This paper examines soccer teams' strategic choices about the extent of offense/defense to adopt in competing with other teams. The sample is European Champions League group stage matches played between 1997–1998 and 2009–2010. We begin by developing a characterization of teams' strategies (extent of offense or defense) using principal component analysis. This is used to estimate the relationship between a team's probabilities of scoring and conceding goals and its chosen strategy. Knowing that relationship, it is then possible to derive a team's optimal strategy, and to study how this varies in different situations (such as playing at home or away). A comparison between optimal and actual strategy reveals that teams appear to adopt more defensive strategies than is optimal. A notable feature of our study is that we model a team as choosing a strategy at the start of each match and also at half time, thereby incorporating a dynamic element. (JEL C23, C72, L83, Z00)

This paper examines the connection between time preference heterogeneity and economic inequality in a deterministic environment. Specifically, we extend the standard neoclassical growth model to allow for (1) heterogeneity in consumers' discount rates, (2) direct preferences for wealth, and (3) human capital formation. The second feature prevents the wealth distribution from collapsing into a degenerate distribution. The third feature generates a strong positive correlation between earnings and capital income across consumers. A calibrated version of the model is able to generate patterns of wealth and income inequality that are very similar to those observed in the United States. (JEL D31, E21, O15)

We empirically investigate whether the persistence of politicians in political institutions affects the innovation activity of firms. We use 12,000 firm-level observations from three waves of the Italian Observatory over Small and Medium Enterprises, and introduce a measure of political persistence defined as the average length of individual political careers in political institutions of Italian municipalities. Using death of politicians as an exogenous source of variation of political persistence, we find a robust negative relation between political persistence and the probability of process innovation. This finding is consistent with the view that political stability may hinder firms' incentive to innovate to maintain their competitiveness, as long as they can extract rents from long-term connections with politicians. (JEL D22, D72, O31)

How do exchange rate regimes influence fiscal discipline? This important question has typically been addressed exploiting the classic dichotomy of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes assuming perfect capital mobility. However, the role of capital controls cannot be neglected, particularly in developing countries. This paper analyzes the effects of capital controls on fiscal performance by focusing on dual exchange rate regimes. In a model in which the fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a nonbenevolent fiscal authority, dual regimes induce politicians to have higher fiscal deficits than under fixed and flexible regimes operating under perfect capital mobility. The model also shows this effect increases as fiscal authorities become more impatient. Dynamic panel regressions confirm that dual regimes lead to higher fiscal deficits than fixed and flexible regimes operating under unified rates. Using a dummy for pre-electoral year as an indicator of fiscal authorities' shortsightedness, we also confirm that dual exchange rate has a more adverse effect on fiscal deficits as the authorities become more impatient. (JEL E50, E60, F31, F41)

We investigate the effects of leadership in a four-player weak-link game. A weak-link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. We wanted to see whether leadership by example, in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group, could help groups do better. Our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success. Specifically, in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency, but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders. We did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned. (JEL C72, H41)

Contests between groups are prone to intra-group externalities (free-riding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might be undesirable, both individually and socially. In contests between two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound differences in strength between groups. If the groups are of relatively similar strengths, they are both worse off when they rein in their intra-group externalities compared to a situation where they do not. If groups' strengths differ sufficiently, the relatively strong group benefits at the expense of the relatively weak one. (JEL Z13, D72, N40, D74)

This article analyzes the relationship between economic growth and the monitoring of corruption. In our theoretical model, we derive a nonlinear relationship between the level of monitoring and economic growth, as well as between corruption and economic growth. At low monitoring levels, the economy experiences widespread corruption and medium growth rates, whereas no corruption occurs at intermediate monitoring levels, but low growth rates are recorded. At high monitoring levels, no corruption takes place and high growth rates are observed. The model is estimated using a dynamic panel data approach for Italy. Empirical results support the theoretical model. (JEL C33, D73, K42)

We examine behavior in a three-player trust game in which the first player may invest in the second and the second may invest in the third. Any amount sent from one player to the next is tripled. The third player decides the final allocation among three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second players send significant amounts and the third player reciprocates. Allowing insider communication between the second and the third players increases cooperation between these two. Interestingly, there is an external effect of insider communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 54% more and receives 289% more than in the baseline treatment. As a result, insider communication increases efficiency from 44% to 68%. (JEL C72, C91, D72)

