran, Kartik Kalaignanam, Meike Eilert</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-25T08:11:02.058059-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2054</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2054</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2054</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Corporate social performance (CSP) consists of actions in different domains that vary in the information they provide stakeholders, and hence, in their effect on firm performance. To demonstrate this, the authors examine the impact of CSP on firm performance in two areas—the product and the environment, referred to as product social performance (PSP) and environmental social performance (ESP), respectively. PSP has a stronger positive impact on firm performance compared to ESP. The findings using disaggregated measures of PSP and ESP indicate negativity bias in that PSP weakness has a stronger negative impact on firm performance compared to PSP strength</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Corporate social performance (CSP) consists of actions in different domains that vary in the information they provide stakeholders, and hence, in their effect on firm performance. To demonstrate this, the authors examine the impact of CSP on firm performance in two areas—the product and the environment, referred to as product social performance (PSP) and environmental social performance (ESP), respectively. PSP has a stronger positive impact on firm performance compared to ESP. The findings using disaggregated measures of PSP and ESP indicate negativity bias in that PSP weakness has a stronger negative impact on firm performance compared to PSP strength. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2055" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>How firms respond to mandatory information disclosure</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2055</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">How firms respond to mandatory information disclosure</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Anil R. Doshi, Glen W. S. Dowell, Michael W. Toffel</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-25T07:29:44.524133-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2055</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2055</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2055</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Mandatory information disclosure regulations seek to create institutional pressure to spur performance improvement. By examining how organizational characteristics moderate establishments' responses to a prominent environmental information disclosure program, we provide among the first empirical evidence characterizing heterogeneous responses by those mandated to disclose information. We find particularly rapid improvement among establishments located close to their headquarters and among establishments with proximate siblings, especially when the proximate siblings are in the same industry. Large establishments improve more slowly than small establishments in sparse regions, but both groups perform similarly in dense regions, suggesting that density mitigates the power of large establishments to resist institutional pressures. Finally, establishments owned by private firms outperform those owned by public firms. We highlight implications for institutional theory, managers, and policymakers</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Mandatory information disclosure regulations seek to create institutional pressure to spur performance improvement. By examining how organizational characteristics moderate establishments' responses to a prominent environmental information disclosure program, we provide among the first empirical evidence characterizing heterogeneous responses by those mandated to disclose information. We find particularly rapid improvement among establishments located close to their headquarters and among establishments with proximate siblings, especially when the proximate siblings are in the same industry. Large establishments improve more slowly than small establishments in sparse regions, but both groups perform similarly in dense regions, suggesting that density mitigates the power of large establishments to resist institutional pressures. Finally, establishments owned by private firms outperform those owned by public firms. We highlight implications for institutional theory, managers, and policymakers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2085" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Fast-mover advantages: Speed capabilities and entry into the emerging submarket of atlantic basin LNG</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2085</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Fast-mover advantages: Speed capabilities and entry into the emerging submarket of atlantic basin LNG</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ashton Hawk, Gonçalo Pacheco-De-Almeida, Bernard Yeung</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-25T07:00:21.57769-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2085</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2085</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2085</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Entry timing benefits and costs typically vary with firms' capabilities. In this study, we empirically examine the entry timing implications of firms' intrinsic speed capabilities, which refer to the ability to execute investment projects faster than competitors. We hypothesize that firms with intrinsic speed capabilities face low preemption risks and, thus, can afford to wait longer for uncertainty resolution before deciding to enter new markets. This hypothesis is more applicable when investment is associated with higher levels of commitment and, thus, greater option value of waiting. A direct implication is that late entrants with intrinsic speed capabilities should have greater expected post-entry performance. We find support for these hypotheses in the Atlantic Basin liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry from 1996 to 2007</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Entry timing benefits and costs typically vary with firms' capabilities. In this study, we empirically examine the entry timing implications of firms' intrinsic speed capabilities, which refer to the ability to execute investment projects faster than competitors. We hypothesize that firms with intrinsic speed capabilities face low preemption risks and, thus, can afford to wait longer for uncertainty resolution before deciding to enter new markets. This hypothesis is more applicable when investment is associated with higher levels of commitment and, thus, greater option value of waiting. A direct implication is that late entrants with intrinsic speed capabilities should have greater expected post-entry performance. We find support for these hypotheses in the Atlantic Basin liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry from 1996 to 2007. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2051" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Do regions matter? An integrated institutional and semiglobalization perspective on the internationalization of MNEs</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2051</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Do regions matter? An integrated institutional and semiglobalization perspective on the internationalization of MNEs</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Jean-Luc Arregle, Toyah L. Miller, Michael A. Hitt, Paul W. Beamish</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-22T08:55:37.589453-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2051</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2051</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2051</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Traditional research suggests a relationship between country-level institutions and the location choices of MNEs. However, more recent theory suggests MNEs also focus on regions (semiglobalization). Therefore, this study examines institutional effects in the context of semiglobalization by considering the influences of three formal institutions (i.e., regulatory control, political democracy, capital investments) of countries and geographic regions on MNEs' location choices of internationalization. We use a sample of Japanese MNEs operating in 45 countries within eight regions. The results show that their degree of internationalization into a country is influenced by both country and regional institutional environments. Additionally, a semiglobalization perspective provides better explanatory power than does the country-level perspective. These results present a new perspective on how MNEs consider institutional environments in their international strategy</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Traditional research suggests a relationship between country-level institutions and the location choices of MNEs. However, more recent theory suggests MNEs also focus on regions (semiglobalization). Therefore, this study examines institutional effects in the context of semiglobalization by considering the influences of three formal institutions (i.e., regulatory control, political democracy, capital investments) of countries and geographic regions on MNEs' location choices of internationalization. We use a sample of Japanese MNEs operating in 45 countries within eight regions. The results show that their degree of internationalization into a country is influenced by both country and regional institutional environments. Additionally, a semiglobalization perspective provides better explanatory power than does the country-level perspective. These results present a new perspective on how MNEs consider institutional environments in their international strategy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2077" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Competition, governance, and relationship-specific investments: Theory and implications for strategy</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2077</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Competition, governance, and relationship-specific investments: Theory and implications for strategy</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Nan Jia</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-22T08:51:15.839625-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2077</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2077</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2077</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This paper uses biform games to examine the endogenous decision to invest in relationship-specific assets. It addresses the questions of how competition affects suppliers' decisions to produce a general-purpose product or a relationship-specific product for a buyer and under what circumstances a governance arrangement designed to share investment costs between the transacting parties increases the investment in relationship-specific assets. We offer a balanced perspective that emphasizes both the superior transaction value of relationship-specific products and their high transaction costs while considering the competition effects generated by alternative investment plans. The model and its extensions generate new insights into investment decisions regarding relationship-specific assets</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This paper uses biform games to examine the endogenous decision to invest in relationship-specific assets. It addresses the questions of how competition affects suppliers' decisions to produce a general-purpose product or a relationship-specific product for a buyer and under what circumstances a governance arrangement designed to share investment costs between the transacting parties increases the investment in relationship-specific assets. We offer a balanced perspective that emphasizes both the superior transaction value of relationship-specific products and their high transaction costs while considering the competition effects generated by alternative investment plans. The model and its extensions generate new insights into investment decisions regarding relationship-specific assets. