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<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"><channel rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/rss/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-6261" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Journal of Finance</title><description> Wiley Online Library : The Journal of Finance</description><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291540-6261</link><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc</dc:publisher><dc:language xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">en</dc:language><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">© American Finance Association</dc:rights><prism:issn xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">0022-1082</prism:issn><prism:eIssn xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1540-6261</prism:eIssn><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-06-01T00:00:00-05:00</dc:date><prism:coverDisplayDate xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">June 2013</prism:coverDisplayDate><prism:volume xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">68</prism:volume><prism:number xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">3</prism:number><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">789</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1305</prism:endingPage><image rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/jofi.2013.68.issue-3/asset/cover.gif?v=1&amp;s=01b3ac8ee5482ac6a68c022020fb40a2eac4d159"/><items><rdf:Seq><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12067"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12068"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12063"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12062"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12061"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12060"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12059"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12058"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12057"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12056"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12055"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12053"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12052"/><rdf:li 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rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12045"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12044"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12035"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12034"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12032"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12031"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12029"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12026"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12064"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12065"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12030"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12023"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12022"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12020"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12021"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12018"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12017"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12019"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12024"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12025"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12028"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12027"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12033"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12066"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12054"/></rdf:Seq></items></channel><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12067" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Capital</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12067</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Capital</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">REBECCA N. HANN, MARIA OGNEVA, OGUZHAN OZBAS</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:55:28.844069-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12067</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12067</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12067</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We examine whether organizational form matters for a firm's cost of capital. Contrary to conventional view, we argue that coinsurance among a firm's business units can reduce systematic risk through the avoidance of countercyclical deadweight costs. We find that diversified firms have on average a lower cost of capital than comparable portfolios of standalone firms. In addition, diversified firms with less correlated segment cash flows have a lower cost of capital, consistent with a coinsurance effect. Holding cash flows constant, our estimates imply an average value gain of approximately 5% when moving from the highest to the lowest cash flow correlation quintile.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

We examine whether organizational form matters for a firm's cost of capital. Contrary to conventional view, we argue that coinsurance among a firm's business units can reduce systematic risk through the avoidance of countercyclical deadweight costs. We find that diversified firms have on average a lower cost of capital than comparable portfolios of standalone firms. In addition, diversified firms with less correlated segment cash flows have a lower cost of capital, consistent with a coinsurance effect. Holding cash flows constant, our estimates imply an average value gain of approximately 5% when moving from the highest to the lowest cash flow correlation quintile.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12068" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Uncertainty, Time-Varying Fear, and Asset Prices</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12068</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Uncertainty, Time-Varying Fear, and Asset Prices</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">ITAMAR DRECHSLER</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:10:31.769101-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12068</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12068</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12068</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I construct an equilibrium model that captures salient properties of index option prices, equity returns, variance, and the risk-free rate. A representative investor makes consumption and portfolio choice decisions that are robust to his uncertainty about the true economic model. He pays a large premium for index options because they hedge important model misspecification concerns, particularly concerning jump shocks to cash flow growth and volatility. A calibration shows that empirically consistent fundamentals and reasonable model uncertainty explain option prices and the variance premium. Time variation in uncertainty generates variance premium fluctuations, helping explain their power to predict stock returns.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

I construct an equilibrium model that captures salient properties of index option prices, equity returns, variance, and the risk-free rate. A representative investor makes consumption and portfolio choice decisions that are robust to his uncertainty about the true economic model. He pays a large premium for index options because they hedge important model misspecification concerns, particularly concerning jump shocks to cash flow growth and volatility. A calibration shows that empirically consistent fundamentals and reasonable model uncertainty explain option prices and the variance premium. Time variation in uncertainty generates variance premium fluctuations, helping explain their power to predict stock returns.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12063" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Ups</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12063</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Ups</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">FREDERIC MALHERBE</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-15T14:33:15.620576-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12063</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12063</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12063</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I analyze a model in which holding cash imposes a negative externality: it worsens future adverse selection in markets for long-term assets, which impairs their role for liquidity provision. Adverse selection worsens when potential sellers of long-term assets hold more cash because then fewer sales reflect cash needs, and proportionally more sales reflect private information. Moreover, future market illiquidity makes current cash holding more appealing. This feedback effect may result in hoarding behavior and a market breakdown, which I interpret as a self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up. This mechanism suggests that imposing liquidity requirements on financial institutions may backfire.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

I analyze a model in which holding cash imposes a negative externality: it worsens future adverse selection in markets for long-term assets, which impairs their role for liquidity provision. Adverse selection worsens when potential sellers of long-term assets hold more cash because then fewer sales reflect cash needs, and proportionally more sales reflect private information. Moreover, future market illiquidity makes current cash holding more appealing. This feedback effect may result in hoarding behavior and a market breakdown, which I interpret as a self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up. This mechanism suggests that imposing liquidity requirements on financial institutions may backfire.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12062" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock Prices?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12062</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock Prices?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">ITZHAK BEN-DAVID, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, AUGUSTIN LANDIER, RABIH MOUSSAWI</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-13T11:44:30.886741-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12062</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12062</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12062</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We provide evidence suggesting that some hedge funds manipulate stock prices on critical reporting dates. Stocks in the top quartile of hedge fund holdings exhibit abnormal returns of 0.30% on the last day of the quarter and a reversal of 0.25% on the following day. A significant part of the return is earned during the last minutes of trading. Analysis of intraday volume and order imbalance provides further evidence consistent with manipulation. These patterns are stronger for funds that have higher incentives to improve their ranking relative to their peers.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We provide evidence suggesting that some hedge funds manipulate stock prices on critical reporting dates. Stocks in the top quartile of hedge fund holdings exhibit abnormal returns of 0.30% on the last day of the quarter and a reversal of 0.25% on the following day. A significant part of the return is earned during the last minutes of trading. Analysis of intraday volume and order imbalance provides further evidence consistent with manipulation. These patterns are stronger for funds that have higher incentives to improve their ranking relative to their peers.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12061" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Risk Management and Firm Value: Evidence from Weather Derivatives</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12061</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Risk Management and Firm Value: Evidence from Weather Derivatives</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">FRANCISCO PÉREZ-GONZÁLEZ, HAYONG YUN</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-13T11:44:19.655342-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12061</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12061</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12061</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper shows that active risk management policies lead to an increase in firm value. To identify the effect of hedging and to overcome endogeneity concerns, we exploit the introduction of weather derivatives as an exogenous shock to firms’ ability to hedge weather risks. This innovation disproportionately benefits weather-sensitive firms, irrespective of their future investment opportunities. Using this natural experiment and data from energy firms, we find that derivatives lead to higher valuations, investments and leverage. Overall, our results demonstrate that risk management has real consequences on firm outcomes.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

