This article focuses on the transformatory potential of macroprudential ideas following the financial crash of 2008, examining how they are being mediated by existing institutional contexts and how and why the task of building a new body of technical macroprudential knowledge is proceeding slowly. It is argued that the movement toward a form of macroprudential regulation has a distinctly incremental dynamic that means any macroprudential transformation will be a gradual process that is likely to span a decade or more. Using Peter Hall's framework of three orders of policy change across substantive and temporal dimensions, the article argues that the macroprudential ideational shift can be compared to third order change. In this sense, it was intellectually radical and took place rapidly in a period of around six months. However, intellectual radicalism does not automatically translate into a radical change in regulatory practice, because of a variety of countervailing political, institutional, and informational variables. In this respect, the task of developing first and second order macroprudential policy is proving to be a much more politically contested process. Furthermore, macroprudential policy is being developed by cautious technocrats who rely on the gradual accumulation of data and evidence to justify policy. The result is a distinctly incremental dynamic to macroprudential policy development that displays many of the features of a process that historical institutionalists refer to as “layering.”

The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union to ban sex discrimination in insurance has shown the potential reach of the principle of non-discrimination. This paper discusses the different positions taken by participants in the policy process leading up to the decision, in order to reveal the potential and limitations of non-discrimination as the basis for market-regulatory social policy. It is shown that the European Commission's initial support for prohibiting insurance discrimination faltered with the realization that the measure would have little efficacy as a distributive social policy. It was left to the Court to assert that non-discrimination rights are constitutive for European markets, regardless of their functional and instrumental limitations. The Court's focus was on the market-integrative potential of rights as sources of norms for the conduct of insurance relationships. It is argued that this form of constitutive regulation is distinct from distributive social policy as it does not require that outcomes are egalitarian, but, rather, that the processes governing market relations should respect fundamental rights.

The regulation of intellectual property rights takes place in a range of international venues. This proliferation of international venues greatly enhances the potential for venue shopping. We argue that different levels of domestic regulation and differing degrees of judicialization account for actors' preferences over institutional venues. We take into consideration two scenarios. Conceiving of judicialization as the delegation of adjudication to an independent third party and the enforcement through multilaterally authorized sanctions, we show that: (i) upward regulatory harmonization leads actors preferring weak regulatory intellectual property rights standards to strive for venues with low degrees of judicialization, whereas those favoring stringent intellectual property rights protection prefer highly judicialized venues; and (ii) downward harmonization leads to the opposite constellation of institutional preferences. We show how these expectations hold by way of in-depth case studies of two instances of global intellectual property rights regulation: the regulation of plant genetic resources and intellectual property rights for medicines.

Analysis of the US Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) treatment of the concept of ownership in the federal proxy rules, between 1934 and 2010, suggests SEC systems and procedures may not employ optimal organizational learning. Addressing this, I develop the Learning Regulator Framework, a normative model facilitating organizational learning and allowing regulatory agencies to maintain awareness of, and adaptation to, socio-economic realities in regulated environments, thereby promoting reflective, responsive, relevant, and efficient regulatory frameworks. The relevance of the model to other institutional settings is also considered.

This article sets out the concept of a technical system and explores its ability to explain why some transnational regulatory domains are governed by a single transnational business governance (TBG) scheme, while in others there are many such schemes. By linking the numbers of TBG schemes that govern any particular transnational regulatory domain to technical systems in this way, important insights are provided into TBG interactions. Where technical systems are present, the TBG schemes that govern them will be specialized and complementary, rather than competitive. More generally, a technical systems approach illuminates the set of extended relationships that connect TBG schemes to the industry they seek to regulate. By tracing out these relationships we can reveal indirect interactions between TBG schemes that may be mediated through firms or market infrastructures. These indirect interactions can be obscured by approaches that only focus on the direct interactions among TBG schemes. The article analyzes two cases of TBG schemes in global finance. The first, derivatives, has a single overall TBG scheme. The second case, professional financial designations, has multiple competing TBG schemes.

