This paper studies the impact of the volatility of monetary policy using a structural vector auroregression (SVAR) model enriched along two dimensions. First, it allows for time-varying variance of monetary policy shocks via a stochastic volatility specification. Second, it allows a dynamic interaction between the level of the endogenous variables in the VAR and the time-varying volatility. The analysis establishes that the nominal interest rate, output growth, and inflation fall in reaction to an increase in the volatility of monetary policy. The analysis also develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model enriched with stochastic volatility to monetary policy that generates similar responses and provides a theoretical underpinning of these findings.

We estimate the dynamic effects of U.S. housing market shocks on state-level spending and home prices from a dynamic common factor model, and identify housing demand and supply shocks using a sign-restrictions approach. While state-level spending and house prices gradually respond positively and persistently to aggregate housing demand shocks, there is significant variation across states in the magnitude of these responses. Cross-state regressions of the estimated responses on an index of mortgage market development suggest that spending in states with greater opportunities for home equity borrowing is more sensitive to housing demand shocks than in states with fewer opportunities, which is consistent with the prominence of a “collateral” channel over a “wealth” channel in explaining the link between housing and the overall economy.

We derive the first closed-form optimal refinancing rule: refinance when the current mortgage interest rate falls below the original rate by at least

We uncover a strong comovement of the stock market risk–return trade-off with the consumption–wealth ratio (CAY). The finding reflects time-varying investment opportunities rather than countercyclical aggregate relative risk aversion. Specifically, the partial risk–return trade-off is positive and constant when we control for CAY as a proxy for investment opportunities. Moreover, conditional market variance scaled by CAY is negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Our results are consistent with a limited stock market participation model, in which shareholders require an illiquidity premium that increases with CAY, in addition to the risk premium that is proportional to conditional market variance.

Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open-market operations have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature these policies are indistinguishable. However, Freeman's argument that the central bank should absorb losses associated with default to provide risk sharing stands in stark contrast to the concern that central banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman's model by introducing moral hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses and Freeman's argument breaks down. However, we show that policies resembling discount window lending and open-market operations can still be distinguished in this new framework. The optimal policy is for the central bank to make a restricted number of creditors compete for funds. By restricting the number of agents, the central bank can limit the moral hazard problem. By making them compete with each other, the central bank can exploit market information that reveals the state of the economy.

This paper analyzes the competitive effects of regulatory minimum capital requirements on an oligopolistic loan market. Before competing in loan rates banks choose their capital structure, thereby making an imperfect commitment to a loan capacity. It is shown that due to this imperfect commitment, regulatory requirements not only increase the marginal cost of loan supply, but can also have a collusive effect resulting in increased profits. This paper derives the threshold value from which capital requirements can turn one round Bertrand competition into a two-stage interaction with capacity commitment, leading to Cournot outcomes. Therefore, it provides theoretical support for the applicability of the Cournot approach when modeling imperfect loan competition.

We investigate the extent to which monetary policy can enhance the functioning of the private credit system. Specifically, we characterize the optimal return on money in the presence of credit arrangements. There is a dual role for credit: it allows buyers to trade without fiat money and also permits them to borrow against future income. However, not all traders have access to credit. As a result, there is a social role for fiat money because it allows agents to self-insure against the risk of not being able to use credit in some transactions. We consider a (nonlinear) monetary mechanism that is designed to enhance the credit system. An active monetary policy is sufficient for relaxing credit constraints. Finally, we characterize the optimal monetary policy and show that it necessarily entails a positive inflation rate.

Disinflationary episodes are a valuable source of information for economic agents trying to learn about the economy. In this paper, we are particularly interested in how policymakers can themselves learn by disinflating. The approach differs from the existing literature, which typically focuses on the learning of private agents during a disinflation. We build a model where both the policymaker and private agents learn, and ask what happens if the policymaker has to disinflate to satisfy a new central bank mandate specifying greater emphasis on inflation stabilization. In this case, our results show that inflation may fall dramatically before it gradually rises to its new long-run level. The potential for inflation to undershoot its long-run level during a disinflationary episode suggests that caution should be exercised when assessing the success of any change in the policymaker's mandate.

This paper studies a popular statistical model of permanent and transitory shocks to output using a set of arguably more plausible structural assumptions. One way to structurally interpret the model is by assuming aggregate demand has no long-run output effect. However, many economic theories are inconsistent with that assumption. Instead, we reinterpret the statistical model assuming a positive shock to aggregate supply lowers the price level and in the long run raises output while a positive shock to aggregate demand raises the price level. Under these assumptions, a puzzling finding from the empirical literature implies that a positive aggregate demand shock had a long-run positive effect on output in pre–World War I economies.