This paper shows that active risk management policies lead to an increase in firm value. To identify the effect of hedging and to overcome endogeneity concerns, we exploit the introduction of weather derivatives as an exogenous shock to firms’ ability to hedge weather risks. This innovation disproportionately benefits weather-sensitive firms, irrespective of their future investment opportunities. Using this natural experiment and data from energy firms, we find that derivatives lead to higher valuations, investments and leverage. Overall, our results demonstrate that risk management has real consequences on firm outcomes.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12060" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Market Expectations in the Cross-Section of Present Values</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12060</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Market Expectations in the Cross-Section of Present Values</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">BRYAN KELLY, SETH PRUITT</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-13T11:44:17.225287-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12060</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12060</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12060</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Returns and cash flow growth for the aggregate U.S. stock market are highly and robustly predictable. Using a single factor extracted from the cross-section of book-to-market ratios, we find an <em>out-of-sample</em> return forecasting <em>R</em><sup>2</sup> of 13 at the annual frequency (0.9% monthly). We document similar out-of-sample predictability for returns on value, size, momentum, and industry portfolios. We present a model linking aggregate market expectations to disaggregated valuation ratios in a latent factor system. Spreads in value portfolios’ exposures to economic shocks are key to identifying predictability and are consistent with duration-based theories of the value premium.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

Returns and cash flow growth for the aggregate U.S. stock market are highly and robustly predictable. Using a single factor extracted from the cross-section of book-to-market ratios, we find an out-of-sample return forecasting R2 of 13 at the annual frequency (0.9% monthly). We document similar out-of-sample predictability for returns on value, size, momentum, and industry portfolios. We present a model linking aggregate market expectations to disaggregated valuation ratios in a latent factor system. Spreads in value portfolios’ exposures to economic shocks are key to identifying predictability and are consistent with duration-based theories of the value premium.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12059" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12059</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">JAN BENA, KAI LI</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-13T11:44:08.350004-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12059</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12059</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12059</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Using a large and unique patent-merger data set over the period 1984 to 2006, we show that companies with large patent portfolios and low R&amp;D expenses are acquirers, while companies with high R&amp;D expenses and slow growth in patent output are targets. Further, technological overlap between firm pairs has a positive effect on transaction incidence, and this effect is reduced for firm pairs that overlap in product markets. We also show that acquirers with prior technological linkage to their target firms produce more patents afterwards. We conclude that synergies obtained from combining innovation capabilities are important drivers of acquisitions.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

Using a large and unique patent-merger data set over the period 1984 to 2006, we show that companies with large patent portfolios and low R&amp;D expenses are acquirers, while companies with high R&amp;D expenses and slow growth in patent output are targets. Further, technological overlap between firm pairs has a positive effect on transaction incidence, and this effect is reduced for firm pairs that overlap in product markets. We also show that acquirers with prior technological linkage to their target firms produce more patents afterwards. We conclude that synergies obtained from combining innovation capabilities are important drivers of acquisitions.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12058" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Consumption Volatility Risk</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12058</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Consumption Volatility Risk</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">OLIVER BOGUTH, LARS-ALEXANDER KUEHN</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-13T11:44:03.759992-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12058</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12058</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12058</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We show that time-variation in macroeconomic uncertainty affects asset prices. Consumption volatility is a negatively priced source of risk for a wide variety of test portfolios. At the firm level, exposure to consumption volatility risk predicts future returns, generating a spread across quintile portfolios in excess of 7% annually. This premium is explained by cross-sectional differences in the sensitivity of dividend volatility to consumption volatility. Stocks with volatile cash flows in uncertain aggregate times require higher expected returns.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

We show that time-variation in macroeconomic uncertainty affects asset prices. Consumption volatility is a negatively priced source of risk for a wide variety of test portfolios. At the firm level, exposure to consumption volatility risk predicts future returns, generating a spread across quintile portfolios in excess of 7% annually. This premium is explained by cross-sectional differences in the sensitivity of dividend volatility to consumption volatility. Stocks with volatile cash flows in uncertain aggregate times require higher expected returns.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12057" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12057</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">ANDREW ELLUL, VIJAY YERRAMILLI</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-13T11:43:42.690656-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12057</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12057</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12057</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12056" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Aggregate Risk and the Choice between Cash and Lines of Credit</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12056</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Aggregate Risk and the Choice between Cash and Lines of Credit</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">VIRAL V. ACHARYA, HEITOR ALMEIDA, MURILLO CAMPELLO</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-13T11:43:40.131214-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12056</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12056</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12056</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Banks can create liquidity for firms by pooling their idiosyncratic risks. As a result, bank lines of credit to firms with greater aggregate risk should be costlier and such firms opt for cash in spite of the incurred liquidity premium. We find empirical support for this novel theoretical insight. Firms with higher beta have a higher ratio of cash to credit lines and face greater costs on their lines. In times of heightened aggregate volatility, banks exposed to undrawn credit lines become riskier; bank credit lines feature fewer initiations, higher spreads and shorter maturity; and, firms’ cash reserves rise.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

Banks can create liquidity for firms by pooling their idiosyncratic risks. As a result, bank lines of credit to firms with greater aggregate risk should be costlier and such firms opt for cash in spite of the incurred liquidity premium. We find empirical support for this novel theoretical insight. Firms with higher beta have a higher ratio of cash to credit lines and face greater costs on their lines. In times of heightened aggregate volatility, banks exposed to undrawn credit lines become riskier; bank credit lines feature fewer initiations, higher spreads and shorter maturity; and, firms’ cash reserves rise.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12055" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Private and Public Merger Waves</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12055</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Private and Public Merger Waves</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">VOJISLAV MAKSIMOVIC, GORDON PHILLIPS, LIU YANG</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-12T15:06:57.882303-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12055</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12055</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12055</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We document that public firms participate more than private firms as buyers and sellers of assets in merger waves and their participation is affected more by credit spreads and aggregate market valuation. Public firm acquisitions realize higher gains in productivity, particularly for on-the-wave acquisitions and when the acquirer's stock is liquid and highly valued. Our results are not driven solely by public firms' better access to capital. Using productivity data from early in the firm's life, we find that better private firms subsequently select to become public. Initial size and productivity predict asset purchases and sales 10 and more years later.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>© 2013 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