Who governs in the international organizations (IOs) that promulgate global norms on trade and commercial law? Using a new analytic approach, this paper focuses on previously invisible attributes of a global legislature – the state and non-state delegations and delegates that create universal norms for international trade and commercial law through the most prominent trade law legislature, the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Based on ten years of fieldwork, extensive interviews, and unique data on delegation and delegate attendance and participation in UNCITRAL's Working Group on Insolvency, we find that the inner core of global trade lawmakers at UNCITRAL represent a tiny and unrepresentative subset of state and non-state actors. This disjunction between UNCITRAL's public face, which accords with a global norm of democratic governance, and its private face, where dominant states and private interests prevail, raises fundamental questions about legitimacy and efficacy of representation in global lawmaking.

Policymakers in the Dominican Republic have responded to foreign pressure by rewriting their labor laws and revitalizing their labor ministry. What are the likely consequences? Is aggressive labor law enforcement more likely to protect vulnerable workers from abuse and exploitation or to undermine their ability to compete for labor-intensive employment in an unforgiving world economy? And what are the broader implications of the answer? I address these questions by analyzing qualitative as well as quantitative data on workplace regulators empowered by the Dominican Republic in response to trade-related labor standards imposed by the United States and find that they reconcile social protection with economic adjustment by simultaneously discouraging “low road” employment practices like informality, union-busting, and the exploitation of child labor, and encouraging “high road” alternatives that link firms, farms, and families, on the one hand, to public educational, training, and financial institutions, on the other. The result is a potentially inclusive alternative to the repressive industrial relations regime that fueled export-led development – and the East Asian “miracle” in particular – in the late twentieth century.

This paper demonstrates how general trends in the management of public institutions, and a specific turf war between the doctors and lawyers in Ontario, Canada, have combined to shape an important risk regulatory decisionmaking process: the coroner's inquest. Drawing on ethnographic evidence, I show how the priorities of managerialism, and the collateral effects of physician coroners battling with lawyers, have reduced the number of public inquests convened in Ontario by 80 per cent over a 20-year period. Where many public safety decisions affecting the province's legal, policy, and physical environments were once made at public inquests, they appear now more likely to be made in private. The paper examines the implications of reduced public participation in the analysis of, and response to, death.

The legitimacy of legal authorities – particularly the police – is central to the state's ability to function in a normatively justifiable and effective manner. Studies, mostly conducted in the US and UK, regularly find that procedural justice is the most important antecedent of police legitimacy, with judgments about other aspects of police behavior – notably, about effectiveness – appearing less relevant. But this idea has received only sporadic testing in less cohesive societies where social order is more tenuous, resources to sustain it scarcer, and the position of the police is less secure. This paper considers whether the link between process fairness and legitimacy holds in the challenging context of present day South Africa. In a high crime and socially divided society, do people still emphasize procedural fairness or are they more interested in instrumental effectiveness? How is the legitimacy of the police influenced by the wider problems faced by the South African state? We find procedural fairness judgments play a key role, but also that South Africans place greater emphasis on police effectiveness (and concerns about crime). Police legitimacy is, furthermore, associated with citizens' judgments about the wider success and trustworthiness of the state.

This research examines conditions under which environmental regulatory disclosure is more versus less likely to work, with focus on the case of the Philippines. Two major findings arise out of a case study. First, we observe a mismatch between the nature of information and the main addressees of the disclosed information, which led the operation of the subject disclosure program to deviate from its targets. Second, this institutional deficiency has to do with the organizational culture and routine practice of the implementing agency. The second finding challenges a major justification of information-based environmental regulation (IBER) administered in weak states and underscores the role that administrative capacity plays in making novel regulations come into effect. Contrary to the popular belief that IBER creates non-governmental forces that offset a limited statehood, it may be less likely to work where state administrative capacity is weak.

This empirical study investigates the compliance of 344 Chinese listed companies with the Accounting Standard for Enterprises No. 20-Business Combination, a mandatory reporting standard applicable to companies involved in business combinations. China has recently reformed its auditing sector, enabling private firms to provide auditing services. The results of the study show a low level of compliance by Chinese listed companies. While companies audited by Chinese domestic auditors have significantly lower compliance than companies audited by Big Four auditors on supplementary disclosure that is mandatory under the Chinese accounting standards, compliance remains low even after companies receive unqualified reports from these international auditors. There appears to be a lack of commitment, and possibly expertise, among Big Four auditors, in fully applying the reporting requirements of the business combination standard in a Chinese setting. This raises concerns about the independence of Chinese auditing in disclosing reliable information about business combinations. Broader theoretical contributions of the paper go beyond the Chinese context by problematizing whether well-resourced international auditors uphold internationally expected standards or succumb to local non-compliant practices.

