This article discusses the state of political participation online more than ten years after the Internet's great popular breakthrough as an everyday medium. Denmark is used as a case study to critically re-examine the frequently discussed replacement and mobilisation hypotheses on behalf of the Internet. The pure replacement hypothesis is rejected. Instead, it is found that the Internet still supplements rather than replaces other media, even among heavy Internet users. The Internet is one among several media used by ‘media omnivores’, and political participation online supplements rather than substitutes offline participation. More interesting, the mobilisation hypothesis is partly confirmed. Even though some online participation patterns resemble traditional ones, it seems as if the Internet finally is starting to mobilise younger generations. Further, traditional predictors behind political participation, efficacy and social capital seem to have less impact on online political participation. In the end, these findings are related to more overall discussions on the democratising potential of the Internet.

Recent analyses have reported a generational pattern in electoral participation both in national and the European Parliament elections which suggests that a lower voting propensity among the younger cohorts remains relatively stable over time. Based on the Swedish national election studies 1960–2010, this article examines the magnitude of generational differences in a high-turnout context. It contributes to earlier studies by using multilevel modeling to estimate the impacts of life cycle, generation and period on turnout and by aiming to account for the generational effect with institutional- and individual-level factors. The results show a fairly modest generational effect. When controlling for the proportion of party members in the electorate and the effective number of parties, the differences between generations in their propensities to vote are substantially reduced.

This article nuances the picture given in current research of Swedish policy implementation and planning as consistent and predictable, and Norwegian policy implementation and planning as more unpredictable and fragmented. It does so by adding a discussion of the sources of legitimacy in each of the two national settings, arguing that each system has its distinct pros and cons. The Swedish planning system and local plan practices rest more firmly on a hierarchical mode of governance which is strong on operational efficiency, but suffers from a weaker sense of ownership to the plan outcome among private and civil society actors. In the Norwegian planning system and local plan practices, a combination of hierarchical and interactive governance measures, boasts a broader anchorage and resource division among public, private and civil society actors. However, this system experiences a lower operational efficiency due to the willingness to reconsider former decisions in order to find a viable compromise among different stakeholders in local plan processes, as well as stronger fragmentation due to the privatization of Norwegian detail planning. The empirical basis of the article is: a comparison of the two countries' plan legislation in terms of the inclusion of non-public actors in plan provision and plan formulation; and four case studies of planning processes concerning the future use of an urban green area.

In the context of European integration, Sweden and Finland are frequently seen as natural allies. Based on a number of perceived similarities, their shared Nordic heritage, established historical ties and their concurrent accession to the European Union (EU), they are rarely seen as competitors or proponents of diverging points of view. Their alignment within the EU, over sub-regional issues surrounding Northern Europe in particular, is often rather taken as a given. By focusing on the specific conduct of Sweden and Finland as regional stakeholders in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) and the way they have played this role within the EU, this article seeks to challenge these common assumptions. It shows that Sweden and Finland do not converge in their positions, also in matters concerning the EU's Northern Dimension – that is, a policy that distinctly furthers regional core issues whose promotion within the EU could be in both states' interest. Instead of pooling forces to attain greater leverage within the EU, Sweden and Finland rather compete with each other in this regard. Using the example of the Finnish Northern Dimension initiative, this article shows how Sweden and Finland have promoted sub-regional matters through different political and organizational channels, keeping bilateral cooperation to a minimum and leaving potential avenues of pooled action at the EU level aside. The article thus concludes that the concept of a Swedish-Finnish tandem within the EU needs to be looked at more critically when it comes to explaining or predicting their conduct as Member States.

A well-functioning democracy needs the news media to provide information to its citizens. It is therefore essential to understand what kinds of news contents contribute to gains in citizens' political knowledge and for whom this takes place. Extant research is divergent on this matter, especially with respect to ‘softer’ news coverage. This cross-national study investigates the effects of exposure to human interest and conflict frames in the news on political knowledge. Drawing on panel surveys and media content analyses in three countries, the study shows how these two frames contribute positively to political knowledge gain. This relationship is moderated by political interest so that those who are least interested learn the most from this type of easily accessible news coverage. The results are discussed in the light of research on news media and knowledge acquisition.

Why do certain ministers remain in their post for years while others have their time in office cut short? Drawing on the broader literature on portfolio allocation, this article argues that the saliency of individual portfolios shapes ministerial turnover. The main argument is that ministerial dismissals are less likely to occur the higher the saliency attributed to the ministerial portfolio since ministers appointed to important posts are more likely to have been through extensive screening before appointment. Importantly, it is also posited in the article that the effect of portfolio salience is conditioned by government approval ratings: when government ratings are on the decline, prime ministers are less likely to reshuffle or fire important ministers than when approval ratings are improving. To test these claims, Cox proportional hazards models are applied to a new dataset on ministerial turnover in Scandinavia during the postwar period. The results strongly support the proposition that portfolio saliency matters for ministerial survival, and that this effect is moderated by government popularity.

