The “Great Recession” in the United States exposed contradictions between the economic well-being of families and capital that developed in the decades prior to this latest downturn. Using social structure of accumulation theory, a qualitative institutional analysis, and quantitative time-series models, this article investigates historically contingent relations between the nature of public assistance, family economic deterioration, and capital accumulation. To sustain the circuit of capital, I argue that the family propped up economic growth first through public cash assistance and then through private expenditures, the latter of which lead to the economic deterioration of families dependent on unprecedented levels of debt.

The neoclassical concept of the market is built on a number of assumptions that lead one to view it as a type of ether, devoid of any institutional content. In opposition to this point of view, this article proposes an alternative characterization of markets based on the fundamental principles of institutional and post-Keynesian economics. After reviewing the main features that characterize the behavior of economic agents, we analyze the set of interrelations between these agents within markets and the role of institutions in the regulation of these interrelations. Finally, we discuss some of the consequences generated by the institutional dimensions of markets with regard to their origins and evolution, the justification for their existence, or the evaluation of their results.

Public policies have become embedded with market-based mechanisms to radically transform essential goods and services markets. This article proposes a framework for empirical analysis of these markets. Key theoretical propositions are distilled to 12 distinctive properties of markets. These properties foreshadow a set of questions to interrogate a market's structure, operation, participants, behaviors, rules, and price setting to generate a substantive, realistic picture of outcomes. This “analytical grid” of questions is applied to four Australian essential goods and services markets. The findings unequivocally demonstrate a very different picture of markets from that promulgated by mainstream neoclassical economics and public policies.

Competition is often thought of a fairly obvious thing, a rivalry. In a market context the meaning of competition is usually taken to be a rivalry among the sellers. The article seeks to broaden this view by considering other competitive relationships in the marketplace. Using the simplifying assumption that there are only two types of market actors, sellers and consumers, there are three possible types of relationships or interdependencies among these actors in a market. In competitive terms this includes the familiar competition among sellers but there is also the possibility of competition between sellers and consumers, as well as competition among consumers. The article outlines essential characteristics of the three modes. Implications of multi-mode competition for market performance and welfare are discussed.

This article develops an argument from a heterodox microeconomic perspective that the business enterprise and the state have to control market institutions in order to protect the vested interests of the ruling class. Market governance by the business enterprise and market regulation by the state are in this regard purposeful and necessary actions to save private business enterprises vis-à-vis fundamental instability inherent in the capitalist system.

Issues of supply and demand are basic to markets, but economic sociologists ignore consumers, while sociologists of consumption rarely treat consumption as demand. I conceptualize markets as cyclic interactions of producers and consumers around a product, each group embedded in different types of macrosocial patterns, with different purposes and structures. I apply this conceptualization to the French and U.S. bicycle markets from 1865 to 1914. The model helps explain differing market trajectories in these cases.

After the acrimonious debates between the New Classical and New Keynesian economists in the 1980s and 1990s, a consensus developed, namely, the New Neoclassical Synthesis. However, the 2007 credit crunch exposed the severe limitations of this approach. This article presents a methodological analysis of the New Neoclassical Synthesis and how the paradigmatic heuristic of the representative agent, namely, market clearing subject to sticky prices, excluded the Keynesian notion of involuntary unemployment arising from lack of effective demand. It shows these models may be modified to produce Keynesian results, but are ruled out of consideration by proponents of the New Neoclassical approach by weak incommensurability. It concludes that because of this the New Neoclassical Synthesis, in spite of its failure to explain the sub-prime crisis, is likely to resist successfully the resurgence in Keynesian economics.