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2059" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>A competition-based explanation of collaborative invention within the firm</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2059</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">A competition-based explanation of collaborative invention within the firm</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Puay Khoon Toh, Francisco Polidoro</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-22T08:51:02.327781-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2059</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2059</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2059</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Existing literature shows that collaborative invention within the firm enhances innovativeness by facilitating knowledge recombination. Despite such benefit, firms vary in their use of collaborative invention when drawing on their individual inventors' knowledge. In addressing this puzzle, we argue that competition from rival products building on similar knowledge compels firms to favor search depth over exploratory search and respond expeditiously, thus reducing a firm's inclination toward collaborative invention. In contrast with prior research's focus on how upstream resources influence a firm's position in downstream markets, this study shows that downstream competition drives heterogeneity across firms in their utilization of upstream resources</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Existing literature shows that collaborative invention within the firm enhances innovativeness by facilitating knowledge recombination. Despite such benefit, firms vary in their use of collaborative invention when drawing on their individual inventors' knowledge. In addressing this puzzle, we argue that competition from rival products building on similar knowledge compels firms to favor search depth over exploratory search and respond expeditiously, thus reducing a firm's inclination toward collaborative invention. In contrast with prior research's focus on how upstream resources influence a firm's position in downstream markets, this study shows that downstream competition drives heterogeneity across firms in their utilization of upstream resources. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2112" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>How does CEO tenure matter? The mediating role of firm-employee and firm-customer relationships</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2112</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">How does CEO tenure matter? The mediating role of firm-employee and firm-customer relationships</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Xueming Luo, Vamsi K. Kanuri, Michelle Andrews</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-21T09:51:21.478698-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2112</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2112</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2112</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>While the direct influence of CEO tenure on firm performance has been examined in the strategy literature, the underlying channels of influence have remained largely unexplored. This article draws upon the career seasons paradigm, learning perspectives, and marketing literature to examine whether firm-employee and firm-customer relationships are the pathways through which CEO tenure influences firm performance. Results from the analysis of a large data set reveal that: (1) CEO tenure has a positive and linear association with firm-employee relationship strength but an inverted U-shaped association with firm-customer relationship strength; (2) industry uncertainty intensifies these associations; and (3) firm-employee and firm-customer relationship strength mediate the effects of CEO tenure on firm performance. These findings have implications for a more balanced and nuanced view of CEO tenure</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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While the direct influence of CEO tenure on firm performance has been examined in the strategy literature, the underlying channels of influence have remained largely unexplored. This article draws upon the career seasons paradigm, learning perspectives, and marketing literature to examine whether firm-employee and firm-customer relationships are the pathways through which CEO tenure influences firm performance. Results from the analysis of a large data set reveal that: (1) CEO tenure has a positive and linear association with firm-employee relationship strength but an inverted U-shaped association with firm-customer relationship strength; (2) industry uncertainty intensifies these associations; and (3) firm-employee and firm-customer relationship strength mediate the effects of CEO tenure on firm performance. These findings have implications for a more balanced and nuanced view of CEO tenure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2110" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>From core to periphery and back: A study on the deliberate shaping of knowledge flows in interfirm dyads and networks</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2110</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">From core to periphery and back: A study on the deliberate shaping of knowledge flows in interfirm dyads and networks</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Andrea Lipparini, Gianni Lorenzoni, Simone Ferriani</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-21T09:38:24.093334-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2110</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2110</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2110</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We study 892 Italian motorcycle industry projects carried out via 184 different buyer–supplier and supplier-supplier relationships to provide evidence on the knowledge dynamics occurring in dyads and networks and to understand the underexplored but important (perhaps even dominant) leading role that some firms play in the evolution of networks and interfirm learning processes. We develop a multiphase model which, from a multilevel perspective addressing different relational subsets, suggests how firms can best organize to generate and exchange knowledge efficiently. We argue that extant theoretical perspectives can profitably draw on our findings to strengthen their dynamic components and help them explain the widely diffused ‘exploring through partner’ strategies more effectively</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We study 892 Italian motorcycle industry projects carried out via 184 different buyer–supplier and supplier-supplier relationships to provide evidence on the knowledge dynamics occurring in dyads and networks and to understand the underexplored but important (perhaps even dominant) leading role that some firms play in the evolution of networks and interfirm learning processes. We develop a multiphase model which, from a multilevel perspective addressing different relational subsets, suggests how firms can best organize to generate and exchange knowledge efficiently. We argue that extant theoretical perspectives can profitably draw on our findings to strengthen their dynamic components and help them explain the widely diffused ‘exploring through partner’ strategies more effectively. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2046" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>When does ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2046</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">When does ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Kurt A. Desender, Ruth V. Aguilera, Rafel Crespi, Miguel GarcÍa-cestona</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-21T09:30:39.277213-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2046</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2046</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2046</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We develop a contingency approach to explain how firm ownership influences the monitoring function of the board—measured as the magnitude of external audit fees contracted by the board—by extending agency theory to incorporate the resource dependence notion that boards have distinct incentives and abilities to monitor management. Analyses of data on Continental European companies reveal that while board independence and audit services are complementary when ownership is dispersed, this is not the case when ownership is concentrated—suggesting that ownership concentration and board composition become substitutes in terms of monitoring management. Additional analysis shows that the relationship between board composition and external audit fees is also contingent upon the type of the controlling shareholder</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We develop a contingency approach to explain how firm ownership influences the monitoring function of the board—measured as the magnitude of external audit fees contracted by the board—by extending agency theory to incorporate the resource dependence notion that boards have distinct incentives and abilities to monitor management. Analyses of data on Continental European companies reveal that while board independence and audit services are complementary when ownership is dispersed, this is not the case when ownership is concentrated—suggesting that ownership concentration and board composition become substitutes in terms of monitoring management. Additional analysis shows that the relationship between board composition and external audit fees is also contingent upon the type of the controlling shareholder. