This article contributes to debates on the proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), by analysing novel empirical material: the EU–India FTA negotiations, which have attracted little academic scrutiny. By elaborating on the underlying negotiating interests and strategies of the EU and India, the article examines the significance of overarching interests in ongoing negotiations and articulates the defensive and offensive interests of both parties. It presents a vision of the controversial and milieu-shaping interests at stake, which offer an alternative theoretical explanation for the pursuit of FTAs, and highlights possible outcome scenarios.

This article argues that the European External Action Service (EEAS) could be conceptualized as an interstitial organization – that is, an organization emerging in interstices between various organizational fields and recombining physical, informational, financial, legal and legitimacy resources stemming from organizations belonging to these different organizational fields. This interstitial status creates a situation in which there are different and sometimes conflicting organizational principles and practices introduced within the organization of the EEAS and different and sometimes conflicting sets of expectations in relation to the Service from actors within the organization as well as from outside. Based on empirical data collected in interviews with EEAS officials and study of official documents in 2011 and 2012, the article documents the interstitial nature of the EEAS. In broader terms, the emergence of the EEAS hence provides a fertile ground for studying patterns of institutional innovation in organizational fields via the establishment of interstitial organizations.

Does criticism of the European Union (EU) by elites cultivate support for democratic values among ordinary citizens? All Eurosceptic messages are critical of European integration; they do not all vilify similar aspects of the European Union. This article proposes a framing model of the effects of Euroscepticism on citizens' domestic political attitudes. EU critiques that are framed in terms of ‘democratic deficit’ lead citizens to consider which political values are desirable in democratic society and may promote support for liberal democratic norms among citizens exposed to these messages. Eurosceptic rhetoric is built into framing experiments that vary the content of EU-critical messages. Subjects in the United Kingdom and Bulgaria are randomly exposed to a ‘cultural threat’ or ‘democratic deficit’ criticism of the EU. Both Eurosceptic frames reduce support for integration, but subjects exposed to the ‘deficit frame’ more strongly embrace liberal democratic values. Under certain conditions, Euroscepticism may carry benefits for representative democracy.

This article analyzes the leadership of three Commission Presidents: Jacques Delors, Jacques Santer and Romano Prodi. It questions whether these Presidents performed as transactional or transforming leaders – that is, whether they ‘mattered’ as forceful promoters of the European project. Drawing on leadership theory, the article identifies three factors providing opportunities and setting constraints, as decisive for exercising political leadership: the institutional setting, the situational context and the personal qualities of the office holders. It analyzes to what extent these factors, and the interplay among them, shape the leadership of the Commission Presidents, and which of these factors are conditional for the exercise of transforming leadership. It concludes that only Delors was able to act as a transforming leader, whereas Santer and Prodi mainly performed as transactional leaders. These differences are explained by variations in the situational context and the personal qualities of the incumbents and the interplay between all three factors determining political leadership.

This article provides empirical findings on the relationship between the open method of co-ordination and participation (OMC). Empirically, it draws on within-case analysis to examine how participation, venues and outcomes have varied in different domains of information society policy. This is a challenging case for claims about the participatory effects of the OMC because it is not a policy originally designed to address social policy concerns or unemployment problems. The main conceptual argument is that the OMC is a political opportunity structure that distributes participatory gains. The article examines this opportunity structure by separating out the dimensions of ‘procedure’ and ‘outcomes’ and including ‘transparency’ as a moderating variable. The findings point to participatory effects in all but one case, although not for the same actors and at the same level (European Union or national/sub-national).

This article analyzes the role of welfare systems in shaping migration patterns in central and eastern Europe. It argues that states have played a crucial role in affecting migration by creating and widening opportunities for potential and actual migrants through welfare system policies. This explains why CEE countries where social spending figures have been lower, unemployment benefit schemes less extensive and where labour market mismatches remained unaddressed, experienced greater out-migration. The article contributes to our understanding of how sending countries’ institutional factors affect out-migration by investigating the role of sending states’ institutions.