We document that public firms participate more than private firms as buyers and sellers of assets in merger waves and their participation is affected more by credit spreads and aggregate market valuation. Public firm acquisitions realize higher gains in productivity, particularly for on-the-wave acquisitions and when the acquirer's stock is liquid and highly valued. Our results are not driven solely by public firms' better access to capital. Using productivity data from early in the firm's life, we find that better private firms subsequently select to become public. Initial size and productivity predict asset purchases and sales 10 and more years later.
© 2013 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12053" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Liquidity in the Foreign Exchange Market: Measurement, Commonality, and Risk Premiums</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12053</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Liquidity in the Foreign Exchange Market: Measurement, Commonality, and Risk Premiums</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">LORIANO MANCINI, ANGELO RANALDO, JAN WRAMPELMEYER</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-09T15:23:29.190599-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12053</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12053</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12053</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We provide the first systematic study of liquidity in the foreign exchange market. We find significant variation in liquidity across exchange rates, substantial illiquidity costs, and strong commonality in liquidity across currencies and with equity and bond markets. Analyzing the impact of liquidity risk on carry trades, we show that funding (investment) currencies offer insurance against (exposure to) liquidity risk. A liquidity risk factor has a strong impact on carry trade returns from 2007 to 2009, suggesting that liquidity risk is priced. We present evidence that liquidity spirals may trigger these findings.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We provide the first systematic study of liquidity in the foreign exchange market. We find significant variation in liquidity across exchange rates, substantial illiquidity costs, and strong commonality in liquidity across currencies and with equity and bond markets. Analyzing the impact of liquidity risk on carry trades, we show that funding (investment) currencies offer insurance against (exposure to) liquidity risk. A liquidity risk factor has a strong impact on carry trade returns from 2007 to 2009, suggesting that liquidity risk is priced. We present evidence that liquidity spirals may trigger these findings.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12052" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Debt Specialization</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12052</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Debt Specialization</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">PAOLO COLLA, FILIPPO IPPOLITO, KAI LI</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-09T15:23:27.879338-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12052</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12052</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12052</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper examines debt structure using a new and comprehensive database on types of debt employed by public U.S. firms. We find that 85% of the sample firms borrow predominantly with one type of debt, and the degree of debt specialization varies widely across different subsamples—large rated firms tend to diversify across multiple debt types, while small unrated firms specialize in fewer types. We suggest several explanations for why debt specialization takes place, and show that firms employing few types of debt have higher bankruptcy costs, are more opaque, and lack access to some segments of the debt markets.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

This paper examines debt structure using a new and comprehensive database on types of debt employed by public U.S. firms. We find that 85% of the sample firms borrow predominantly with one type of debt, and the degree of debt specialization varies widely across different subsamples—large rated firms tend to diversify across multiple debt types, while small unrated firms specialize in fewer types. We suggest several explanations for why debt specialization takes place, and show that firms employing few types of debt have higher bankruptcy costs, are more opaque, and lack access to some segments of the debt markets.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12051" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Effects of Stock Lending on Security Prices: An Experiment</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12051</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Effects of Stock Lending on Security Prices: An Experiment</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">STEVEN N. KAPLAN, TOBIAS J. MOSKOWITZ, BERK A. SENSOY</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-09T15:23:19.42103-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12051</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12051</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12051</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We examine the impact of short selling by conducting a randomized stock lending experiment. Working with a large, anonymous money manager, we create an exogenous and sizeable shock to the supply of lendable shares by taking high-loan fee stocks in the manager's portfolio and randomly making available and withholding stocks from the lending market. The experiment ran in two independent phases: the first, from September 5 to 18, 2008, with over $580 million of securities lent; and the second, from June 5 to September 30, 2009, with over $250 million of securities lent. While the supply shocks significantly reduce market lending fees and raise quantities, we find no evidence that returns, volatility, skewness, or bid-ask spreads are affected. The results provide novel evidence on the impact of shorting supply and do not indicate any adverse effects on stock prices from securities lending.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We examine the impact of short selling by conducting a randomized stock lending experiment. Working with a large, anonymous money manager, we create an exogenous and sizeable shock to the supply of lendable shares by taking high-loan fee stocks in the manager's portfolio and randomly making available and withholding stocks from the lending market. The experiment ran in two independent phases: the first, from September 5 to 18, 2008, with over $580 million of securities lent; and the second, from June 5 to September 30, 2009, with over $250 million of securities lent. While the supply shocks significantly reduce market lending fees and raise quantities, we find no evidence that returns, volatility, skewness, or bid-ask spreads are affected. The results provide novel evidence on the impact of shorting supply and do not indicate any adverse effects on stock prices from securities lending.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12050" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Product Market Threats, Payouts, and Financial Flexibility</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12050</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Product Market Threats, Payouts, and Financial Flexibility</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">GERARD HOBERG, GORDON PHILLIPS, NAGPURNANAND PRABHALA</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-01T08:40:23.459292-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12050</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12050</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12050</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We examine how product market threats influence firm payout policy and cash holdings. Using firms' product text descriptions, we develop new measures of competitive threats. Our primary measure, product market fluidity, captures changes in rival firms' products relative to the firm's products. We show that fluidity decreases firm propensity to make payouts via dividends or repurchases and increases the cash held by firms, especially for firms with less access to financial markets. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms' financial policies are significantly shaped by product market threats and dynamics.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We examine how product market threats influence firm payout policy and cash holdings. Using firms' product text descriptions, we develop new measures of competitive threats. Our primary measure, product market fluidity, captures changes in rival firms' products relative to the firm's products. We show that fluidity decreases firm propensity to make payouts via dividends or repurchases and increases the cash held by firms, especially for firms with less access to financial markets. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms' financial policies are significantly shaped by product market threats and dynamics.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12049" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Evidence on the Benefits of Alternative Mortgage Products</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12049</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Evidence on the Benefits of Alternative Mortgage Products</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">JOÃO F. COCCO</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-28T08:00:19.039057-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12049</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12049</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12049</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Alternative mortgage products have been identified by many as culprits in the financial crisis. However, because of their lower initial mortgage payments relative to loan amount, they may be a valuable tool for households who expect higher and more certain future labor income, and who wish to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. Using U.K. household-level panel data, this paper provides evidence in support of this hypothesis and highlights other important benefits of alternative mortgages, including portfolio diversification, tax benefits, and a reduction in the transaction costs incurred in housing transactions.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

