<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="http://onlinelibrarystatic.wiley.com/xslt/wol-journal-rss.xsl"
            type="text/xsl"?><rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"><channel rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/rss/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9930" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Law &amp; Policy</title><description> Wiley Online Library : Law &amp; Policy</description><link>http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9930</link><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc</dc:publisher><dc:language xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">en</dc:language><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">© John Wiley &amp; Sons and the University of Denver</dc:rights><prism:issn xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">0265-8240</prism:issn><prism:eIssn xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1467-9930</prism:eIssn><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-04-01T00:00:00-05:00</dc:date><prism:coverDisplayDate xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">April 2012</prism:coverDisplayDate><prism:volume xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">34</prism:volume><prism:number xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">2</prism:number><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">105</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">236</prism:endingPage><image rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/lapo.2012.34.issue-2/asset/cover.gif?v=1&amp;s=0fc382a270df442a01c52bbaeb037b26ecd79e06"/><items><rdf:Seq><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2012.00362.x"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00357.x"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00360.x"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00356.x"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00358.x"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00359.x"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00361.x"/></rdf:Seq></items></channel><item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2012.00362.x" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Role of Case Complexity in Judicial Decision Making</title><link>http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2012.00362.x</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Role of Case Complexity in Judicial Decision Making</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">LAURA P. MOYER</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-02-15T22:15:16.452332-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2012.00362.x</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/j.1467-9930.2012.00362.x</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2012.00362.x</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">no</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">no</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The literature on ideology and decision making offers conflicting expectations about how judges' ideology should affect their votes in cases that raise many legal issues. Using cases from the U.S. courts of appeals, I examine the strength of ideology as a predictor of sincere voting in single and multi-issue cases, and test whether the same effect for ideology can be seen for liberal and conservative judges. For all judges, ideology yields a larger effect as the number of issues increases; however, conservative judges are much more likely than liberal judges to cast sincere votes at all levels of complexity.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>The literature on ideology and decision making offers conflicting expectations about how judges' ideology should affect their votes in cases that raise many legal issues. Using cases from the U.S. courts of appeals, I examine the strength of ideology as a predictor of sincere voting in single and multi-issue cases, and test whether the same effect for ideology can be seen for liberal and conservative judges. For all judges, ideology yields a larger effect as the number of issues increases; however, conservative judges are much more likely than liberal judges to cast sincere votes at all levels of complexity.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00357.x" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Scaled Down: Perspectives on State and Local Creation and Enforcement of Immigration Law. Introduction to the Special Issue of Law &amp; Policy</title><link>http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00357.x</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Scaled Down: Perspectives on State and Local Creation and Enforcement of Immigration Law. Introduction to the Special Issue of Law &amp; Policy</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">DORIS MARIE PROVINE</dc:creator><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">MONICA W. VARSANYI</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-04-01T00:00:00-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00357.x</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00357.x</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00357.x</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">105</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">112</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[]]></content:encoded><description/></item><item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00360.x" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Policy Innovation or Vertical Integration? A View of Immigration Federalism from the States</title><link>http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00360.x</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Policy Innovation or Vertical Integration? A View of Immigration Federalism from the States</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">LINA NEWTON</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-04-01T00:00:00-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00360.x</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00360.x</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00360.x</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">113</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">137</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Since 2005, state legislatures have passed hundreds of immigration bills, and state officials have argued that their efforts attempt to solve immigration crises caused by federal inaction. The state–federal clash over immigration seems to confirm scholarship suggesting deepening lines of conflict in the federal system since the 1990s. The question remains, however, whether this explosion in state immigration laws signifies a move by states to tailor their own solutions to immigration issues. This article explores whether states are serving as laboratories of innovation for immigration policy. The study analyzes over five hundred immigration bills passed between January 2006 and December 2008, and engages in a comparative analysis of three immigration policy areas (immigration law enforcement, employment regulations, and drivers' licenses) where there exist varying degrees of state autonomy from national policy and thus distinctive possibilities for states to offer creative approaches to immigration issues. The findings suggest little evidence of policy innovation at the state level, although a handful of states are challenging federal supremacy in immigration matters.