This article explores the implications of the financial crisis for the relationship between monetary integration and democratic government in the European Union (EU). As the crisis has exposed the original balance that economic and monetary union (EMU) sought to maintain between monetary integration and policy diversity to be unsustainable, the eurozone is put before the choice of one of three governance models: executive federalism, democratic federalization or EMU dissolution. Notably, these three governance models perfectly illustrate Dani Rodrik's ‘trilemma of the world economy’, which maintains that of the three goods – economic (and monetary) integration, the nation-state and democratic politics – one will always have to give. In light of this, the article concludes that the present course towards executive federalism can be justified for preventing euro dissolution and recognizing the value of national self-government. Nevertheless, it threatens to come at a democratic price. Hence, it is imperative to consider possible flanking measures that can mitigate this effect.

What drives European Union (EU) policy change in a sensitive and contentious area? To answer this question, this article tells the story of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the EU from its beginnings until the present. The EU's role in EU CSR has changed from social-liberal standard-setter to neo-liberal cheerleader and back. This article attempts to explain these shifts. It argues that Europe's institutional diversity hampers standard-setting while economic crises and declining levels of business legitimacy facilitate it. Contention has been fuelled by CSR's inherent ambiguity: is CSR a means to regulate the economy, or a domain of voluntary activity that must remain free of state regulation? Fearful of regulation, business groups – German employers in particular – have forcefully advocated the latter view. In addition to converting EU CSR from social-liberal to neo-liberal, business has neutralized two of the Commission's standard-setting advocates. The financial crisis, the power of arguments and discourse, and the impact of global policy developments in the field of CSR have re-empowered standard-setters. The article concludes with a critical analysis of the EU's renewed CSR strategy and non-financial reporting agenda.

The European Union (EU) is often seen as an institutional environment that facilitates the exchange of information about the effects of policies, and thus promotes convergence towards successful policies. However, current qualitative studies analyze only EU members and cannot dismiss the hypothesis that the relation between policy success and policy convergence is universal and not affected by EU membership. The article analyzes a dyadic data set on privatization policies in the electricity sector to test the interaction hypothesis that joint EU membership not only causes policy convergence, but also increases the effect of policy success on policy convergence. The result is that economic success of privatizations in role-model countries and joint EU membership both increase the probability of policy convergence. However, there is no interaction between policy success and joint EU membership. Thus, contrary to widely held assumptions, joint EU membership does not amplify learning from each other's policy success.

Transatlantic co-operation and conflict over air passenger information, financial transactions records and maritime container security illustrate the European Union's reaction to the transboundary assertion of US counter-terrorism regulation in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11. A close examination of the cases suggests that the EU–US agreements on the transfer and use of PNR and SWIFT data were made to safeguard the integrity of the EU data protection regime and more importantly the European norm of data privacy from the undermining effects that might arise from the extraterritorial exercise of authority by the United States.

Through the analysis of Regulation 1082/2006 (also known as ‘The European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation’), which enables regional and local authorities from different European Union (EU) countries to set up co-operation groupings as legal entities for projects of cross-border and trans-European significance, this article aims to assess whether the daily politics of the EU is still state driven in a zero-sum game, and conversely, whether states and state representatives are no longer the only interface between the sub-national and supranational levels and the operation of power across the various levels of governance on a local/national/supranational level in a non-zero-sum game. The article will show that a type of ‘multi-level governance’ is emerging in cross-border regions in which cross-border activities are empowering the regional/local level (sub-national level), permitting it to circumvent/supersede the national level through a process of negotiation and ‘alliances’. Furthermore, it will be highlighted that Regulation 1082/2006 is a clear example of multi-level governance in practice.