Alternative mortgage products have been identified by many as culprits in the financial crisis. However, because of their lower initial mortgage payments relative to loan amount, they may be a valuable tool for households who expect higher and more certain future labor income, and who wish to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. Using U.K. household-level panel data, this paper provides evidence in support of this hypothesis and highlights other important benefits of alternative mortgages, including portfolio diversification, tax benefits, and a reduction in the transaction costs incurred in housing transactions.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12043" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Informed Trading through the Accounts of Children</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12043</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Informed Trading through the Accounts of Children</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Henk Berkman, Paul D. Koch, P. Joakim Westerholm</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-19T04:15:28.847194-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12043</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12043</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12043</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This study shows that the guardians behind underaged accounts are successful at picking stocks. Moreover, they tend to channel their best trades through the accounts of children, especially when they trade just before major earnings announcements, large price changes, and takeover announcements. Building on these results, we argue that the proportion of total trading activity through underaged accounts (labeled <em>BABYPIN</em>) should serve as an effective proxy for the probability of information trading in a stock. Consistent with this claim, we show that investors demand a higher return for holding stocks with a greater likelihood of private information, proxied by <em>BABYPIN</em>.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

This study shows that the guardians behind underaged accounts are successful at picking stocks. Moreover, they tend to channel their best trades through the accounts of children, especially when they trade just before major earnings announcements, large price changes, and takeover announcements. Building on these results, we argue that the proportion of total trading activity through underaged accounts (labeled BABYPIN) should serve as an effective proxy for the probability of information trading in a stock. Consistent with this claim, we show that investors demand a higher return for holding stocks with a greater likelihood of private information, proxied by BABYPIN.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12042" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Real Effects of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Exogenous Changes in Analyst Coverage</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12042</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Real Effects of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Exogenous Changes in Analyst Coverage</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">FRANÇOIS DERRIEN, AMBRUS KECSKÉS</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-19T04:10:50.589479-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12042</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12042</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12042</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We study the causal effects of analyst coverage on corporate investment and financing policies. We hypothesize that a decrease in analyst coverage increases information asymmetry and thus increases the cost of capital; as a result, firms decrease their investment and financing. We use broker closures and broker mergers to identify changes in analyst coverage that are exogenous to corporate policies. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that firms that lose an analyst decrease their investment and financing by 1.9% and 2.0% of total assets, respectively, compared to similar firms that do not lose an analyst.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We study the causal effects of analyst coverage on corporate investment and financing policies. We hypothesize that a decrease in analyst coverage increases information asymmetry and thus increases the cost of capital; as a result, firms decrease their investment and financing. We use broker closures and broker mergers to identify changes in analyst coverage that are exogenous to corporate policies. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that firms that lose an analyst decrease their investment and financing by 1.9% and 2.0% of total assets, respectively, compared to similar firms that do not lose an analyst.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12041" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>International Stock Return Predictability: What is the Role of the United States?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12041</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">International Stock Return Predictability: What is the Role of the United States?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">DAVID E. RAPACH, JACK K. STRAUSS, GUOFU ZHOU</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-19T04:10:47.969215-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12041</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12041</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12041</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We investigate lead-lag relationships among monthly country stock returns and identify a leading role for the U.S.: lagged U.S. returns significantly predict returns in numerous non-U.S. industrialized countries, while lagged non-U.S. returns display limited predictive ability with respect to U.S. returns. We estimate a news-diffusion model, and the results indicate that return shocks arising in the U.S. are only fully reflected in equity prices outside of the U.S. with a lag, consistent with a gradual information diffusion explanation of the predictive power of lagged U.S. returns.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We investigate lead-lag relationships among monthly country stock returns and identify a leading role for the U.S.: lagged U.S. returns significantly predict returns in numerous non-U.S. industrialized countries, while lagged non-U.S. returns display limited predictive ability with respect to U.S. returns. We estimate a news-diffusion model, and the results indicate that return shocks arising in the U.S. are only fully reflected in equity prices outside of the U.S. with a lag, consistent with a gradual information diffusion explanation of the predictive power of lagged U.S. returns.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12040" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Law, Stock Markets, and Innovation</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12040</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Law, Stock Markets, and Innovation</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">JAMES R. BROWN, GUSTAV MARTINSSON, BRUCE C. PETERSEN</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-19T04:10:42.572316-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12040</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12040</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12040</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We study a broad sample of firms across 32 countries and find that strong shareholder protections and better access to stock market financing lead to substantially higher long-run rates of R&amp;D investment, particularly in small firms, but are unimportant for fixed capital investment. Credit market development has a modest impact on fixed investment but no impact on R&amp;D. These findings connect law and stock markets with innovative activities key to economic growth, and show that legal rules and financial developments affecting the availability of external equity financing are particularly important for risky, intangible investments not easily financed with debt.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We study a broad sample of firms across 32 countries and find that strong shareholder protections and better access to stock market financing lead to substantially higher long-run rates of R&amp;D investment, particularly in small firms, but are unimportant for fixed capital investment. Credit market development has a modest impact on fixed investment but no impact on R&amp;D. These findings connect law and stock markets with innovative activities key to economic growth, and show that legal rules and financial developments affecting the availability of external equity financing are particularly important for risky, intangible investments not easily financed with debt.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12048" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Mutual Fund Performance and the Incentive to Generate Alpha</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12048</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Mutual Fund Performance and the Incentive to Generate Alpha</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">DIANE GUERCIO, JONATHAN REUTER</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-19T03:49:08.681292-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12048</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12048</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12048</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>To rationalize the well-known underperformance of the average actively managed mutual fund, we exploit the fact that retail funds in different market segments compete for different types of investors. Within the segment of funds marketed directly to retail investors, we show that flows chase risk-adjusted returns, and that funds respond by investing more in active management. Importantly, within this direct-sold segment, we find no evidence that actively managed funds underperform index funds. In contrast, we show that actively managed funds sold through brokers face a weaker incentive to generate alpha and significantly underperform index funds.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

To rationalize the well-known underperformance of the average actively managed mutual fund, we exploit the fact that retail funds in different market segments compete for different types of investors. Within the segment of funds marketed directly to retail investors, we show that flows chase risk-adjusted returns, and that funds respond by investing more in active management. Importantly, within this direct-sold segment, we find no evidence that actively managed funds underperform index funds. In contrast, we show that actively managed funds sold through brokers face a weaker incentive to generate alpha and significantly underperform index funds.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12047" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Business Cycle, Investor Sentiment, and Costly External Finance</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12047</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Business Cycle, Investor Sentiment, and Costly External Finance</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">R. DAVID MCLEAN, MENGXIN ZHAO</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-19T03:49:03.76452-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12047</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12047</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12047</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The recent financial crisis shows that financial markets can impact the real economy. We investigate whether access to finance typically time-varies and if so, what are the real effects. Consistent with time-varying external finance costs, both investment and employment are less sensitive to Tobin's <em>q</em> and more sensitive to cash flow during recessions and low investor sentiment periods. Share issuance plays a bigger role than debt issuance in causing these effects. Alternative tests that do not rely on <em>q</em> and cash flow sensitivities suggest that recessions and low sentiment increase external finance costs, thereby limiting investment and employment.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