This article examines the occurrence of political non-attitudes in Sweden and identifies the population segment possessing a ‘something for nothing’ (SFN) mentality regarding social spending. Sweden – often regarded as epitomizing the advanced welfare state – constitutes an analytically interesting case, providing a useful counterpoint to the predominantly American-based evidence on the subject. It is argued here that national political institutions fundamentally affect the prevalence – and social base – of the SFN segment. To identify SFN sentiments, two question batteries measuring social spending preferences are used. One battery contains ‘priced’ items emphasizing the cost of public spending, while the other set of ‘unpriced’ items does not explicitly connect increased public spending with increased taxes. The patterning of attitudes across these items is explored in order to determine whether SFN sentiments are common in the Swedish electorate. The observed attitude patterns are then linked to broader sets of attitudes to the welfare state, testing whether the degree of ideological coherence differs fundamentally between the SFN segment and other groups. The analysis then explores the individual-level determinants associated with different attitude patterns. The overall results show that: SFN sentiments are not dominant among the Swedish citizenry; the quality of the SFN segment's belief system, in terms of ideological coherence, does not represent a deviant case; and the background characteristics associated with SFN sentiments suggest that members of this segment should rather be viewed as free riders in economically vulnerable positions than ignorant and politically confused citizens.

From minor party status, the True Finn Party (PS) claimed nearly one-fifth of the vote and almost the same proportion of parliamentary seats at the April 2011 Finnish general election. It registered the largest gains made by any party in postwar Finnish history, thus writing – in the eyes of foreign journalists at least – yet another chapter in the surge of populist radical right parties across contemporary Europe. This article, however, is concerned more with how the substantial PS vote was mobilised than with how much was mobilised. The idea is not to identify the primary causes of the PS's national breakthrough, but to explore the internal dynamics of party's explosive growth and the process of translating a large prospective vote into ‘hard votes’ through the ballot boxes. The focus is on district-level nomination strategies, the range of candidate types, the mechanics of vote optimisation and the distribution of the personal vote. With regard to the latter, the article seeks to measure and analyse the role of intra-party competition in the anatomy of party transformation and to do so by the novel means of adapting the Laakso-Taagepera index to measure the ‘effective number of co-partisans’. Significantly, at the 2011 Eduskunta election the PS exhibited the highest level of intra-party competition of any of the eight parliamentary parties.

When collective choices are made in more than one round and with different groups of decision makers, so-called ‘election inversions’ may take place, where each round produces different majority outcomes. In this article, two versions of such compound majority paradoxes are identified that are particularly, but not exclusively, relevant for systems of proportional representation with governing coalitions: the ‘Threshold Paradox’ and the ‘Federal Paradox’. The empirical relevance of the paradoxes is illustrated with examples from two Danish elections (in 1971 and in 1990), where a majority of the voters voted for one bloc of parties, but a majority of the seats fell to another.

Does the mass media affect the dispersion of the policy positions of political parties? In this article it is argued that the mass media polarize parties' policy positions because vote-seeking strategies are more viable if party policy positions are clearly communicated to the electorate and because a vote-seeking strategy corresponds with parties taking a distinct policy position away from the median. Hence, the main hypothesis is that party policy position dispersion is larger with more mass media penetration. In order to test this argument, a novel dataset on party positions and mass media penetration in 267 Danish municipalities in 2004 is utilized and a new measure of the dispersion of policy positions in multiparty systems is constructed. The analysis corroborates the article's main hypothesis.

Employees' pro-social motivation has been shown to be positively related to job satisfaction, especially when the perceived usefulness of the job to society and other people is high. There is, however, a lack of analyses which include both public and private employees, and it has not yet been studied whether the relationships are robust across welfare state regimes. This study therefore examines the moderated relationship between pro-social motivation and job satisfaction. Using data from the cross-national 2005 ISSP survey (14 countries, N = 10,630), it confirms that the relationship between pro-social motivation and job satisfaction is moderated by perceived usefulness of the job for society and other people. Usefulness again depends on the individual's employment sector (public versus private), and this public–private difference in perceived usefulness also varies between different welfare state regimes. This indicates that sector differences in how pro-social motivation affects job satisfaction depends on the broader institutional context, and the article therefore contributes with important knowledge for the recruitment and retention of motivated and satisfied employees in a period of changing public–private responsibilities in the provision of welfare services.

This article presents a framework for analysing party-organisational culture, with a special focus on the elite level. The framework is based on an interpretation of Mary Douglas’ Grid/Group model, and is empirically supported by an extensive study of the seven party groups in the Swedish parliament. The model identifies two fundamental cultural dimensions: the level of submission by individual group members to the group as a collectivity; and the principle that dictates the distribution of status and prestige within the party (a distribution here correlating with views on knowledge). The study shows that the parties distribute themselves on the cultural map in ways that do not coincide in any straightforward way with other well-known variables of party politics, such as ideology, origin or size. The methodological innovations presented in this article pave the way for a new framework for analysing party politics in which hitherto neglected aspects of party organisation are highlighted.