This article demonstrates that the European Parliament has increasingly voted with the Council for a more restrictive position on irregular migration and asylum since obtaining co-decision authority in these areas in 2005, in contrast to its previous liberal position. Roll-call votes in the fifth and sixth European Parliaments (1999–2009) in the field of irregular migration and asylum were analyzed, and it was found that an abrupt change in voting behaviour of many MEPs, particularly those members belonging to two of its main liberal-leaning parties, the S&D and ELDR, is evidently linked to the change of authority of the EP. Apparently, there is an inverse correlation between the level of decision-making authority and the freedom to vote for a liberal immigration and asylum policy. The author suggests several explanations for this behaviour, including the need for MEPs to be flexible in working with the Council in order to pass legislation.

This article investigates the (in)equality of the European budget with respect to financial contributions and expenditures across Member States. Standard tools from the measurement of income inequality, including the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient, are applied to the distribution of European Union contributions and expenditure. In addition, the inequality in the allocation of the budget is juxtaposed against the distribution of voting power within the Council of Ministers. Redistribution from rich to poor members can mainly be attributed to unequal per capita contributions in funding the EU budget, while voting power rather than the needs of individual members dominates with respect to expenditure. The accession to the EU of relatively smaller eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007 delivered more voting power to poorer countries with relatively small population shares. This change reinforced the voting power effect in expenditures.

In this article, wavelet tools and economic sentiment indicators are used to study the similarity and synchronization of economic cycles in the eurozone. The time-varying and frequency-varying patterns of business cycles synchronization are assessed and the impact of the creation of the European monetary union (EMU) in 1999 is tested. Among several results, it is found that: the EMU is associated with a significant increase in the similarity and synchronization of the economic sentiment in the eurozone; and the hard-peg of its currency to the euro led to a comparable effect on Denmark's economic sentiment after 1999, different from what happened in the United Kingdom.

This article explores how company law reforms, particularly the reduction or abolition of minimum capital requirements, in various European jurisdictions affect the decision of entrepreneurs to incorporate by means of a private limited liability company (LLC). Since the landmark rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the years 1999, 2002 and 2003, entrepreneurs in the European Union (EU) have been able to choose the country of incorporation independently of their real seat. As a result, the proliferation of the United Kingdom private company limited by shares has posed a competitive threat to many European legislators. The article analyzes whether the reforms adopted in Spain, France, Hungary, Germany and Poland have promoted the popularity of domestic legal forms and encouraged entrepreneurship more generally. Using a difference-in-difference approach, a strong impact is recorded in both respects, especially if the minimum capital requirement was reduced or abolished.

This article assesses the recent developments in the Turkish democratic reform processes, particularly those affecting the Kurdish minority, induced by Turkey's ambition to accede to the European Union (EU). The analysis is rooted in the Europeanization literature, specifically the external incentives model. In addition to providing a systematic review of recent political developments in this area, the analysis leads us to question some of the model's basic premises. Most notably, it is found that credible EU commitment, rather than low adoption costs and weak veto players, has constituted a necessary and sufficient condition for the reform process. Likewise, there is a dynamic relationship between EU-induced democratic reforms and adoption costs that is largely overlooked in the existing literature.

This article systematically investigates both regional and issue-specific variation in external perceptions of the European Union (EU) as a global power and an international leader. While most studies on EU external perceptions focus on a one-dimensional vision of EU leadership and/or great-powerness, it is argued here that these perceptions are highly issue-specific, multilayered and differentiating. This study draws on data collected through elite interviews in three regions: the Pacific, Southeast Asia and Africa. The findings make a contribution to the debate on the perception of third states on the international role of the EU.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR) are two advisory bodies of the European Union involved in a broad array of policy areas. However, little is known about the effects of the two committees on the positions of the other institutions or final policy outcomes. This article investigates to what extent and under what conditions the CoR and the EESC can exert influence. Based on a comprehensive survey conducted in 2010, a series of hypotheses derived from a neo-institutionalism framework are tested. It is found that consultative committees are not very influential overall. Nevertheless, they can exert influence under certain scope conditions, including the speed with which they produce recommendations, the quality of the recommendations and the resonance with the addressees’ prior beliefs.