This article examines the long-term impact of legalized abortion on childbearing by unwed teenagers in the United States. I find that the 1970 legalization of abortion in the repeal states led to about a 6% reduction in unwed childbearing rates for white women aged 15–20 who were born in these states immediately after abortion became legal. I find a larger long-term impact for African-American women of the same ages: a 7.5%–13% reduction in unwed childbearing. My estimates are smaller and not as precise for the effect of Roe v. Wade. This outcome is not surprising given that I am able to estimate only a potential lower bound of the effect on unwed childbearing rates. On the other hand, when I estimated a Difference-in-Difference regression for the non-repeal states assuming that there was no national trend that affected the childbearing behavior of the treatment age groups and their respective control age groups separately, I found that the true effect of Roe v. Wade on childbearing by unwed teenagers was about an 11% and 3% reductions for white and African-American teenagers, respectively. (JEL J13, I18)

Between the 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 seasons, the National Football League (NFL) repositioned one of its officials in order to prevent injuries among officials. This creates a quasi-experiment for studying how a change in the extent of policing affects detection of offenses. Using play-by-play data from the 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 NFL season, I estimate how the detection of offensive holding changes when the positioning of an official changes. I find that there is approximately a 20 increase in the number of offensive holding penalties called after the NFL repositioned the official. Penalties called on defensive linemen fell as a result of the repositioning. Overall, there was no change in the total number of penalties called. Using the estimated change in the probability of a penalty, I estimate the probability of an official calling a penalty. I infer that NFL officials detect approximately 60% of crimes committed on the field. (JEL K4, Z0, D0)

Debit cards are the fastest growing consumer payment method despite being more expensive and less versatile than credit cards. In this paper, we investigate some of the oft cited explanations for debit card use. Checking account data shows that debit card use is correlated with age, pay frequency, overdrafting, and ATM use, but not income, gender, crime, or expenditure. The data contain some signs that debit cards might be used as a method of spending restraint. (JEL D14, G21, L14)

We report an experiment designed to study whether inefficient firms are systematically driven from overcrowded markets. Our data set includes a series of 3,800 wars of attrition of a type modeled by Fudenberg and Tirole in 1986. We find that exit tends to be efficient and exit times conform surprisingly well to point predictions of the model. Moreover, subjects respond similarly to implementations framed in terms of losses as they do to those framed in terms of gains. (JEL D21, L11, C92)

The time tradeoff (TTO) method is popular in medical decision making for valuing health states. We use it to elicit economists' preferences for publishing in top economic journals and for living without limbs. The economists value journal publications highly and have a clear preference among them, with the American Economic Review (AER) the most preferred. Their responses imply they would sacrifice more than half a thumb for an AER publication. These TTO results are consistent with ranking and willingness to pay results, and indicate that journal preferences are not entirely determined by impact factors or by expectations of a salary increase following a publication in a prestigious journal. (JEL A10, B41, I10)

Every year billions of dollars are spent on research grants to produce new knowledge in universities. However, as grants may also affect other research funding, the effects of financial resources on knowledge production remain unclear. To uncover how financial resources affect knowledge production, we study the effects of research spending itself. Utilizing the legal constraints on university spending from an endowment we develop an instrumental variables approach. Our approach instruments for university research spending with time-series variation in stock prices interacted with cross-sectional variation in initial endowment market values for research universities in the United States. Our analysis reveals that research spending has a substantial positive effect on the number of papers produced, but not their impact. We also demonstrate that research spending effects are quite similar at private and public universities. (JEL H5, I2, O3)

Were the large import fluctuations around the 2007–2009 recession because of increasing trade volatility? I show that import volatility relative to gross domestic product (GDP) increased in the 2000s and examine whether vertical specialization (VS) trade can explain this increase. I develop and calibrate a model of VS trade that generates most of the observed increase in relative import volatility from the 1960s to the 2000s. The increase is because of GDP's shift to less volatile services production. VS trade has a negligible impact. VS causes trade to fall more in recession but also increases the share of output that is traded, leaving volatility unaffected. It increases volatility by shifting trade to more volatile sectors, but this effect is quantitatively small. (JEL E3, F1)