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>Since 2005, state legislatures have passed hundreds of immigration bills, and state officials have argued that their efforts attempt to solve immigration crises caused by federal inaction. The state–federal clash over immigration seems to confirm scholarship suggesting deepening lines of conflict in the federal system since the 1990s. The question remains, however, whether this explosion in state immigration laws signifies a move by states to tailor their own solutions to immigration issues. This article explores whether states are serving as laboratories of innovation for immigration policy. The study analyzes over five hundred immigration bills passed between January 2006 and December 2008, and engages in a comparative analysis of three immigration policy areas (immigration law enforcement, employment regulations, and drivers' licenses) where there exist varying degrees of state autonomy from national policy and thus distinctive possibilities for states to offer creative approaches to immigration issues. The findings suggest little evidence of policy innovation at the state level, although a handful of states are challenging federal supremacy in immigration matters.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00356.x" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>A Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork: Immigration Federalism in the United States</title><link>http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00356.x</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">A Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork: Immigration Federalism in the United States</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">MONICA W. VARSANYI</dc:creator><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">PAUL G. LEWIS</dc:creator><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">DORIS MARIE PROVINE</dc:creator><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">SCOTT DECKER</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-04-01T00:00:00-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00356.x</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00356.x</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00356.x</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">138</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">158</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article focuses on the immigration-related demands currently being placed on local police in the United States and the emergence of what we call a “multilayered jurisdictional patchwork” (MJP) of immigration enforcement. We report results from nationwide surveys of city police chiefs and county sheriffs and intensive fieldwork in three jurisdictions. The enforcement landscape we describe is complicated by the varying and overlapping responsibilities of sheriffs and city police, and by the tendency for sheriffs to maintain closer relationships with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of the MJP—for immigrants, for their communities, and for the evolving relationship between levels of government in the federal system.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>This article focuses on the immigration-related demands currently being placed on local police in the United States and the emergence of what we call a “multilayered jurisdictional patchwork” (MJP) of immigration enforcement. We report results from nationwide surveys of city police chiefs and county sheriffs and intensive fieldwork in three jurisdictions. The enforcement landscape we describe is complicated by the varying and overlapping responsibilities of sheriffs and city police, and by the tendency for sheriffs to maintain closer relationships with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of the MJP—for immigrants, for their communities, and for the evolving relationship between levels of government in the federal system.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00358.x" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The “Local” Migration State: The Site-Specific Devolution of Immigration Enforcement in the U.S. South</title><link>http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00358.x</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The “Local” Migration State: The Site-Specific Devolution of Immigration Enforcement in the U.S. South</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">MATHEW COLEMAN</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-04-01T00:00:00-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00358.x</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00358.x</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00358.x</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">159</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">190</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article examines the implementation of 287(g) authority and Secure Communities by several law enforcement agencies in Wake County and Durham County, North Carolina. I argue that despite being federally supervised programs, 287(g) and Secure Communities take shape within specific political, legal, policing, and biographic contexts, and, as such, take on a site-specific form. I conclude that although site specificity is a characteristic of devolved immigration enforcement in the U.S. context, devolution also predictably relocates interior immigration enforcement to immigrant populations' spaces of social reproduction. Accordingly, programs like 287(g) and Secure Communities work at a suprasite level to amplify immigrant populations' everyday insecurities.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>This article examines the implementation of 287(g) authority and Secure Communities by several law enforcement agencies in Wake County and Durham County, North Carolina. I argue that despite being federally supervised programs, 287(g) and Secure Communities take shape within specific political, legal, policing, and biographic contexts, and, as such, take on a site-specific form. I conclude that although site specificity is a characteristic of devolved immigration enforcement in the U.S. context, devolution also predictably relocates interior immigration enforcement to immigrant populations' spaces of social reproduction. Accordingly, programs like 287(g) and Secure Communities work at a suprasite level to amplify immigrant populations' everyday insecurities.