Educational theorists frequently invoke rights claims to express their views about educational justice and authority. But the unyielding nature of rights claims presents a significant quandary in democratic contexts, given the tension between rights claims and majoritarian democracy. Educational theorists have given limited attention to this tension, while political theorists tend to sideline education in their analyses. In this essay Anne Newman addresses this gap by advancing a democratic rationale for educational rights. Newman's purpose is to provide a framework for advancing educational rights that protects these rights from the whims of majoritarian politics. Her central argument is that the importance of educational rights warrants giving democratic bodies far less deference than they are typically accorded. Yet the assertion of a right to a quality education, Newman emphasizes, should not be viewed as an undue constraint on democratic authority but rather is consistent with and required by the values that underlie democracy.

The state's commitment to educating all children can be framed as a matter of human capital development, or the economic benefits accrued to individuals and society as a result of educational attainment; it can be framed as a matter of capabilities, or the development of functionings that enable human flourishing; and it can be framed as a matter of rights. In this essay Sigal Ben-Porath considers the relative merits of the three approaches, elaborating the implications each of these different frameworks has for the education of children with disabilities. While the capabilities approach, which arises from and relates to the rights approach, is sensitive to the needs of individuals with disabilities (more than the human capital approach is, in any case), Ben-Porath concludes that a rights framework can best express through educational policy the state's commitment to the education of all children, regardless of ability.

In this article Sarah Stitzlein highlights an educational right that has been largely unacknowledged in the past but has recently gained significance given renewed citizen participation in displays of public outcry on our streets and in our town halls. Dissent is typically conceived of as a negative right—a liberty that guarantees that the government will not interfere with one's public self-expression. Stitzlein argues that, insofar as the legitimacy of the state depends on obtaining the consent of the governed, the state must allow the lively proliferation of dissent. Attending to this negative rights perspective, Stitzlein explores the educational implications of reframing the right to dissent as a positive right. This includes discussing the state's obligation to cultivate the skills of dissent in its young citizens and, correspondingly, student entitlement to this training. These educational implications, especially for civics education, are far more substantial than the thinner implications of the negative right to dissent.

In this essay Bryan Warnick explores how rights to religious expression should be understood for students in public schools. Warnick frames student religious rights as a debate between the conflicting values associated with the Free Exercise Clause and the values associated with the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. He then asks how the special characteristics of the school environment should guide us in prioritizing those values. The overall weight of the considerations, particularly concerns about civic education, leads to a two-pronged approach to religious rights. The first prong involves a robust protection of student religious exercise; the second involves an equally robust regime of school disassociation from student religious exercises.

By blurring the distinction between formal school and education writ large, homeschooling both highlights and complicates the tensions among the interests of parents, children, and the state. In this essay, Robert Kunzman argues for a modest version of children's educational rights, at least in a legal sense that the state has the duty and authority to enforce. At the same time, however, it is important to retain a principled distinction between schooling and education—not only to protect children's basic educational rights, but also to prevent the state from overreaching into the private realm of the home and family.

In this essay Olivia Newman critically examines two opposing rights claims: the liberal claim that children have a right to become liberal choosers and the fundamentalist claim that children have a right to not become liberal choosers. These positions reflect differing views regarding the value of critically choosing, rather than simply accepting, a way of life. Given their assumptions regarding preference formation, both of these rights appear untenable in light of recent scholarship in psychology: we can neither select a way of life independent of our social milieu, as liberals often imply, nor can we predict how different experiences will affect our preferences, as fundamentalists assume. Nevertheless, each position points to important concerns. Children have a substantive right of exit from constraining social milieus, as liberals purport, as well as a right to respect in public institutions, as fundamentalists insist. When liberals and fundamentalists assert these more modest rights claims, educators can and should strive to satisfy both.

The ideal of personal autonomy enjoys considerable support in educational theory, but close analysis reveals serious problems with its core analytical and psychological components. The core conception of autonomy authorizes individuals to employ their imaginations in troubling and unhealthy ways that clash with sound ideals of moral character. Lucas Swaine argues in this essay that this gives grounds to deny that the core conception of autonomy should be promoted in democratic education. What is more, according to Swaine, young citizens appear to have no right to be educated, in public schools, for the purpose of becoming autonomous individuals of the kind he describes and criticizes in this account.