Risk-based governance is argued by many to hold the promise of a more rational and efficient state, by making explicit the limitations of state interventions and focusing finite resources on those targets where probable damage is greatest. This paper challenges the assumption that risk-based governance has the potential for universal and uniform application, by comparing contemporary flood management in Germany and England. On first inspection, flooding appears to be a paradigmatic case of risk colonizing European policy discourses, with the traditional notion of flood defense giving way to flood risk management in the context of climate change, increasingly frequent flood disasters, political and cost pressures on flood protection, and publicly available European-wide flood assessments. Drawing on in-depth empirical research, this paper shows how the role, and even the definition, of “risk” is institutionally shaped, and how the respective institutional environments of German and English flood management practices impede and promote risk colonization. In particular, the use and conceptualizations of risk in governance are variously promoted, filtered, or constrained by the administrative procedures, structures, and political expectations embedded within flood management and wider polities of each country. The findings of this research are important for the design and implementation of supranational policies and regulations that endorse risk-based approaches, such as the recent EU Flood Directive, as well as scholarly debate as to how to legitimately define the limits of governance in the face of uncertainty and accountability pressures.

Research has recognized that states enable or constrain private governance initiatives, but we still know too little about the interactions between private and public authority in the governance of various social and environmental problems. This article examines how states have responded to the emergence of forest and fisheries certification programs, and how state responses have influenced the subsequent development of these programs. It is argued that historical and structural differences in the management of forest and fisheries have resulted in divergent state responses to certification programs, but that both trajectories of interaction have led to a strengthening of the non-state program. The article draws upon these cases to inductively identify types of interaction between state policies and non-state certification programs, the causal mechanisms that shed light on interaction dynamics, and the conditions under which state involvement is likely to result in either strengthening or weakening of non-state programs.

Compared to economics, sociology, political science, and law, the discipline of history has had a limited role in the wide-ranging efforts to reconsider strategies of regulatory governance, especially inside regulatory institutions. This article explores how more sustained historical perspective might improve regulatory decisionmaking. We first survey how a set of American regulatory agencies currently rely on historical research and analysis, whether for the purposes of public relations or as a means of supporting policymaking. We then consider how regulatory agencies might draw on history more self-consciously, more strategically, and to greater effect. Three areas stand out in this regard – the use of history to improve understanding of institutional culture; reliance on historical analysis to test the empirical plausibility of conceptual models that make assumptions about the likelihood of potential economic outcomes; and integration of historical research methods into program and policy evaluation.

This paper examines how changes in governmental and social influences affect environmental enforcement in Guangzhou city, China, between 2000 and 2006. The paper finds that a form of “decentered regulation” has developed. Regulatory enforcement is no longer the sole affair of the government and the regulatory bureaucracy, but has been increasingly influenced by societal forces. The transformation over time shows the promises and limits of decentered regulation in Guangzhou's dynamic authoritarian setting. Analyzing a set of longitudinal survey data and qualitative interviews, the paper finds that by 2006, the rise of civil society and its increased support for protecting the environment had a double-edged impact on the enforcement of environmental regulations. The paper demonstrates that on the one hand, by 2006, when government support for enforcement was low, societal forces developed an ability to counterbalance such lack of governmental support and positively influence enforcement. However, it also shows that when government support was high, a concurrent rise in societal support created a negative effect on enforcement. Thus too much societal support can become an enforcement burden.

Ex ante policy appraisals, such as Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs), are promoted because they are expected to inform decisionmakers and, thus, to lead to better quality regulation. Such instrumental use is not the only possible use of RIAs. Ex ante policy appraisal can affect the policy process in various ways. However, a consolidated theory on the conditions for utilization of RIAs in the policy process has yet to be developed. In order to explore these conditions, we analyze three case studies of Swiss decisionmaking processes and apply concepts from knowledge utilization literature. In conclusion, we find that policy arenas matter more than the institutional context and design of RIA procedures. In line with previous literature, political use seems to be a prevalent type of utilization. Yet we find that, under specific conditions, RIAs also provide a basis for the optimization of policy designs (instrumental use), help improve interagency relations (policy-process use), and may change how a policy issue is understood (conceptual use).

