Mind & Language Wiley Online Library : Mind & Languagehttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291468-0017John Wiley & Sons, Incen© Blackwell Publishing Ltd0268-10641468-00172013-04-01T00:00:00-05:00April 2013282141257Mindreading in Infancyhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fmila.12014Mindreading in InfancyPeter Carruthers2013-04-01T14:06:09.567169-05:00doi:10.1111/mila.12014John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/mila.12014http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fmila.12014Original Article141172Abstract

Various dichotomies have been proposed to characterize the nature and development of human mindreading capacities, especially in light of recent evidence of mindreading in infants aged 7 to 18 months. This article will examine these suggestions, arguing that none is currently supported by the evidence. Rather, the data support a modular account of the domain-specific component of basic mindreading capacities. This core component is present in infants from a very young age and does not alter fundamentally thereafter. What alters with development are the interactions between core mindreading and other systems, including executive systems, and forms of learning that do not require radical conceptual change.

]]> Various dichotomies have been proposed to characterize the nature and development of human mindreading capacities, especially in light of recent evidence of mindreading in infants aged 7 to 18 months. This article will examine these suggestions, arguing that none is currently supported by the evidence. Rather, the data support a modular account of the domain-specific component of basic mindreading capacities. This core component is present in infants from a very young age and does not alter fundamentally thereafter. What alters with development are the interactions between core mindreading and other systems, including executive systems, and forms of learning that do not require radical conceptual change. Semantic Comprehension, Inference and Psychological Externalismhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fmila.12015Semantic Comprehension, Inference and Psychological ExternalismJoseph I. Owens2013-04-01T14:06:09.567169-05:00doi:10.1111/mila.12015John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/mila.12015http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fmila.12015Original Article173203Abstract

The externalist examples of Burge, Putnam etc. were offered as examples of how it is physically identical twins can differ in mental states such as belief, and little attention was paid to the interpretations the twins impose on their respective acoustic inputs. The received story today is that this form of interpretation—the semantic reading one assigns the sounds one hears—is the product of inference. The problem for this inferential model is simple to state: though the twins are physical doppelgangers and don't differ in their acoustic inputs, they differ in the interpretations they impose on their respective inputs. I argue that the inferential model does not allow for how it is the twins arrive at these different interpretations. And, since the externalist examples are compelling, this tells against the inferential model.

]]> The externalist examples of Burge, Putnam etc. were offered as examples of how it is physically identical twins can differ in mental states such as belief, and little attention was paid to the interpretations the twins impose on their respective acoustic inputs. The received story today is that this form of interpretation—the semantic reading one assigns the sounds one hears—is the product of inference. The problem for this inferential model is simple to state: though the twins are physical doppelgangers and don't differ in their acoustic inputs, they differ in the interpretations they impose on their respective inputs. I argue that the inferential model does not allow for how it is the twins arrive at these different interpretations. And, since the externalist examples are compelling, this tells against the inferential model. Protagonist Projectionhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fmila.12016Protagonist ProjectionAndreas Stokke2013-04-01T14:06:09.567169-05:00doi:10.1111/mila.12016John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/mila.12016http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fmila.12016Original Article204232Abstract

This article provides a semantic analysis of Protagonist Projection, the phenomenon by which things are described from a point of view different from that of the speaker. Against what has been argued by some, the account vindicates the intuitive idea that Protagonist Projection does not give rise to counterexamples to factivity, and similar plausible principles. A pragmatics is sketched that explains the attitude attributions generated by Protagonist Projection. Further, the phenomenon is compared to Free Indirect Discourse, and the proposed account is seen to preserve the relation between them.

]]> This article provides a semantic analysis of Protagonist Projection, the phenomenon by which things are described from a point of view different from that of the speaker. Against what has been argued by some, the account vindicates the intuitive idea that Protagonist Projection does not give rise to counterexamples to factivity, and similar plausible principles. A pragmatics is sketched that explains the attitude attributions generated by Protagonist Projection. Further, the phenomenon is compared to Free Indirect Discourse, and the proposed account is seen to preserve the relation between them. Mirror Neurons and Social Cognitionhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fmila.12017Mirror Neurons and Social CognitionShannon Spaulding2013-04-01T14:06:09.567169-05:00doi:10.1111/mila.12017John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/mila.12017http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fmila.12017Original Article233257Abstract

Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this article is to explicate clearly the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and empirical considerations lead us to accord a fairly minimal role for mirror neurons in social cognition.

]]> Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this article is to explicate clearly the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and empirical considerations lead us to accord a fairly minimal role for mirror neurons in social cognition.