Achievement gaps may reflect the cognitive impairment thought to occur in evaluative settings (e.g., classrooms) where a stereotyped identity is salient (i.e., stereotype threat). This study presents an economic model of stereotype threat that reconciles prior evidence on how student effort and performance are influenced by this social-identity phenomenon. This study also presents empirical evidence from a framed field experiment in which students at a selective college were randomly assigned to a treatment that primed their awareness of a negatively stereotyped identity (i.e., student-athlete). This social-identity manipulation reduced the test-score performance of athletes relative to non-athletes by 12%. These negative performance effects were concentrated among male student-athletes who also responded to the social-identity manipulation by attempting to answer more questions. (JEL I2, C9, D0)

During their meetings, the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) make monetary policy, but they also make each other laugh. This article studies the amount of laughter elicited by members of the FOMC during their meetings. The study finds that a member elicits more laughter if he or she expects higher inflation, other things being equal. This finding suggests that members may use humor to cope with the threat of inflation. (JEL E52, E58, C23)

This paper applies Jones' test for the empirical validity of AK-type models to the Chinese economy over the period 1952–2006 (Jones C. I., Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1995a, 495–525). We aim to establish whether large permanent movements in the physical investment rate cause permanent movements in output growth. The evidence indicates that the one-sector AK model cannot be rejected. We also find that augmenting the model to allow for transitional dynamics—via imbalances in factor endowments, structural transformation, and R&D-based technology transfer—does a better job in describing China's growth dynamics than the basic AK model. (JEL C22, O41, O47)

Draft lottery number assignment during the Vietnam Era provides a natural experiment to examine the effects of military service on crime. Using exact dates of birth for inmates in state and federal prisons in 1979, 1986, and 1991, we find that draft eligibility increases incarceration for violent crimes but decreases incarceration for nonviolent crimes among whites. This is particularly evident in 1979, where two-sample instrumental variable estimates indicate that military service increases the probability of incarceration for a violent crime by 0.34 percentage points and decreases the probability of incarceration for a nonviolent crime by 0.30 percentage points. We conduct two falsification tests, one that applies each of the three binding lotteries to unaffected cohorts and another that considers the effects of lotteries that were not used to draft servicemen. (JEL K42, H56)

Many charitable organizations believe it is worthwhile to solicit very small donations, particularly from young people, because these gifts form a habit of giving which leads to larger donations in the future. Indeed, there is some evidence of a positive correlation between giving when young and giving when old. However, such a correlation, by itself, does not constitute evidence of habit formation. Using data on alumni contributions to a university, we assess whether the correlation is due to habit formation—true state dependence—or to unobservable factors such as affinity to the school. We further examine whether habits form by the mere act of giving or based on the amount given. We implement an instrumental variables approach using the fact that performance of the school's athletic teams and solicitation by one's former roommates generate shocks to giving while young that are plausibly uncorrelated with giving when older. There is strong evidence of habit formation on the extensive margin, but not in the amount given. This finding has important implications for fundraising strategies, charities' accounting practices, and tax policy. (JEL D64, D91, D12)

In the 1980s and 1990s, many states and districts began to provide funding for prekindergarten (PK) programs for the first time. This paper takes advantage of the staggered timing in program funding to investigate the effect that increased availability of PK programs has on the labor supply of mothers with 4-year-olds. I find that mothers with a 4-year-old and no younger children were significantly more likely to be in the labor force and employed once PK became available. Mothers with a 4-year-old and other younger children were also significantly more likely to be in the labor force and employed. (JEL I20, J01, J20)

Using data from U.S. commodity flow survey, we show that the historical Union–Confederacy border lowers contemporaneous trade between U.S. states by about 13%. The finding is robust over econometric models, survey waves, or aggregation levels. Including contemporaneous controls, such as network or institutional variables, lowers the estimate only slightly. Historical variables, such as slavery, do not explain the effect. Adding U.S. states unaffected by the Civil War, we argue that the friction is not merely reflecting unmeasured North–South differences. Finally, the border effect is larger for differentiated than for homogeneous goods, stressing the potential role for cultural factors and trust. (JEL F15, N72, N92, Z10)