This article argues that regional integration can follow three different developmental paths, depending on the centrality of external economic actors and economic asymmetries in regional trade networks. The first path causes intra-regional interdependence, the second path reinforces dependence on extra-regional actors, and the third path reinforces asymmetries in the region. The article illustrates this argument using diachronic network visualization of trade networks in three world regions. The European Union (EU) corresponds to the first path, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the second and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to the third. The theoretical argument and empirical analysis in the article demonstrate how regional organizations get locked into these developmental paths, and how regional integration reinforces rather than changes existing economic structures.

After the 2004 eastern enlargement, the European Union has become a terrain of competition between different memory narratives. At the core of the debate is the status of the Holocaust and its role in the identity-definition process of European societies. This article asks why similar memory debates have resulted in different policy outcomes when taking place in different institutional settings at the EU level. It finds, along with Schattschneider's analysis of policy conflicts, that the choice of the venue of the conflict determined what the conflict was about and how people were divided. Policy outcomes were determined by which of the different possible conflicts gained the dominant position and this, in turn, depended on ‘losers’ in the policy debate being able to choose the right venue for the defence of their concerns.

There is a growing body of literature examining the influence of social identification on European Union (EU) attitudes. Broadly speaking, this literature can be divided into two strands. One strand examines the way social identity affects support for EU integration quantitatively, using opinion poll data. The other draws (often loosely) on social constructivism, using qualitative research methods. Social Identity Theory (SIT) is increasingly invoked in both these literatures and this development is to be welcomed. However, so far engagement with SIT has been rather tentative, drawing largely on theoretically impoverished versions of SIT. It is argued in this article that this practice has resulted in SIT's theoretical potential being underutilized. At other times, this has resulted in theoretical confusion because SIT explanations are being used alongside other theories whose premises clash with core SIT assumptions. We conclude that more in-depth engagement with SIT's basic and core tenets will enable quantitative EU identity researchers to move beyond ‘attachment’ to territorial identities, and allow qualitative EU identity researchers to move beyond ‘shared history’, ‘deeply rooted identities’ and ‘resonance’.

This article compares the decision-making structures of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with those of the European Union (EU). It asks whether the EU is an appropriate template for ASEAN or whether, given the apparently unique circumstances of European integration and Southeast Asian regionalism, analogies between the two are counterproductive. Attempts, for example, to model ASEAN's Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) on the EU's Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) throw into relief the latter's uniquely consensual modus operandi. Can this consensus be replicated by ASEAN simply by institutional mimesis? First, the EU's evolution is briefly outlined; second, ASEAN's institutional architecture is set in the context of the ASEAN Charter's innovations that most invite comparison with the EU; and third, the two organizations are compared by assessing a ‘zone of discretion’ between setting ambitious, but realistic, goals for ASEAN's greater integration and adopting structures that might be inappropriate to ASEAN.

In analyzing the European Capitals of Culture programme, this article argues that transnational experts have had a large impact on this flagship of European Union (EU) cultural policy by forming a close-knit advocacy coalition with official EU actors. Most recent developments, however, have added a new dimension. The Commission has now developed a subtle technique of governmentality focusing the programme more on its ‘European dimension’. The article discusses this evolution and the role of transnational actors, the limits to integration intrinsic to culture as a policy domain, and the attempts of both official actors and experts to work around such constraints.

The virulent European Union hedge fund debate led many observers to suspect a paradigmatic battle between liberal market economies and countries in favour of tighter regulation. By contrast, this article points to the economic interests that drove government agendas. However, national preferences were not defined by the aggregate of a country's economic interests, but by very specific stakeholders only, despite the existence of opponents with considerable resources. This article argues that the unequal success of financial lobbyists depended on how their demands fitted into the government's overarching negotiation strategy. The primacy of government objectives, in turn, resulted from the high saliency of financial regulation and hedge funds in particular.