The recent financial crisis shows that financial markets can impact the real economy. We investigate whether access to finance typically time-varies and if so, what are the real effects. Consistent with time-varying external finance costs, both investment and employment are less sensitive to Tobin's q and more sensitive to cash flow during recessions and low investor sentiment periods. Share issuance plays a bigger role than debt issuance in causing these effects. Alternative tests that do not rely on q and cash flow sensitivities suggest that recessions and low sentiment increase external finance costs, thereby limiting investment and employment.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12046" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Opening the Black Box: Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Power</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12046</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Opening the Black Box: Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Power</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">MARKUS GLASER, FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, ZACHARIAS SAUTNER</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-19T03:49:00.220486-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12046</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12046</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12046</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We analyze the internal capital markets of a multinational conglomerate, using a unique panel data set of planned and actual allocations to business units and a survey of unit CEOs. Following cash windfalls, more powerful managers obtain larger allocations and increase investment substantially more than their less connected peers. We identify cash windfalls as a source of misallocation of capital, as more powerful managers overinvest and their units exhibit lower ex-post performance and productivity. These findings contribute to our understanding of frictions in resource allocation within firms and point to an important channel through which power may lead to inefficiencies.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We analyze the internal capital markets of a multinational conglomerate, using a unique panel data set of planned and actual allocations to business units and a survey of unit CEOs. Following cash windfalls, more powerful managers obtain larger allocations and increase investment substantially more than their less connected peers. We identify cash windfalls as a source of misallocation of capital, as more powerful managers overinvest and their units exhibit lower ex-post performance and productivity. These findings contribute to our understanding of frictions in resource allocation within firms and point to an important channel through which power may lead to inefficiencies.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12045" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Cheap Credit, Lending Operations, and International Politics: The Case of Global Microfinance</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12045</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Cheap Credit, Lending Operations, and International Politics: The Case of Global Microfinance</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">MARK J. GARMAISE, GABRIEL NATIVIDAD</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-19T03:48:48.115703-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12045</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12045</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12045</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The provision of subsidized credit to financial institutions is an important and frequently used policy tool of governments and central banks. To assess its effectiveness, we exploit changes in international bilateral political relationships that generate shocks to the cost of financing for microfinance institutions (MFIs). MFIs that experience politically driven reductions in total borrowing costs hire more staff and increase administrative expenses. Cheap credit leads to greater profitability for MFIs and promotes a shift towards noncommercial loans but has no effect on total overall lending. Instead, the additional resources are either directed to promoting future growth or dissipated.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

The provision of subsidized credit to financial institutions is an important and frequently used policy tool of governments and central banks. To assess its effectiveness, we exploit changes in international bilateral political relationships that generate shocks to the cost of financing for microfinance institutions (MFIs). MFIs that experience politically driven reductions in total borrowing costs hire more staff and increase administrative expenses. Cheap credit leads to greater profitability for MFIs and promotes a shift towards noncommercial loans but has no effect on total overall lending. Instead, the additional resources are either directed to promoting future growth or dissipated.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12044" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Determinants of Attitudes towards Strategic Default on Mortgages</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12044</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Determinants of Attitudes towards Strategic Default on Mortgages</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">LUIGI GUISO, PAOLA SAPIENZA, LUIGI ZINGALES</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-19T03:45:57.364392-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12044</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12044</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12044</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We use survey data to measure households’ propensity to default on mortgages even if they can afford to pay them (strategic default) when the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house. The willingness to default increases in both the absolute and the relative size of the home-equity shortfall. Our evidence suggests that this willingness is affected by both pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, such as views about fairness and morality. We also find that exposure to other people who strategically defaulted increases the propensity to default strategically because it conveys information about the probability of being sued.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We use survey data to measure households’ propensity to default on mortgages even if they can afford to pay them (strategic default) when the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house. The willingness to default increases in both the absolute and the relative size of the home-equity shortfall. Our evidence suggests that this willingness is affected by both pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, such as views about fairness and morality. We also find that exposure to other people who strategically defaulted increases the propensity to default strategically because it conveys information about the probability of being sued.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12035" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Pricing Model Performance and the Two-Pass Cross-Sectional Regression Methodology</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12035</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Pricing Model Performance and the Two-Pass Cross-Sectional Regression Methodology</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">RAYMOND KAN, CESARE ROBOTTI, JAY SHANKEN</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-15T10:32:35.362002-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12035</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12035</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12035</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Over the years, many asset pricing studies have employed the sample cross-sectional regression (CSR) R2 as a measure of model performance. We derive the asymptotic distribution of this statistic and develop associated model comparison tests, taking into account the impact of model misspecification on the variability of the CSR estimates. We encounter several examples of large R2 differences that are not statistically significant. A version of the intertemporal CAPM exhibits the best overall performance, followed by the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). Interest- ingly, the performance of prominent consumption CAPMs is sensitive to variations in experimental design.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

Over the years, many asset pricing studies have employed the sample cross-sectional regression (CSR) R2 as a measure of model performance. We derive the asymptotic distribution of this statistic and develop associated model comparison tests, taking into account the impact of model misspecification on the variability of the CSR estimates. We encounter several examples of large R2 differences that are not statistically significant. A version of the intertemporal CAPM exhibits the best overall performance, followed by the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). Interest- ingly, the performance of prominent consumption CAPMs is sensitive to variations in experimental design.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12034" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Organization Capital and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12034</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Organization Capital and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">ANDREA L. EISFELDT, DIMITRIS PAPANIKOLAOU</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-15T10:32:23.270871-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12034</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12034</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12034</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Organization capital is a production factor that is embodied in the firm's key talent and has an efficiency that is firm specific. Hence, both shareholders and key talent have a claim to its cash flows. We develop a model in which the outside option of the key talent determines the share of firm cash flows that accrue to shareholders. This outside option varies systematically and renders firms with high organization capital riskier from shareholders’ perspective. We find that firms with more organization capital have average returns that are 4.6% higher than firms with less organization capital.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