This article examines whether the efficiency gains accompanying fiscal decentralization generate higher growth in more decentralized economies, applying pooled-mean group techniques to a panel dataset of 23 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, 1972–2005. We find that spending decentralization has tended to be associated with lower economic growth while revenue decentralization has been associated with higher growth. Since OECD countries are substantially more spending than revenue decentralized, this is consistent with Oates' (1972) hypothesis that maximum efficiency gains require a close match between spending and revenue decentralization. It suggests reducing expenditure decentralization, and simultaneously increasing the fraction financed locally, would be growth-enhancing. (JEL E62, H71, H72)

This article uses both linear and nonlinear causality tests to examine the causal relationships between changes in commodity prices and U.S. inflation. Prior to the Great Moderation, there is evidence that changes in commodity price indices linearly lead inflation. The stability of the causal relationship appears to vary over time with a stronger bivariate link established before the Great Moderation. Further, there is evidence of significant nonlinear causality from raw industrials and metals indices to inflation with most of this detected nonlinear relationship being captured using the Baba, Engle, Kraft, and Kroner asymmetric generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model. This implies that the observed nonlinear Granger causality is largely driven by unanticipated shocks and volatility spillovers in the run-up of commodity prices in late 2000. (JEL C18, C22, E31)

We conduct public goods experiments in which participant groups are heterogeneous in regards to the source of their endowments. We find that this dimension of heterogeneity significantly reduces contributions to the public good, yielding strong support for the Nash prediction of minimal contributions. These minimal contributions arise in environments in which there exists a clear minority in terms of source of endowments. We discuss these results in light of current research on the influence of heterogeneous populations on public goods provision and redistributive policies. (JEL C9, D63, H4, J15)

We study two-player contests in which each player hires a delegate, and the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort. First, we look closely at the delegates' decisions on when to expend their effort, given contracts between the players and the delegates, and look at the players' decisions on their contracts. Then, we compare the outcomes of the endogenous-timing framework with those of the simultaneous-move framework. We show that the higher-valuation player offers her delegate greater contingent compensation than her opponent, the delegate of the higher-valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart's, the equilibrium expected payoff of the delegate of the higher-valuation player is greater than that of his counterpart, and economic rent for each delegate exists. We show that, in the endogenous-timing framework, each player offers her delegate better contingent compensation, each delegate's expected payoff is greater, and each player's expected payoff is smaller, as compared with the simultaneous-move framework. (JEL D72)

Numerous social indicators turned negative for Blacks in the 1980s and rebounded a decade later. We explore whether crack cocaine explains these patterns. Absent a direct measure, we construct a crack prevalence index using multiple proxies. Our index reproduces spatial and temporal patterns described in ethnographic accounts of the crack epidemic. It explains much of the 1980s rise in Black youth homicide and more moderate increases in adverse birth outcomes. Although our index remains high through the 1990s, crack's deleterious social impact fades. Changes over time in behavior, crack markets, and the user population may have mitigated crack's damaging impacts. (JEL K42, J15, I30)

In 2006, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved access to emergency contraception through pharmacies without a prescription. Several states, however, had previously allowed pharmacy access to emergency contraception. In particular, Washington State was the first state to implement such a program in 1998. If emergency contraception is used as a substitute for a surgical abortion, then pharmacy access could reduce unintended pregnancy. Pharmacy access, however, could lead to an increase in risk taking, especially among teens or young adults, and hence lead to increased rates of sexually transmitted diseases. In this article, we use county-level data as well as specific timing of changes in pharmacy access to consider the intended and unintended consequences of pharmacy access to emergency contraception in Washington. The results indicate that while county-level access to emergency contraception was unrelated to trends in sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and abortions before access changed, access afterwards led to a statistically significant increase in STD rates (gonorrhea rates), both overall and for females. We do not find, however, an impact of pharmacy access on abortion or birth rates. These results are robust to several specification tests (including use of Oregon counties as additional control counties) as well as several falsification tests. (JEL I1, I18, J13)