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2057" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Intra-industry diversification and firm performance</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2057</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Intra-industry diversification and firm performance</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Talli Zahavi, Dovev Lavie</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-21T09:20:46.489683-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2057</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2057</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2057</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We study how intra-industry product diversity affects firm performance by analyzing the implications of expanding a firm's product line within its core business. We conjecture that increases in product diversity initially undermine performance because of negative transfer effects but then improve it due to economies of scope. We further theorize that this U-shaped effect of product diversity becomes more pronounced as the firm increases the intensity of its technology investment, yet is likely to be attenuated by the firm's accumulated experience with intra-industry diversification. Data on 156 U.S.-based software firms operating from 1990 to 2001 furnish support for these conjectures. Our study advances emerging research on intra-industry diversification by underscoring some of its contingent performance effects</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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We study how intra-industry product diversity affects firm performance by analyzing the implications of expanding a firm's product line within its core business. We conjecture that increases in product diversity initially undermine performance because of negative transfer effects but then improve it due to economies of scope. We further theorize that this U-shaped effect of product diversity becomes more pronounced as the firm increases the intensity of its technology investment, yet is likely to be attenuated by the firm's accumulated experience with intra-industry diversification. Data on 156 U.S.-based software firms operating from 1990 to 2001 furnish support for these conjectures. Our study advances emerging research on intra-industry diversification by underscoring some of its contingent performance effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2117" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Unraveling the mechanisms of reputation and alliance formation: A study of venture capital syndication in china</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2117</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Unraveling the mechanisms of reputation and alliance formation: A study of venture capital syndication in china</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Qian Gu, Xiaohui Lu</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-21T06:29:30.23444-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2117</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2117</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2117</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Extant research shows that resources are significant to a firm's choice of alliance formation. We focus on an important form of intangible resource—firm reputation—and examine how it affects a firm's propensity to form alliances. We propose an inverted U-shaped relationship between a firm's reputation and its likelihood of alliance formation, resulting from the opposing mechanisms of opportunity and need. We also examine how this relationship may vary across two contingencies: (1) foreign and domestic firms; and (2) different levels of institutional development. Empirical analyses of China's venture capital (VC) industry provide support for our hypotheses</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Extant research shows that resources are significant to a firm's choice of alliance formation. We focus on an important form of intangible resource—firm reputation—and examine how it affects a firm's propensity to form alliances. We propose an inverted U-shaped relationship between a firm's reputation and its likelihood of alliance formation, resulting from the opposing mechanisms of opportunity and need. We also examine how this relationship may vary across two contingencies: (1) foreign and domestic firms; and (2) different levels of institutional development. Empirical analyses of China's venture capital (VC) industry provide support for our hypotheses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2113" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Clear and present danger: Planning and new venture survival amid political and civil violence</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2113</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Clear and present danger: Planning and new venture survival amid political and civil violence</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Shon R. Hiatt, Wesley D. Sine</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-14T11:28:26.411191-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2113</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2113</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2113</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Many entrepreneurs in developing economies face unstable environments due to violence and civil unrest. Yet, we know very little about how environments characterized by high levels of political and civil violence affect new venture processes and survival. Moreover, it is unclear whether standard theories about organizational strategy, such as planning, hold true in such environments. We explore these issues using a sample of 730 new ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001. We find that political and civil violence decreases firm survival, increases the benefits of incremental (operational) planning, and decreases the benefits of comprehensive (strategic) planning</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Many entrepreneurs in developing economies face unstable environments due to violence and civil unrest. Yet, we know very little about how environments characterized by high levels of political and civil violence affect new venture processes and survival. Moreover, it is unclear whether standard theories about organizational strategy, such as planning, hold true in such environments. We explore these issues using a sample of 730 new ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001. We find that political and civil violence decreases firm survival, increases the benefits of incremental (operational) planning, and decreases the benefits of comprehensive (strategic) planning. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2060" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Why pure strategies may be wrong for transition economy firms</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2060</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Why pure strategies may be wrong for transition economy firms</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">George A. Shinkle, Aldas P. Kriauciunas, Greg Hundley</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-13T11:20:56.869077-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2060</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2060</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2060</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>The strategy purity hypothesis argues firms will have better results pursuing a single, business-level strategy of either cost leadership or differentiation rather than a mix of both. Since this claim implicitly assumes a developed-economy context, we examine the efficacy of business strategies in transition economies. We find the benefits of a pure strategy are diminished when the institutional environment has a low degree of market orientation but are increased when the institutional environment is more market oriented. Our results indicate a boundary condition for the strategy purity hypothesis and support arguments for an institution-based view of business strategy</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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The strategy purity hypothesis argues firms will have better results pursuing a single, business-level strategy of either cost leadership or differentiation rather than a mix of both. Since this claim implicitly assumes a developed-economy context, we examine the efficacy of business strategies in transition economies. We find the benefits of a pure strategy are diminished when the institutional environment has a low degree of market orientation but are increased when the institutional environment is more market oriented. Our results indicate a boundary condition for the strategy purity hypothesis and support arguments for an institution-based view of business strategy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2056" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Market frictions as building blocks of an organizational economics approach to strategic management</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2056</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Market frictions as building blocks of an organizational economics approach to strategic management</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Joseph T. Mahoney, Lihong Qian</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-13T11:16:14.709786-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2056</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2056</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2056</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This paper shows that market frictions are fundamental building blocks for an organizational economics approach to strategic management. Various organizational economic approaches (transaction costs, property rights, real options, and resource-based) have distinctive focal problems and emphasize different combinations of market frictions. A wider recognition of the role of market frictions is useful for three main objectives. First, it helps identify an evolving market-frictions paradigm in strategic management. Second, it shows how two primary questions in strategy of why firms exist and why some firms outperform others and the three primary strategic goals of cost minimization, value creation, and value capture can be better joined and evaluated. Third, different combinations of market frictions can generate new research questions and advance theory development in the strategic management field</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>This paper shows that market frictions are fundamental building blocks for an organizational economics approach to strategic management. Various organizational economic approaches (transaction costs, property rights, real options, and resource-based) have distinctive focal problems and emphasize different combinations of market frictions. A wider recognition of the role of market frictions is useful for three main objectives. First, it helps identify an evolving market-frictions paradigm in strategic management. Second, it shows how two primary questions in strategy of why firms exist and why some firms outperform others and the three primary strategic goals of cost minimization, value creation, and value capture can be better joined and evaluated. Third, different combinations of market frictions can generate new research questions and advance theory development in the strategic management field. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2062" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Reconceptualizing plural sourcing</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2062</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Reconceptualizing plural sourcing</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Anna Krzeminska, Glenn Hoetker, Thomas Mellewigt</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-08T15:27:29.837579-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2062</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2062</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2062</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Firms often procure the same input via multiple means, e.g., making and buying. Recent papers have yielded rich, but inconsistent, theoretical and empirical insights. Resolving these inconsistencies requires reconceptualizing two aspects of plural sourcing: what and how. We reconceptualize plural sourcing as a set of combined governance modes—make-and-buy, make-and-ally, and buy-and-ally—which differ in their capabilities and limitations. We demonstrate our reconceptualization's potential with propositions predicting the choice of specific plural sourcing modes</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Firms often procure the same input via multiple means, e.g., making and buying. Recent papers have yielded rich, but inconsistent, theoretical and empirical insights. Resolving these inconsistencies requires reconceptualizing two aspects of plural sourcing: what and how. We reconceptualize plural sourcing as a set of combined governance modes—make-and-buy, make-and-ally, and buy-and-ally—which differ in their capabilities and limitations. We demonstrate our reconceptualization's potential with propositions predicting the choice of specific plural sourcing modes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2049" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>How constraints and knowledge impact open innovation</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2049</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">How constraints and knowledge impact open innovation</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Helena Garriga, Georg von Krogh, Sebastian Spaeth</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-06T13:23:38.612833-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2049</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2049</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2049</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Laursen and Salter (2006) examined the impact of a firm's search strategy for external knowledge on innovative performance. Based on organizational learning and open innovation literature, we extend the model hypothesizing that the search strategy itself is impacted by firm context. That is, both ‘constraints on the application of firm resources’ and the ‘abundance of external knowledge’ have a direct impact on innovative performance and a firm's search strategy in terms of breadth and depth. Based on a survey of Swiss-based firms, we find that constraints decrease and external knowledge increases innovative performance. Although constraints lead to a broader but shallower search, external knowledge is associated with the breadth and the depth of the search in a U-shaped relationship</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Laursen and Salter (2006) examined the impact of a firm's search strategy for external knowledge on innovative performance. Based on organizational learning and open innovation literature, we extend the model hypothesizing that the search strategy itself is impacted by firm context. That is, both ‘constraints on the application of firm resources’ and the ‘abundance of external knowledge’ have a direct impact on innovative performance and a firm's search strategy in terms of breadth and depth. Based on a survey of Swiss-based firms, we find that constraints decrease and external knowledge increases innovative performance. Although constraints lead to a broader but shallower search, external knowledge is associated with the breadth and the depth of the search in a U-shaped relationship. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2052" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Discourse revisited: Dimensions and employment of first-order strategy discourse during institutional adoption</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2052</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Discourse revisited: Dimensions and employment of first-order strategy discourse during institutional adoption</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">SOTIRIOS PAROUTIS, LOIZOS HERACLEOUS</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-06T06:08:29.94334-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2052</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2052</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2052</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Despite decades of research on strategy, we still know little about what the concept of strategy means to actual strategists and how they use it in practice. Working at the intersections of institutional and practice theories, we use exploratory interviews with strategy directors and a longitudinal case study to uncover four dimensions of first-order strategy discourse: functional, contextual, identity, and metaphorical. We also reveal three phases in the interrelation between first-order strategy discourse and institutional work: shaping, settling, and selling and a differential emphasis (selective focusing) on dimensions of the first-order strategy discourse during the institutional adoption process. We contribute to a deeper understanding of the concept of strategy in practice, the process of institutional adoption, and of the role of discourse in this process</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>Despite decades of research on strategy, we still know little about what the concept of strategy means to actual strategists and how they use it in practice. Working at the intersections of institutional and practice theories, we use exploratory interviews with strategy directors and a longitudinal case study to uncover four dimensions of first-order strategy discourse: functional, contextual, identity, and metaphorical. We also reveal three phases in the interrelation between first-order strategy discourse and institutional work: shaping, settling, and selling and a differential emphasis (selective focusing) on dimensions of the first-order strategy discourse during the institutional adoption process. We contribute to a deeper understanding of the concept of strategy in practice, the process of institutional adoption, and of the role of discourse in this process. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2050" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Software firm turnarounds in the 1990s: An analysis of reversing decline in a growing, dynamic industry</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2050</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Software firm turnarounds in the 1990s: An analysis of reversing decline in a growing, dynamic industry</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">HERMANN Achidi NDOFOR, JEFF VANEVENHOVEN, VINCENT L. BARKER</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-01T03:50:33.916025-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2050</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2050</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2050</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Investigations into management actions that reverse organizational decline have produced inconsistent findings. Prior studies have focused on the value of retrenchment actions versus strategic actions to engineer a performance turnaround. These studies, however, have generally not controlled for the cause of firm decline, overlooking a major theoretical contingency. Examining prepackaged software firms in the 1990s, we test the association of strategic and retrenchment actions in facilitating turnarounds in a munificent industry. The results show that measures of strategic actions—new product introductions, strategic alliances, and acquisitions—were positively associated with turnarounds. Conversely, measures of retrenchment actions—layoffs, asset reductions, and product withdrawals—were negatively associated with performance recovery. Our results suggest declining firms in munificent industries cannot retrench their way back to prosperity</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Investigations into management actions that reverse organizational decline have produced inconsistent findings. Prior studies have focused on the value of retrenchment actions versus strategic actions to engineer a performance turnaround. These studies, however, have generally not controlled for the cause of firm decline, overlooking a major theoretical contingency. Examining prepackaged software firms in the 1990s, we test the association of strategic and retrenchment actions in facilitating turnarounds in a munificent industry. The results show that measures of strategic actions—new product introductions, strategic alliances, and acquisitions—were positively associated with turnarounds. Conversely, measures of retrenchment actions—layoffs, asset reductions, and product withdrawals—were negatively associated with performance recovery. Our results suggest declining firms in munificent industries cannot retrench their way back to prosperity. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2068" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Are there always synergies between productive resources and resource deployment capabilities?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2068</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Are there always synergies between productive resources and resource deployment capabilities?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Marco D. Huesch</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-28T03:17:08.084585-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2068</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2068</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2068</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>While the independent impacts of particular firm resources and deployment capabilities on firm performance are unambiguous cornerstones of the strategy field, it is commonly assumed that their joint impacts are synergistic. This article seeks to understand whether this common misconception of resource-based theory can be refuted empirically. Using data from hospitals conducting specialist surgery, I find hospital performance improves independently through better surgical resource quality and from more use of a streamlined form of resource management in which overall patient team leadership and operating team leadership are held by the same physician. Generally the interaction of these two firm activities had no impact on performance. These results contribute to the strategy field's understanding of whether and when internal fit affects performance, clarifying an incorrect inference commonly made about resource-based theory</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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While the independent impacts of particular firm resources and deployment capabilities on firm performance are unambiguous cornerstones of the strategy field, it is commonly assumed that their joint impacts are synergistic. This article seeks to understand whether this common misconception of resource-based theory can be refuted empirically. Using data from hospitals conducting specialist surgery, I find hospital performance improves independently through better surgical resource quality and from more use of a streamlined form of resource management in which overall patient team leadership and operating team leadership are held by the same physician. Generally the interaction of these two firm activities had no impact on performance. These results contribute to the strategy field's understanding of whether and when internal fit affects performance, clarifying an incorrect inference commonly made about resource-based theory. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2047" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Biases in the selection stage of bottom-up strategy formulation</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2047</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Biases in the selection stage of bottom-up strategy formulation</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Markus Reitzig, Olav Sorenson</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-22T11:51:07.677556-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2047</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2047</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2047</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We propose that the failure to adopt an idea or innovation can arise from an in-group bias among employees within an organizational subunit that leads the subunit's members to undervalue systematically ideas associated with members of the organization outside their subunit. Such biases in internal selection processes can stymie organizational adaptation and therefore depress the performance of the firm. Analyzing data on innovation proposals inside a large, multinational consumer goods firm, we find that evaluators are biased in favor of ideas submitted by individuals that work in the same division and facility as they do, particularly when they belong to small or high-status subunits</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd</p></div>
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We propose that the failure to adopt an idea or innovation can arise from an in-group bias among employees within an organizational subunit that leads the subunit's members to undervalue systematically ideas associated with members of the organization outside their subunit. Such biases in internal selection processes can stymie organizational adaptation and therefore depress the performance of the firm. Analyzing data on innovation proposals inside a large, multinational consumer goods firm, we find that evaluators are biased in favor of ideas submitted by individuals that work in the same division and facility as they do, particularly when they belong to small or high-status subunits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2074" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Implications of internal organization structure for firm boundaries</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2074</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Implications of internal organization structure for firm boundaries</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Carmen Weigelt, Douglas J. Miller</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-13T11:22:51.474595-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2074</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2074</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2074</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Knowledge issues are central to governance choice. Organization structure influences knowledge flows and costs of knowledge creation and exchange inside the firm. Yet the question of how a firm's internal structure affects its governance choice for new activities has received scant empirical attention. We examine the role of internal structure, specifically unit autonomy and lateral coordination, in a firm's governance decision for new, knowledge-intensive activities. The findings show that internal structure is a ‘shift parameter’ that affects governance choice by moderating the relationship between task complexity and degree of integration. The empirical setting is the U.S. banking industry and its adoption of Internet banking</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Knowledge issues are central to governance choice. Organization structure influences knowledge flows and costs of knowledge creation and exchange inside the firm. Yet the question of how a firm's internal structure affects its governance choice for new activities has received scant empirical attention. We examine the role of internal structure, specifically unit autonomy and lateral coordination, in a firm's governance decision for new, knowledge-intensive activities. The findings show that internal structure is a ‘shift parameter’ that affects governance choice by moderating the relationship between task complexity and degree of integration. The empirical setting is the U.S. banking industry and its adoption of Internet banking. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2042" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Extending the firm vs. industry debate: Does industry life cycle stage matter?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2042</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Extending the firm vs. industry debate: Does industry life cycle stage matter?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ekaterina V. Karniouchina, Stephen J. Carson, Jeremy C. Short, David J. Ketchen</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-12T11:55:20.324891-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2042</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2042</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2042</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>A series of Strategic Management Journal studies have debated the extent to which business-unit, corporate parent, and industry effects explain variance in firm performance. Despite evidence that the industry life cycle impacts competition and performance, the life cycle concept has yet to be incorporated into the firm vs. industry debate. Building on ideas from systems theory, we use longitudinal data from 1,957 firms in 49 industries to examine the relative importance of business-unit, corporate parent, and industry effects during the growth, maturity, and decline stages of the industry life cycle. We find that corporate parent and industry effects increase as industries move through the life cycle while business-unit effects decrease between maturity and decline. Thus, the life cycle concept should be incorporated within the firm vs. industry debate</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd</p></div>
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A series of Strategic Management Journal studies have debated the extent to which business-unit, corporate parent, and industry effects explain variance in firm performance. Despite evidence that the industry life cycle impacts competition and performance, the life cycle concept has yet to be incorporated into the firm vs. industry debate. Building on ideas from systems theory, we use longitudinal data from 1,957 firms in 49 industries to examine the relative importance of business-unit, corporate parent, and industry effects during the growth, maturity, and decline stages of the industry life cycle. We find that corporate parent and industry effects increase as industries move through the life cycle while business-unit effects decrease between maturity and decline. Thus, the life cycle concept should be incorporated within the firm vs. industry debate. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2073" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Venture capitalists' decision to withdraw: The role of portfolio configuration from a real options lens</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2073</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Venture capitalists' decision to withdraw: The role of portfolio configuration from a real options lens</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Yong Li, Tailan Chi</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-12T11:27:01.399642-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2073</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2073</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2073</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>When does a venture capital firm withdraw from an investment project prior to its completion? This study offers a real options view on this decision by examining the contingent effects of portfolio configuration. We explore how project withdrawal can be influenced by two distinct dimensions of portfolio configuration, portfolio focus in a strategic domain and portfolio diversity across multiple domains. The empirical analysis shows that while portfolio focus weakens the negative effect of industry-level uncertainty on a venture capitalist's propensity to withdraw from a project, portfolio diversity strengthens the effect of uncertainty. This study informs current research on the boundary of real options theory and sheds light on the behavior of venture capitalists in financing entrepreneurship</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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When does a venture capital firm withdraw from an investment project prior to its completion? This study offers a real options view on this decision by examining the contingent effects of portfolio configuration. We explore how project withdrawal can be influenced by two distinct dimensions of portfolio configuration, portfolio focus in a strategic domain and portfolio diversity across multiple domains. The empirical analysis shows that while portfolio focus weakens the negative effect of industry-level uncertainty on a venture capitalist's propensity to withdraw from a project, portfolio diversity strengthens the effect of uncertainty. This study informs current research on the boundary of real options theory and sheds light on the behavior of venture capitalists in financing entrepreneurship. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2066" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Platform competition: Strategic trade-offs in platform markets</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2066</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Platform competition: Strategic trade-offs in platform markets</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Carmelo Cennamo, Juan Santalo</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-08T08:29:31.410323-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2066</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2066</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2066</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Because the literature on platform competition emphasizes the role of network effects, it prescribes rapidly expanding a network of platform users and complementary applications to capture entire markets. We challenge the unconditional logic of a winner-take-all (WTA) approach by empirically analyzing the dominant strategies used to build and position platform systems in the U.S. video game industry. We show that when platform firms pursue two popular WTA strategies concurrently and with equal intensity (growing the number and variety of applications while also securing a larger fraction of those applications with exclusivity agreements), it diminishes the benefits of each strategy to the point that it lowers platform performance. We also show that a differentiation strategy based on distinctive positioning improves a platform's performance only when a platform system is highly distinctive relative to its rivals. Our results suggest that platform competition is shaped by important strategic trade-offs and that the WTA approach will not be universally successful</em>.</p></div>
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Because the literature on platform competition emphasizes the role of network effects, it prescribes rapidly expanding a network of platform users and complementary applications to capture entire markets. We challenge the unconditional logic of a winner-take-all (WTA) approach by empirically analyzing the dominant strategies used to build and position platform systems in the U.S. video game industry. We show that when platform firms pursue two popular WTA strategies concurrently and with equal intensity (growing the number and variety of applications while also securing a larger fraction of those applications with exclusivity agreements), it diminishes the benefits of each strategy to the point that it lowers platform performance. We also show that a differentiation strategy based on distinctive positioning improves a platform's performance only when a platform system is highly distinctive relative to its rivals. Our results suggest that platform competition is shaped by important strategic trade-offs and that the WTA approach will not be universally successful.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2041" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Necessity as the mother of ‘green’ inventions: Institutional pressures and environmental innovations</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2041</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Necessity as the mother of ‘green’ inventions: Institutional pressures and environmental innovations</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Pascual Berrone, Andrea Fosfuri, Liliana Gelabert, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-21T12:53:51.540082-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2041</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2041</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2041</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Drawing on institutional theory and innovation literature, we argue that greater regulatory and normative pressures concerning environmental issues positively influence companies' propensity to engage in environmental innovation. Analysis of environment-related patents of 326 publicly traded firms from polluting industries in the United States suggests that institutional pressures can trigger such innovation, especially in those firms displaying a greater deficiency gap (i.e., firms polluting relatively more than their industry peers). Moreover, we find that this effect is stronger when asset specificity is high, and that the availability of resources plays different roles depending on the type of pressures (regulatory vs. normative).Copyright © 2012 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd</em>.</p></div>
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Drawing on institutional theory and innovation literature, we argue that greater regulatory and normative pressures concerning environmental issues positively influence companies' propensity to engage in environmental innovation. Analysis of environment-related patents of 326 publicly traded firms from polluting industries in the United States suggests that institutional pressures can trigger such innovation, especially in those firms displaying a greater deficiency gap (i.e., firms polluting relatively more than their industry peers). Moreover, we find that this effect is stronger when asset specificity is high, and that the availability of resources plays different roles depending on the type of pressures (regulatory vs. normative).Copyright © 2012 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2040" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Does good governance prevent bad strategy? A study of corporate governance, financial diversification, and value creation by French corporations, 2000–2006</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2040</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Does good governance prevent bad strategy? A study of corporate governance, financial diversification, and value creation by French corporations, 2000–2006</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Xavier Castañer, Nikolaos Kavadis</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-21T12:53:38.888542-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2040</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2040</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2040</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Building on and extending prior research, we propose a comprehensive framework which posits that free cash flow moderates the impact of corporate governance on financial diversification. We argue that because it increases CEO perceived risk, alignment devices increase rather than decrease financial diversification. In a sample of 59 publicly traded French corporations during 2000–2006, we show that financial diversification negatively impacts shareholder return and firm value. We obtain support for several of our hypotheses: at high levels of free cash flow, CEO variable compensation increases financial diversification, whereas chairman/CEO non-duality reduces it. In contrast, independent directors increase financial diversification at low values of free cash flow (although weakly). We also find that ownership concentration only reduces financial diversification when free cash flow is low.Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd</em>.</p></div>
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Building on and extending prior research, we propose a comprehensive framework which posits that free cash flow moderates the impact of corporate governance on financial diversification. We argue that because it increases CEO perceived risk, alignment devices increase rather than decrease financial diversification. In a sample of 59 publicly traded French corporations during 2000–2006, we show that financial diversification negatively impacts shareholder return and firm value. We obtain support for several of our hypotheses: at high levels of free cash flow, CEO variable compensation increases financial diversification, whereas chairman/CEO non-duality reduces it. In contrast, independent directors increase financial diversification at low values of free cash flow (although weakly). We also find that ownership concentration only reduces financial diversification when free cash flow is low.Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2039" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Group polarization on corporate boards: Theory and evidence on board decisions about acquisition premiums</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2039</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Group polarization on corporate boards: Theory and evidence on board decisions about acquisition premiums</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">David H. Zhu</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-16T11:55:31.464377-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2039</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2039</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2039</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This study investigates how a fundamental group decision-making bias referred to as group polarization can influence boards' acquisition premium decisions. The theory suggests that when prior premium experience would lead directors on average to support a relatively high premium prior to board discussions, they will support a focal premium that is even higher after discussions; but when directors' prior premium experience would lead them on average to support a relatively low premium prior to board discussions, they will support a focal premium that is even lower after discussions. Results provided strong support for the theory. Moreover, group polarization was reduced by demographic homogeneity among directors and by minority expertise but increased by board influence. This study introduces a fundamental group decision-making bias into governance research and explains how group processes can influence network diffusions</em>. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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This study investigates how a fundamental group decision-making bias referred to as group polarization can influence boards' acquisition premium decisions. The theory suggests that when prior premium experience would lead directors on average to support a relatively high premium prior to board discussions, they will support a focal premium that is even higher after discussions; but when directors' prior premium experience would lead them on average to support a relatively low premium prior to board discussions, they will support a focal premium that is even lower after discussions. Results provided strong support for the theory. Moreover, group polarization was reduced by demographic homogeneity among directors and by minority expertise but increased by board influence. This study introduces a fundamental group decision-making bias into governance research and explains how group processes can influence network diffusions. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2032" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Property rights and international investment in information technology services</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2032</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Property rights and international investment in information technology services</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Srividya Jandhyala</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-11-29T08:50:22.398367-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2032</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2032</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2032</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Many modern information technology services are increasingly being produced in a host country to serve clients in an offshore location. As a result, the internationalization of service functions is beginning to resemble that of their more traditional manufacturing counterparts. This paper examines the role of formal and de facto property rights protection in the offshore location choice of information technology services. I also explore the role of a firm's global subsidiary network and its experience with similar property rights regimes. Using investment data based on 152 firms and their international information service investments between 2002–2006, the empirical results highlight the role of de facto property rights protection and related experience in location choice.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Many modern information technology services are increasingly being produced in a host country to serve clients in an offshore location. As a result, the internationalization of service functions is beginning to resemble that of their more traditional manufacturing counterparts. This paper examines the role of formal and de facto property rights protection in the offshore location choice of information technology services. I also explore the role of a firm's global subsidiary network and its experience with similar property rights regimes. Using investment data based on 152 firms and their international information service investments between 2002–2006, the empirical results highlight the role of de facto property rights protection and related experience in location choice.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2043" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Small forces and large firms: Foundations of the RBV</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2043</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Small forces and large firms: Foundations of the RBV</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Birger Wernerfelt</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-11T11:10:39.538566-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2043</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2043</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2043</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Prospectives</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">635</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">643</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>The article presents a synthesis of several papers I have written, mostly in the economics literature, since the publication of ‘A resource-based view of the firm’ (Wernerfelt, 1984). The starting point is a very small force: the reduction in bargaining costs when several bargains are pooled into one. I show how one can construct a theory of the firm based on this force and defend the theory by arguing that it makes predictions consistent with several stylized facts. In addition, the theory suggests that firms should decide on their strategy and scope based on excess capacity of productive resources—exactly like the RBV</em>.</p></div>
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The article presents a synthesis of several papers I have written, mostly in the economics literature, since the publication of ‘A resource-based view of the firm’ (Wernerfelt, 1984). The starting point is a very small force: the reduction in bargaining costs when several bargains are pooled into one. I show how one can construct a theory of the firm based on this force and defend the theory by arguing that it makes predictions consistent with several stylized facts. In addition, the theory suggests that firms should decide on their strategy and scope based on excess capacity of productive resources—exactly like the RBV.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2036" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Value creation in university-firm research collaborations: A matching approach</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2036</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Value creation in university-firm research collaborations: A matching approach</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Denisa Mindruta</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-12-21T09:31:55.71496-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2036</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2036</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2036</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">644</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">665</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>University-based technological opportunities are often exploited through joint corporate and academic entrepreneurship activities such as university–industry research collaborations. This paper explores the partner attributes that drive the matching of academic scientists and firms involved in these relationships. The paper models the formation of firm–faculty partnership as an endogenous selection process driven by synergy between partners' knowledge-creation capabilities. The main findings indicate that faculty–firm matching is multidimensional: firms and scientists complement each other in publishing capabilities but substitute each other in patenting skills. Furthermore, firms and scientists with specialized knowledge create more value by teaming with more knowledge-diversified partners. The paper contributes to the literature on university–industry knowledge transfer and, more generally, to the literature on alliance formation.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>University-based technological opportunities are often exploited through joint corporate and academic entrepreneurship activities such as university–industry research collaborations. This paper explores the partner attributes that drive the matching of academic scientists and firms involved in these relationships. The paper models the formation of firm–faculty partnership as an endogenous selection process driven by synergy between partners' knowledge-creation capabilities. The main findings indicate that faculty–firm matching is multidimensional: firms and scientists complement each other in publishing capabilities but substitute each other in patenting skills. Furthermore, firms and scientists with specialized knowledge create more value by teaming with more knowledge-diversified partners. The paper contributes to the literature on university–industry knowledge transfer and, more generally, to the literature on alliance formation.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2044" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Cutting the Gordian knot: The effect of knowledge complexity on employee mobility and entrepreneurship</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2044</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Cutting the Gordian knot: The effect of knowledge complexity on employee mobility and entrepreneurship</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Martin Ganco</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-12T06:36:53.258596-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2044</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2044</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2044</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">666</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">686</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Employee entrepreneurship and employee moves to rival firms (employee mobility) have both been recognized as critical drivers of the transfer of knowledge. Drawing on a unique database of intra-industry inventor entrepreneurship and mobility events in the U.S. semiconductor industry, I examine the effect of the complexity of inventors' prior patenting activities on their decisions to join a rival firm or found a start-up. The findings show that even though complexity inhibits knowledge diffusion to rival firms through employee mobility, complex knowledge may be underexploited within existing organizations and may still flow to startups through employee entrepreneurship. This study sheds new light on how technology shapes patterns of employee entrepreneurship and mobility, with implications for knowledge flows and competitive dynamics.</p></div>