Organization capital is a production factor that is embodied in the firm's key talent and has an efficiency that is firm specific. Hence, both shareholders and key talent have a claim to its cash flows. We develop a model in which the outside option of the key talent determines the share of firm cash flows that accrue to shareholders. This outside option varies systematically and renders firms with high organization capital riskier from shareholders’ perspective. We find that firms with more organization capital have average returns that are 4.6% higher than firms with less organization capital.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12032" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The TIPS—Treasury Bond Puzzle*</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12032</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The TIPS—Treasury Bond Puzzle*</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Matthias Fleckenstein, Francis A. Longstaff, Hanno Lustig</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-30T12:48:37.913322-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12032</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12032</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12032</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We show that the price of a Treasury bond and an inflation-swapped TIPS issue exactly replicating the cash flows of the Treasury bond can differ by more than $20 per $100 notional. Treasury bonds are almost always overvalued relative to TIPS. Total TIPS–Treasury mispricing has exceeded $56 billion, representing nearly 8% of the total amount of TIPS outstanding. We find direct evidence that the mispricing narrows as additional capital flows into the markets. This provides strong support for the slow-moving-capital explanation of arbitrage persistence.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

We show that the price of a Treasury bond and an inflation-swapped TIPS issue exactly replicating the cash flows of the Treasury bond can differ by more than $20 per $100 notional. Treasury bonds are almost always overvalued relative to TIPS. Total TIPS–Treasury mispricing has exceeded $56 billion, representing nearly 8% of the total amount of TIPS outstanding. We find direct evidence that the mispricing narrows as additional capital flows into the markets. This provides strong support for the slow-moving-capital explanation of arbitrage persistence.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12031" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>A Model of Shadow Banking</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12031</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">A Model of Shadow Banking</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-30T12:46:23.819628-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12031</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12031</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12031</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry-ups when investors ignore tail risks.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry-ups when investors ignore tail risks.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12029" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Trading Complex Assets</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12029</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Trading Complex Assets</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Bruce Ian Carlin, Shimon Kogan, Richard Lowery</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-30T12:46:12.633653-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12029</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12029</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12029</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We perform an experimental study to assess the effect of complexity on asset trading. We find that higher complexity leads to increased price volatility, lower liquidity, and decreased trade efficiency especially when repeated bargaining takes place. However, the channel through which complexity acts is not simply due to the added noise induced by estimation error. Rather, complexity alters the bidding strategies used by traders, making them less inclined to trade, even when we control for estimation error across treatments. As such, it appears that adverse selection plays an important role in explaining the trading abnormalities caused by complexity.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

We perform an experimental study to assess the effect of complexity on asset trading. We find that higher complexity leads to increased price volatility, lower liquidity, and decreased trade efficiency especially when repeated bargaining takes place. However, the channel through which complexity acts is not simply due to the added noise induced by estimation error. Rather, complexity alters the bidding strategies used by traders, making them less inclined to trade, even when we control for estimation error across treatments. As such, it appears that adverse selection plays an important role in explaining the trading abnormalities caused by complexity.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12026" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Taxes, Theft, and Firm Performance</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12026</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Taxes, Theft, and Firm Performance</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Maxim Mironov</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-30T12:45:49.668255-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12026</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12026</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12026</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper examines the interaction between income diversion and firm performance. Using unique Russian banking transaction data, I identify 42,483 <em>spacemen,</em> fly-by-night firms created specifically for income diversion. Next, I build a direct measure of income diversion for 45,429 companies and show that it is negatively related to firm performance. I identify the main reason for the observed effect as managerial diversion rather than tax evasion per se. I further show that stricter tax enforcement can improve firm performance: a one standard deviation increase in tax enforcement corresponds to an increase in the annual revenue growth rate of 2.6%.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

This paper examines the interaction between income diversion and firm performance. Using unique Russian banking transaction data, I identify 42,483 spacemen, fly-by-night firms created specifically for income diversion. Next, I build a direct measure of income diversion for 45,429 companies and show that it is negatively related to firm performance. I identify the main reason for the observed effect as managerial diversion rather than tax evasion per se. I further show that stricter tax enforcement can improve firm performance: a one standard deviation increase in tax enforcement corresponds to an increase in the annual revenue growth rate of 2.6%.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12064" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>FRONT MATTER</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12064</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">FRONT MATTER</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12064</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12064</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12064</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">FRONT MATTER</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">fmi</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">fmvii</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[]]></content:encoded><description/></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12065" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>BACK MATTER</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12065</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">BACK MATTER</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12065</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12065</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12065</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">BACK MATTER</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">bmi</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">bmi</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[]]></content:encoded><description/></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12030" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Reverse Survivorship Bias</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12030</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Reverse Survivorship Bias</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">JUHANI T. LINNAINMAA</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12030</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12030</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12030</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">789</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">813</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Mutual funds often disappear following poor performance. When this poor performance is partly attributable to negative idiosyncratic shocks, funds' estimated alphas understate their true alphas. This paper estimates a structural model to correct for this bias. Although most funds still have negative alphas, they are not nearly as low as those suggested by the fund-by-fund regressions. Approximately 12% of funds have net four-factor model alphas greater than 2% per year. All studies that run fund-by-fund regressions to draw inferences about the prevalence of skill among mutual fund managers are subject to reverse survivorship bias.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

Mutual funds often disappear following poor performance. When this poor performance is partly attributable to negative idiosyncratic shocks, funds' estimated alphas understate their true alphas. This paper estimates a structural model to correct for this bias. Although most funds still have negative alphas, they are not nearly as low as those suggested by the fund-by-fund regressions. Approximately 12% of funds have net four-factor model alphas greater than 2% per year. All studies that run fund-by-fund regressions to draw inferences about the prevalence of skill among mutual fund managers are subject to reverse survivorship bias.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12023" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12023</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">DANIEL COVITZ, NELLIE LIANG, GUSTAVO A. SUAREZ</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12023</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12023</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12023</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">815</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">848</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper documents “runs” on asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programs in 2007. We find that one-third of programs experienced a run within weeks of the onset of the ABCP crisis and that runs, as well as yields and maturities for new issues, were related to program-level and macro-financial risks. These findings are consistent with the asymmetric information framework used to explain banking panics, have implications for commercial paper investors’ degree of risk intolerance, and inform empirical predictions of recent papers on dynamic coordination failures.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