Transplantation is notable for the degree to which resources are allocated via administrative rather than market mechanisms. However, non-monetary incentives still permeate the system. Using instrumental variable regression, we estimate the substitution patterns between cadaveric and living kidney donations in the United States from 1988 to 2008. On average, a decrease of two to five cadaveric donations causes living kidney donations to increase by one. Disaggregating living donors into blood-related and non-blood-related donors, the strongest effect is found among non-blood-related donors known to the organ recipient. A 1% increase of cadaveric donations decreases living donations from this group by 1.54%. (JEL D62, D64, I1)

Firms often cooperate explicitly through activities such as research joint ventures, while competing in other markets. Cooperation in research and development can allow firms to internalize the external benefits of knowledge creation and increase the returns from research and development (R&D) expenditures. Such cooperation may spill over to facilitate collusion in the market, however, potentially lowering welfare and efficiency. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine if sellers successfully coordinate to fund a joint research project to reduce their costs, and how this collaboration affects their pricing behavior. The experiment includes control treatments with separate R&D cooperation and markets. Our results show that although participants usually cooperate when given an opportunity, cooperation is observed less frequently when they also compete in the market. Communication improves cooperation in all environments, particularly when the market is present. Nevertheless, the data provide no evidence of seller collusion in the market. (JEL D43, D71, H40, O3)

In this paper, we study if and how having two differentiated assets affects bubble formation. We consider differences in assets' intrinsic characteristics as well as trading regulations that help differentiate two otherwise identical assets. We find that, compared to trading regulations, differences in assets' intrinsic characteristics encourage more arbitrage across assets and thus help reduce mispricing significantly. We also find that short-term speculation does not depend on how assets or markets are being differentiated. As a result, short-term speculation cannot be used to explain why bubbles are smaller when two assets are intrinsically different than when they are not. (JEL C91, F34)

We introduce negative network externalities—“congestion costs”—into H. Hotelling's (1929) model of spatial competition with linear transportation costs. For any firm locations on opposite sides of the midpoint, a pure strategy price equilibrium exists and is unique if congestion costs are strong enough relative to transportation costs. We analyze product differentiation and find that Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation comes closer to holding in the presence of congestion costs. The greater are congestion costs, the less differentiated products can be in (locationally symmetric) equilibrium. In fact, minimum differentiation comes arbitrarily close to holding depending on the magnitude of these costs relative to transportation costs. Intuitively, greater congestion effects stabilize competition at closer quarters, eliminating aggressive pricing equilibria. Thus, negative network externalities can play a significant role in product differentiation. (JEL D21, L15, R12)

We develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities. Universities choose grading standards to maximize the total wages of graduates, taking into account how the grading standards affect firms' productivity assessment and job placement. We identify conditions under which better universities set lower grading standards, exploiting the fact that firms cannot distinguish between “good” and “bad”“A’'s. In contrast, a social planner sets stricter standards at better universities. We show how increases in skilled jobs drive grade inflation, and determine when grading standards fall faster at better schools. (JEL I21)

Pay secrecy is often justified on the ground of concerns about the detrimental consequences of intra-firm pay comparisons for work morale and performance. Surprisingly, however, there is only limited empirical evidence that the availability of pay comparison information is detrimental for effort provision. In this paper, I study pay comparison effects in a gift-exchange game laboratory experiment where an employer is matched with two symmetric employees. I compare effort choices made by employees in a “pay secrecy” treatment and in two “public wages” treatments where employees are informed of the wage paid to the co-worker. In one “public wages” treatment the employer can choose both wages she pays to the employees, while in the other treatment the wage paid to one employee is regulated exogenously. I show that pay disclosure can be detrimental for effort provision if employees are treated unequally. (JEL A13, C92, J31)

We estimate the association between parental earnings and child well-being using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Social Security Administration earnings records. We use very large samples on a wide variety of measures of child well-being that are also linked to long histories of parent earnings from administrative records. Consistent with previous studies, we find that the use of longer time averages of parent earnings leads to substantially higher estimated associations compared to using only a single year of parent earnings. Using 7-year time averages of parent earnings, we show, for example, that a doubling of parent earnings is associated with a reduced probability of a teenager reporting being in poor health by close to 50% and a decrease in the likelihood of a child repeating a grade by 39%. We also examine how the associations vary by the timing of when parental earnings are received during childhood. We find suggestive evidence that parental earnings received during the child's school-going years (ages 6 to 17) are more strongly associated with college enrollment and children's future earnings as adults than parent earnings received earlier or later in the child's life. (JEL J13, I1, I2)