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Employee entrepreneurship and employee moves to rival firms (employee mobility) have both been recognized as critical drivers of the transfer of knowledge. Drawing on a unique database of intra-industry inventor entrepreneurship and mobility events in the U.S. semiconductor industry, I examine the effect of the complexity of inventors' prior patenting activities on their decisions to join a rival firm or found a start-up. The findings show that even though complexity inhibits knowledge diffusion to rival firms through employee mobility, complex knowledge may be underexploited within existing organizations and may still flow to startups through employee entrepreneurship. This study sheds new light on how technology shapes patterns of employee entrepreneurship and mobility, with implications for knowledge flows and competitive dynamics.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2029" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Toward a theory of intraorganizational attention based on desirability and feasibility factors</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2029</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Toward a theory of intraorganizational attention based on desirability and feasibility factors</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ilídio Barreto, david l. Patient</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-11-22T06:32:52.501818-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2029</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2029</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2029</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">687</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">703</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Why would managers in the same firm differ in their attention to opportunity versus threat aspects of the same exogenous shock? Drawing on the attention-based view, strategic issue
diagnosis theory, and construal level theory, we propose and test a theoretical model of differentiated attention among managers within a firm driven by desirability (shock distance) and feasibility (capability perception) considerations. Managers more distant from the locus of the shock and managers with stronger ex ante perceptions regarding organizational capabilities to address the shock paid more attention to opportunity aspects and less attention to threat aspects. We also found subordination effects between shock distance and capability perception, and a moderating role of domain-specific experience on the effects of capability perception.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Why would managers in the same firm differ in their attention to opportunity versus threat aspects of the same exogenous shock? Drawing on the attention-based view, strategic issue
diagnosis theory, and construal level theory, we propose and test a theoretical model of differentiated attention among managers within a firm driven by desirability (shock distance) and feasibility (capability perception) considerations. Managers more distant from the locus of the shock and managers with stronger ex ante perceptions regarding organizational capabilities to address the shock paid more attention to opportunity aspects and less attention to threat aspects. We also found subordination effects between shock distance and capability perception, and a moderating role of domain-specific experience on the effects of capability perception.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2035" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Performance effects of top management team demographic faultlines in the process of product diversification</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2035</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Performance effects of top management team demographic faultlines in the process of product diversification</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Thomas Hutzschenreuter, Julian Horstkotte</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-12-08T06:53:08.272032-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2035</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2035</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2035</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">704</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">726</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Expanding into new product areas is an important part of the growth strategy of many firms, but there is still more to learn about how it affects firm performance. We believe that as the top management team (TMT) is responsible for coordinating product expansion, looking there can yield valuable clues. We argue that diversification entails significant additional information processing and that this strains top managerial resources. We hypothesize that task-related faultlines within the TMT may help it cope with product expansion while bio-demographic faultlines may hinder it. We find support for these hypotheses on a longitudinal sample of 2,730 expansion steps made by 61 German firms between 1985 and 2007: task related faultline strength increases performance when diversifying, while bio-demographic faultline strength decreases it</em>. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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Expanding into new product areas is an important part of the growth strategy of many firms, but there is still more to learn about how it affects firm performance. We believe that as the top management team (TMT) is responsible for coordinating product expansion, looking there can yield valuable clues. We argue that diversification entails significant additional information processing and that this strains top managerial resources. We hypothesize that task-related faultlines within the TMT may help it cope with product expansion while bio-demographic faultlines may hinder it. We find support for these hypotheses on a longitudinal sample of 2,730 expansion steps made by 61 German firms between 1985 and 2007: task related faultline strength increases performance when diversifying, while bio-demographic faultline strength decreases it. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2109" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The importance of the first relationship: The ongoing influence of initial network on future status</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2109</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The importance of the first relationship: The ongoing influence of initial network on future status</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Hana Milanov, Dean A. Shepherd</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-07T11:43:42.409428-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2109</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2109</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2109</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">727</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">750</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>The current view of network emergence is predominantly influenced by path-dependent mechanisms where immediately preceding network structures inform current network positions. However, less explored is the ongoing sensitivity of future network positions to the composition and structure of newcomers' first partnerships. Building on the social categorization literature, we develop a model of the ongoing direct and moderating effects of newcomers' first network partnership on their status. We test our model using a panel of 272 U.S. venture capital firms from the 1980 to 2004 period and show that the reputation of newcomers' first partners exerts a positive influence on their future status (over and above intermediate network conditions). We find that this positive influence is stronger for those newcomers whose first partners formed a cohesive network</em>. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</p></div>
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The current view of network emergence is predominantly influenced by path-dependent mechanisms where immediately preceding network structures inform current network positions. However, less explored is the ongoing sensitivity of future network positions to the composition and structure of newcomers' first partnerships. Building on the social categorization literature, we develop a model of the ongoing direct and moderating effects of newcomers' first network partnership on their status. We test our model using a panel of 272 U.S. venture capital firms from the 1980 to 2004 period and show that the reputation of newcomers' first partners exerts a positive influence on their future status (over and above intermediate network conditions). We find that this positive influence is stronger for those newcomers whose first partners formed a cohesive network. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2034" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The antecedents and innovation effects of domestic and offshore R&amp;D outsourcing: The contingent impact of cognitive distance and absorptive capacity</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2034</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The antecedents and innovation effects of domestic and offshore R&amp;D outsourcing: The contingent impact of cognitive distance and absorptive capacity</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Olivier Bertrand, Michael J. Mol</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-11-29T09:12:21.404955-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1002/smj.2034</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1002/smj.2034</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1002%2Fsmj.2034</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Research Notes and Commentaries</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">751</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">760</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper analyzes differences in the antecedents and performance consequences of domestic and offshore R&amp;D outsourcing. Offshore outsourcing is characterized by larger cognitive distance. We find that absorptive capacity from internal R&amp;D allows for more offshore outsourcing and that offshore outsourcing leads to more positive innovation outcomes, especially product innovation.</p></div>
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This paper analyzes differences in the antecedents and performance consequences of domestic and offshore R&amp;D outsourcing. Offshore outsourcing is characterized by larger cognitive distance. We find that absorptive capacity from internal R&amp;D allows for more offshore outsourcing and that offshore outsourcing leads to more positive innovation outcomes, especially product innovation.
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