This paper documents “runs” on asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programs in 2007. We find that one-third of programs experienced a run within weeks of the onset of the ABCP crisis and that runs, as well as yields and maturities for new issues, were related to program-level and macro-financial risks. These findings are consistent with the asymmetric information framework used to explain banking panics, have implications for commercial paper investors’ degree of risk intolerance, and inform empirical predictions of recent papers on dynamic coordination failures.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12022" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Equilibrium Subprime Lending</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12022</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Equilibrium Subprime Lending</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">IGOR MAKAROV, GUILLAUME PLANTIN</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12022</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12022</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12022</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">849</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">879</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper develops an equilibrium model of a subprime mortgage market. Our goal is to offer a benchmark with which the recent subprime boom and bust can be compared. The model is tractable and delivers plausible orders of magnitude for borrowing capacities, as well as default and trading intensities. We offer simple explanations for several phenomena in the subprime market, such as the prevalence of teaser rates and the clustering of defaults. In our model, both nondiversifiable and diversifiable income risks reduce debt capacities. Thus, debt capacities need not be higher when a larger fraction of income risk is diversifiable.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

This paper develops an equilibrium model of a subprime mortgage market. Our goal is to offer a benchmark with which the recent subprime boom and bust can be compared. The model is tractable and delivers plausible orders of magnitude for borrowing capacities, as well as default and trading intensities. We offer simple explanations for several phenomena in the subprime market, such as the prevalence of teaser rates and the clustering of defaults. In our model, both nondiversifiable and diversifiable income risks reduce debt capacities. Thus, debt capacities need not be higher when a larger fraction of income risk is diversifiable.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12020" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Access to Collateral and Corporate Debt Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12020</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Access to Collateral and Corporate Debt Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">VIKRANT VIG</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12020</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12020</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12020</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">881</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">928</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We investigate how firms respond to strengthening of creditor rights by examining their financial decisions following a securitization reform in India. We find that the reform led to a reduction in secured debt, total debt, debt maturity, and asset growth, and an increase in liquidity hoarding by firms. Moreover, the effects are more pronounced for firms that have a higher proportion of tangible assets because these firms are more affected by the secured transactions law. These results suggest that strengthening of creditor rights introduces a liquidation bias and documents how firms alter their debt structures to contract around it.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We investigate how firms respond to strengthening of creditor rights by examining their financial decisions following a securitization reform in India. We find that the reform led to a reduction in secured debt, total debt, debt maturity, and asset growth, and an increase in liquidity hoarding by firms. Moreover, the effects are more pronounced for firms that have a higher proportion of tangible assets because these firms are more affected by the secured transactions law. These results suggest that strengthening of creditor rights introduces a liquidation bias and documents how firms alter their debt structures to contract around it.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12021" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Value and Momentum Everywhere</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12021</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Value and Momentum Everywhere</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">CLIFFORD S. ASNESS, TOBIAS J. MOSKOWITZ, LASSE HEJE PEDERSEN</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12021</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12021</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12021</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">929</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">985</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We find consistent value and momentum return premia across eight diverse markets and asset classes, and a strong common factor structure among their returns. Value and momentum returns correlate more strongly across asset classes than passive exposures to the asset classes, but value and momentum are negatively correlated with each other, both within and across asset classes. Our results indicate the presence of common global risks that we characterize with a three-factor model. Global funding liquidity risk is a partial source of these patterns, which are identifiable only when examining value and momentum jointly across markets. Our findings present a challenge to existing behavioral, institutional, and rational asset pricing theories that largely focus on U.S. equities.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

We find consistent value and momentum return premia across eight diverse markets and asset classes, and a strong common factor structure among their returns. Value and momentum returns correlate more strongly across asset classes than passive exposures to the asset classes, but value and momentum are negatively correlated with each other, both within and across asset classes. Our results indicate the presence of common global risks that we characterize with a three-factor model. Global funding liquidity risk is a partial source of these patterns, which are identifiable only when examining value and momentum jointly across markets. Our findings present a challenge to existing behavioral, institutional, and rational asset pricing theories that largely focus on U.S. equities.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12018" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Can Time-Varying Risk of Rare Disasters Explain Aggregate Stock Market Volatility?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12018</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Can Time-Varying Risk of Rare Disasters Explain Aggregate Stock Market Volatility?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">JESSICA A. WACHTER</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12018</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12018</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12018</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">987</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1035</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
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<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Why is the equity premium so high, and why are stocks so volatile? Why are stock returns in excess of government bill rates predictable? This paper proposes an answer to these questions based on a time-varying probability of a consumption disaster. In the model, aggregate consumption follows a normal distribution with low volatility most of the time, but with some probability of a consumption realization far out in the left tail. The possibility of this poor outcome substantially increases the equity premium, while time-variation in the probability of this outcome drives high stock market volatility and excess return predictability.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

Why is the equity premium so high, and why are stocks so volatile? Why are stock returns in excess of government bill rates predictable? This paper proposes an answer to these questions based on a time-varying probability of a consumption disaster. In the model, aggregate consumption follows a normal distribution with low volatility most of the time, but with some probability of a consumption realization far out in the left tail. The possibility of this poor outcome substantially increases the equity premium, while time-variation in the probability of this outcome drives high stock market volatility and excess return predictability.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12017" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>State-Level Business Cycles and Local Return Predictability</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12017</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">State-Level Business Cycles and Local Return Predictability</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">GEORGE M. KORNIOTIS, ALOK KUMAR</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12017</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12017</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12017</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1037</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1096</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This study examines whether local stock returns vary with local business cycles in a predictable manner. We find that U.S. state portfolios earn higher future returns when state-level unemployment rates are higher and housing collateral ratios are lower. During the 1978 to 2009 period, geography-based trading strategies earn annualized risk-adjusted returns of 5%. This abnormal performance reflects time-varying systematic risks and local-trading induced mispricing. Consistent with the mispricing explanation, the evidence of predictability is stronger among firms with low visibility and high local ownership. Nonlocal domestic and foreign investors arbitrage away the predictable patterns in local returns in 1 year.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

This study examines whether local stock returns vary with local business cycles in a predictable manner. We find that U.S. state portfolios earn higher future returns when state-level unemployment rates are higher and housing collateral ratios are lower. During the 1978 to 2009 period, geography-based trading strategies earn annualized risk-adjusted returns of 5%. This abnormal performance reflects time-varying systematic risks and local-trading induced mispricing. Consistent with the mispricing explanation, the evidence of predictability is stronger among firms with low visibility and high local ownership. Nonlocal domestic and foreign investors arbitrage away the predictable patterns in local returns in 1 year.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12019" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12019</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">JULIAN ATANASSOV</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12019</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12019</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12019</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1097</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1131</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I examine how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation and firm value. I find a significant decline in the number of patents and citations per patent for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not. Most of the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation occurs 2 or more years after they are passed, indicating a causal effect. The negative effect of antitakeover laws is mitigated by the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as large shareholders, pension fund ownership, leverage, and product market competition.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