The global war on cartels has had much success in introducing tough sanctions for cartel conduct, such as price fixing and market sharing. The policy rhetoric justifying criminalization assumes that compliance can be induced through deterrence. This, in turn, assumes that business people know about the law, believe that they are likely to be caught and face enforcement action and jail if they break the law, and calculate that they should comply. This paper problematizes these policy assumptions using evidence from a survey of a random sample of Australian business people and in-depth interviews with 25 cartelists. This paper argues that business people's knowledge about the law is less important than their relationship with (or distance from) the law. Corporate elites see themselves as intimate with the law and, therefore, able to strategically “play” the law; while small business people and managers lower down the corporate hierarchy see themselves as “innocent” of any knowledge of the law. The impact of a policy of increased sanctions for misconduct cannot be understood solely in terms of marginal difference in aggregate levels of deterrence. It must also be understood in terms of how it interacts with people's experience of the law to create and maintain or contest and destabilize social segmentation and inequality.

Regulation by independent agencies, rather than ministries, is believed to result in better policy outcomes. Yet this belief requires one to accept a complex causal chain leading from formal independence to actual independence from politics, to policy decisions, and, ultimately, to policy outcomes. In this study, we analyze the link between the formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies in Western Europe. New data on the appointment of chief executives of these agencies is used to create a proxy for the actual independence of agencies from politics. The analysis demonstrates that formal independence is an important determinant of actual independence, but the rule of law and the number of veto players matter as well.

This paper asks why an officially unregulated market in pharmaceuticals in a least developed country, Djibouti, behaves as if it were strictly regulated, with limited access to a small number of high-cost drugs. We use Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to show that the explanation is more complex than critics of the international pharmaceutical industry have supposed. Regulation and property rights generated in developed countries have become embedded in the drugs and “black boxed” to the point of invisibility. This has allowed them to travel to Djibouti with the drugs, while maintaining their effects in action. This case study develops our understanding of the way in which materials that are not designated as regulatory agents may still have regulatory impacts through their ability to enrol complex networks of actors, rules, values, and practices. Finally, it argues against the notion of law as a fixed and distinctive space for action, as opposed to the ANT vision of a fluid and contingent order, where law is part of a socio-technico-legal alliance that happens to achieve certain effects.

Risk-based approaches to governance are widely promoted as universally applicable foundations for improving the quality, efficiency, and rationality of governance across policy domains. Premised on the idea that governance cannot eliminate all adverse outcomes, these approaches provide a method for establishing priorities and allocating scarce resources, and, in so doing, rationalise the limits of what governance interventions can, and should, achieve. Yet cursory observation suggests that risk-based approaches have spread unevenly across countries. Based on a comparison of the UK, France, and Germany, this article explores the ways in which, and why, such approaches have “colonised” governance regimes in the UK, but have had much more limited application in France and Germany. We argue that the institutionally patterned adoption of risk-based governance across these three countries is related to how entrenched governance norms and accountability structures within their national polities handle both the identification and acceptance of adverse governance outcomes.

This paper compares the quality and use of regulatory analysis accompanying economically significant regulations proposed by US executive branch agencies in 2008, 2009, and 2010. We find that the quality of regulatory analysis is generally low, but varies widely. Budget regulations, which define how the federal government will spend money or collect revenues, have much lower-quality analysis than other regulations. The Bush administration's “midnight” regulations finalized between Election Day and Inauguration Day, along with other regulations left for the Obama administration to finalize, tended to have lower-quality analysis. Most differences between the Bush and Obama administrations depend on agencies' policy preferences. More conservative agencies tended to produce better analysis in the Obama administration, and more liberal agencies tended to do so in the Bush administration. This suggests that agencies more central to an administration's policy priorities do not have to produce as good an analysis to get their regulations promulgated.