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00359.x" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>From Sheriff's Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant Status in a Tennessee Jail</title><link>http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00359.x</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">From Sheriff's Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant Status in a Tennessee Jail</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AMADA ARMENTA</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-04-01T00:00:00-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00359.x</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00359.x</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00359.x</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">191</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">210</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article contributes to emerging literature documenting the devolution of immigration enforcement authority by focusing on the implementation of the 287(g) program in Davidson County, Tennessee. It outlines how deputized immigration officers do their work as well as the ways they come to think about their roles in the larger immigration bureaucracy. Immigration officers see themselves as objective administrators whose primary responsibilities are to identify and process immigrants for removal, but who are not responsible for their subsequent deportation. While immigration officers never waiver about their obligation to uphold the rule of law, alternate narratives emerge depending on how they feel about the immigrants they encounter. These frames range from pride at identifying “criminal aliens” to guilt for processing immigrants who had been arrested for very minor violations. Ultimately, this work shows deputized immigration officers act as extensions of the federal government rather than as independent agents.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>This article contributes to emerging literature documenting the devolution of immigration enforcement authority by focusing on the implementation of the 287(g) program in Davidson County, Tennessee. It outlines how deputized immigration officers do their work as well as the ways they come to think about their roles in the larger immigration bureaucracy. Immigration officers see themselves as objective administrators whose primary responsibilities are to identify and process immigrants for removal, but who are not responsible for their subsequent deportation. While immigration officers never waiver about their obligation to uphold the rule of law, alternate narratives emerge depending on how they feel about the immigrants they encounter. These frames range from pride at identifying “criminal aliens” to guilt for processing immigrants who had been arrested for very minor violations. Ultimately, this work shows deputized immigration officers act as extensions of the federal government rather than as independent agents.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00361.x" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Negotiating Citizenship on the Frontlines: How the Devolution of Canadian Immigration Policy Shapes Service Delivery to Women Fleeing Abuse</title><link>http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00361.x</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Negotiating Citizenship on the Frontlines: How the Devolution of Canadian Immigration Policy Shapes Service Delivery to Women Fleeing Abuse</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">RUPALEEM BHUYAN</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-04-01T00:00:00-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00361.x</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00361.x</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9930.2011.00361.x</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">211</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">236</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article examines how nongovernmental service providers navigate devolutionary trends in Canada, in both immigration control and integration policy, when responding to migrants who come to them for help and support. Drawing upon conceptualizations of citizenship as a “negotiated relationship” (<a href="#b64" rel="references:#b64">Stasiulis and Bakan 2003</a>), I explore how social service providers, who work amidst a complex interplay of federal, provincial, and local policies, can influence both who is deemed worthy of social membership and what rights an individual can successfully claim from the state. Empirically, this article focuses on observation of community meetings and conversational interviews with service providers in violence against women shelters in Toronto, Ontario, Canada's most populous and diverse city. While service providers navigate different levels of government to advocate for women's rights to seek safety from abuse, I argue that both individual service providers and the organizations in which they work monitor and constrain the degree to which they openly challenge state authority to restrict immigrants' “right to have rights” (<a href="#b3" rel="references:#b3">Arendt 1951 [1979]</a>, 296).</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>This article examines how nongovernmental service providers navigate devolutionary trends in Canada, in both immigration control and integration policy, when responding to migrants who come to them for help and support. Drawing upon conceptualizations of citizenship as a “negotiated relationship” (Stasiulis and Bakan 2003), I explore how social service providers, who work amidst a complex interplay of federal, provincial, and local policies, can influence both who is deemed worthy of social membership and what rights an individual can successfully claim from the state. Empirically, this article focuses on observation of community meetings and conversational interviews with service providers in violence against women shelters in Toronto, Ontario, Canada's most populous and diverse city. While service providers navigate different levels of government to advocate for women's rights to seek safety from abuse, I argue that both individual service providers and the organizations in which they work monitor and constrain the degree to which they openly challenge state authority to restrict immigrants' “right to have rights” (Arendt 1951 [1979], 296).</description></item></rdf:RDF>