I examine how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation and firm value. I find a significant decline in the number of patents and citations per patent for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not. Most of the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation occurs 2 or more years after they are passed, indicating a causal effect. The negative effect of antitakeover laws is mitigated by the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as large shareholders, pension fund ownership, leverage, and product market competition.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12024" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Decentralized Investment Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12024</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Decentralized Investment Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">DAVID BLAKE, ALBERTO G. ROSSI, ALLAN TIMMERMANN, IAN TONKS, RUSS WERMERS</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12024</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12024</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12024</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1133</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1178</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Using a unique data set, we document two secular trends in the shift from centralized to decentralized pension fund management over the past few decades. First, across asset classes, sponsors replace generalist balanced managers with better-performing specialists. Second, within asset classes, funds replace single managers with multiple competing managers following diverse strategies to reduce scale diseconomies as funds grow larger relative to capital markets. Consistent with a model of decentralized management, sponsors implement risk controls that trade off higher anticipated alphas of multiple specialists against the increased difficulty in coordinating their risk-taking and the greater uncertainty concerning their true skills.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

Using a unique data set, we document two secular trends in the shift from centralized to decentralized pension fund management over the past few decades. First, across asset classes, sponsors replace generalist balanced managers with better-performing specialists. Second, within asset classes, funds replace single managers with multiple competing managers following diverse strategies to reduce scale diseconomies as funds grow larger relative to capital markets. Consistent with a model of decentralized management, sponsors implement risk controls that trade off higher anticipated alphas of multiple specialists against the increased difficulty in coordinating their risk-taking and the greater uncertainty concerning their true skills.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12025" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Financial Regulation, Financial Globalization, and the Synchronization of Economic Activity</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12025</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Financial Regulation, Financial Globalization, and the Synchronization of Economic Activity</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">SEBNEM KALEMLI-OZCAN, ELIAS PAPAIOANNOU, JOSÉ-LUIS PEYDRÓ</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12025</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12025</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12025</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1179</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1228</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We analyze the impact of financial globalization on business cycle synchronization using a proprietary database on banks’ international exposure for industrialized countries during 1978 to 2006. Theory makes ambiguous predictions and identification has been elusive due to lack of bilateral time-varying financial linkages data. In contrast to conventional wisdom and previous empirical studies, we identify a strong negative effect of banking integration on output synchronization, conditional on global shocks and country-pair heterogeneity. Similarly, we show divergent economic activity due to higher integration using an exogenous de-jure measure of integration based on financial regulations that harmonized EU markets.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We analyze the impact of financial globalization on business cycle synchronization using a proprietary database on banks’ international exposure for industrialized countries during 1978 to 2006. Theory makes ambiguous predictions and identification has been elusive due to lack of bilateral time-varying financial linkages data. In contrast to conventional wisdom and previous empirical studies, we identify a strong negative effect of banking integration on output synchronization, conditional on global shocks and country-pair heterogeneity. Similarly, we show divergent economic activity due to higher integration using an exogenous de-jure measure of integration based on financial regulations that harmonized EU markets.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12028" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>How Wise Are Crowds? Insights from Retail Orders and Stock Returns</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12028</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">How Wise Are Crowds? Insights from Retail Orders and Stock Returns</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">ERIC K. KELLEY, PAUL C. TETLOCK</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12028</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12028</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12028</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1229</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1265</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We analyze the role of retail investors in stock pricing using a database uniquely suited for this purpose. The data allow us to address selection bias concerns and to separately examine aggressive (market) and passive (limit) orders. Both aggressive and passive net buying positively predict firms’ monthly stock returns with no evidence of return reversal. Only aggressive orders correctly predict firm news, including earnings surprises, suggesting they convey novel cash flow information. Only passive net buying follows negative returns, consistent with traders providing liquidity and benefiting from the reversal of transitory price movements. These actions contribute to market efficiency.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

We analyze the role of retail investors in stock pricing using a database uniquely suited for this purpose. The data allow us to address selection bias concerns and to separately examine aggressive (market) and passive (limit) orders. Both aggressive and passive net buying positively predict firms’ monthly stock returns with no evidence of return reversal. Only aggressive orders correctly predict firm news, including earnings surprises, suggesting they convey novel cash flow information. Only passive net buying follows negative returns, consistent with traders providing liquidity and benefiting from the reversal of transitory price movements. These actions contribute to market efficiency.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12027" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Sentiment during Recessions</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12027</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Sentiment during Recessions</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">DIEGO GARCÍA</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12027</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12027</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12027</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ARTICLE</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1267</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1300</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">ABSTRACT</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper studies the effect of sentiment on asset prices during the 20th century (1905 to 2005). As a proxy for sentiment, we use the fraction of positive and negative words in two columns of financial news from the <em>New York Times</em>. The main contribution of the paper is to show that, controlling for other well-known time-series patterns, the predictability of stock returns using news' content is concentrated in recessions. A one standard deviation shock to our news measure during recessions predicts a change in the conditional average return on the DJIA of 12 basis points over one day.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

This paper studies the effect of sentiment on asset prices during the 20th century (1905 to 2005). As a proxy for sentiment, we use the fraction of positive and negative words in two columns of financial news from the New York Times. The main contribution of the paper is to show that, controlling for other well-known time-series patterns, the predictability of stock returns using news' content is concentrated in recessions. A one standard deviation shock to our news measure during recessions predicts a change in the conditional average return on the DJIA of 12 basis points over one day.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12033" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>MISCELLANEA</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12033</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">MISCELLANEA</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12033</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12033</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12033</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">MISCELLANEA</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1301</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1302</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[]]></content:encoded><description/></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12066" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>ANNOUNCEMENTS</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12066</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">ANNOUNCEMENTS</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12066</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12066</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12066</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ANNOUNCEMENTS</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1303</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1303</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[]]></content:encoded><description/></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12054" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Maturity Rat Race—Erratum</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12054</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Maturity Rat Race—Erratum</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-20T10:39:14.491478-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/jofi.12054</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/jofi.12054</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjofi.12054</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">ERRATUM</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1305</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1305</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[]]></content:encoded><description/></item></rdf:RDF>