In this article, we investigate the relationship between school quality and information disclosure in housing markets. When presented with the option of identifying their local public school in a real estate listing, we find that sellers with homes assigned to higher-performing schools are more likely to provide this information. We find more evidence of selective disclosure in 2001–2002 than in 2006–2007, when the costs of gathering and disclosing information on school assignments and quality were lower. Furthermore, we find more evidence of strategic behavior among sellers of large single-family units that presumably appeal to families with children. After controlling for school quality, information disclosure does not appear to affect housing prices. Taken together, our results support the findings of the education literature on the importance of school quality capitalization in residential real estate and they provide the first evidence of strategic information disclosure in housing markets. (JEL L15, I20, R31)

This paper presents a model of self-fulfilling expectations by firms and households which generates multiplicity of equilibria in pay and housework time allocation for ex-ante identical spouses. Multiplicity arises from statistical discrimination exerted by firms in the provision of paid-for training to workers, rather than from incentive problems in the labor market. Employers' beliefs about differences in spouses' reactions to housework shocks lead to symmetric (ungendered) and asymmetric (gendered) equilibria. We find that: (1) the ungendered equilibrium tends to prevail as aggregate productivity in the economy increases (regardless of the generosity of family aid policies), (2) the ungendered equilibrium could yield higher welfare under some scenarios, and (3) gender-neutral job subsidies are more effective that gender-targeted ones in removing the gendered equilibrium. (JEL J16, J70, J71)

An average person born in the United States in the second half of the 19th century completed 7 years of schooling and spent 58 hours a week working in the market. In contrast, an average person born at the end of the 20th century completed 14 years of schooling and spent 40 hours a week working. In the span of 100 years, completed years of schooling doubled and working hours decreased by 30%. What explains these trends? We consider a model of human capital and labor supply to quantitatively assess the contribution of exogenous variations in productivity (wage) and life expectancy in accounting for the secular trends in educational attainment and hours of work. We find that the observed increase in wages and life expectancy accounts for 80% of the increase in years of schooling and 88% of the reduction in hours of work. Rising wages alone account for 75% of the increase in schooling and almost all the decrease in hours in the model, whereas rising life expectancy alone accounts for 25% of the increase in schooling and almost none of the decrease in hours of work. In addition, we show that the mechanism emphasized in the model is consistent with other trends at a more disaggregate level such as the reduction in the racial gap in schooling and the decrease in the cross-sectional dispersion in hours. (JEL E1, I25, J11, O4)

This paper introduces trade adjustment considerations as active determinants of trade policy. Using novel U.S. data sets, I show that, despite their small monetary value, trade-induced unemployment and trade-adjustment costs can incite an incumbent politician to grant protection to an unorganized industry, even in the presence of political pressure by organized sectors. This finding complements the theoretical predictions from Grossman and Helpman (American Economic Review, 84, 1994, 833–50) who argue that the government should protect organized industries but should subsidize imports in unorganized sectors. (JEL D73, F13, F14, F16, J68)

In this paper, we investigate whether countries' trade costs act like other national endowments by affecting the composition of countries' exports. Using an econometric approach that controls for endogeneity by accounting for potentially relevant omitted variables, we find strong evidence for a sample of 37 industrialized and transition countries that national trade costs systematically affect the composition of trade and can be viewed therefore as a source of comparative advantage. Industries located in countries with low trade costs capture significantly higher shares of world exports, where this effect is stronger in trade cost intensive industries. (JEL F11, F14)

Where the social planner, threatened by final producers and walled-in by innovators, releases the representative consumer from the pillory, hires two anonymous referees, and convinces the Economics Minister that final firms' purchases of monopolistically produced intermediate inputs should be taxed, not subsidized, as long as output growth does not exhibit scale effects. This normative prescription hinges on an often neglected reallocation mechanism generated by the linear accumulation laws that eliminate scale effects in most endogenous growth models. (JEL O41, O31)