The 2008 financial crisis has had an important, but neglected, impact on carbon market governance in the United States. It acted as a catalyst for the emergence of a domestic coalition that drew upon the crisis experience to demand stronger regulation over carbon markets. The influence of this coalition was seen first in the changing content of draft climate change bills between 2008 and 2010. But the coalition's more lasting legacy was its role in shaping the content of, and supporting, the passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd–Frank bill) in July 2010. Although that bill was aimed primarily at bolstering financial stability, its derivatives provisions strengthened carbon market regulation in significant ways. This policy episode demonstrates new patterns of coalition building in carbon market politics as well as the growing links between climate governance and financial regulatory politics. At the same time, the significance of these developments should not be overstated because of various limitations in the content and implementation of the Dodd–Frank bill, as well as the waning support for carbon markets more generally within the US since the bill's passage.

Transnational governance initiatives increasingly face the problem of regime complexity in which a proliferation of regulatory schemes operate in the same policy domain, supported by varying combinations of public and private actors. The literature suggests that such regime complexity can lead to forum shopping and other self-interested strategies, which undermine the effectiveness of transnational regulation. Based on the design principles of experimentalist governance, this paper identifies a variety of pathways and mechanisms, which promote productive interactions in regime complexes. We use the case of the EU's Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative, interacting with private certification schemes and public legal timber regulations, including those of third countries such as the US and China, to demonstrate how an increasingly comprehensive transnational regime can be assembled by linking together distinct components of a regime complex. We argue that it is the experimentalist features of this initiative and its regulatory interactions, which accommodate local diversity and foster recursive learning from decentralized implementation experience, that make it possible to build up a flexible and adaptive transnational governance regime from an assemblage of interconnected pieces, even in situations where interests diverge and no hegemon can impose its own will.

Many of the very significant insights in Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite's 1992 book, Responsive Regulation, have transcended the book's time. At the same time, on the 20th anniversary of its publication, two things about the book are striking. The first is the direct, personal relationship on which the regulatory interaction is premised. The second is the boundedness and manageability of the regulatory project. At least in prudential regulation of global financial institutions in the wake of the recent financial crisis (though surely elsewhere too), neither of these features can be taken for granted. This brief essay seeks to open a preliminary conversation about responsive regulation in terms of its scalability. It considers whether as a practical matter, responsive regulation can be scaled up to more diffuse, multiparty, logistically complex contexts, such as financial regulation. As a matter of representation, it asks whether by projecting the focal object, the responsive relationship, outward, responsive regulation distorts our image of regulation in other contexts (or even in responsive regulation's own home environment). The essay closes by arguing that in order to incorporate responsive regulation's considerable discursive and relational benefits into regulatory environments like global financial regulation, it needs to be buttressed by additional regulatory technologies.

Responsive Regulation translated an ongoing academic debate about behavior orientation and regulatory enforcement into a synthetic framework. Yet ethnographic studies reveal that ambiguity pervades regulator–regulatee interactions and suggest that the reality of regulatory encounters may be too ambivalent to fit the picture of the regulatory “game” at the heart of Ayres and Braithwaite's theory. This article proposes to address this ambivalence by drawing the outline of a relational signaling approach to regulatory encounters. The regulatory game is deconstructed into several ideal types of regulator–regulatee relationships. Within each ideal type ambiguity is managed with relational signals, namely behaviors that take a specific signification depending on the nature of the relationship. A relational signaling approach can account for the varying meanings of cooperation, defection, and mutual social control across different regulator–regulatee dyads.

Although responsive regulation includes much more than the enforcement pyramid, it is the pyramid that has received most attention from academics and practitioners. This is despite the fact that the implementation of the strategy of gradual escalation has proved challenging in many respects. Why has the enforcement pyramid been so attractive? Apart from its scholarly and policy usefulness, this paper suggests that it appeals to practitioners because it provides a theoretical endorsement of the professional autonomy to which practitioners aspire. It was, and is, still appealing to scholars because it provides a practical means to improve regulation, which is congruent with the dominant neoliberal reflex to depoliticize the regulation of capitalist economies. All in all, because responsive regulation has very largely been reduced to the enforcement pyramid, the literature has neglected the normative issues surrounding the regulation of capitalist economies that were central to Ayres and Braithwaite.

This paper considers the context for the development of the concept of responsive regulation, namely the transcending of the deregulation debate. It argues that claims regarding responsive regulation when allied to risk-based rationales for enforcement can, in fact, allow a “deregulatory” momentum to develop. This argument is grounded with reference to a case study of the regulation of workplace health and safety in the UK, with a particular focus upon the period 2000–2010. The paper casts doubt on the relevance and robustness of the concept of responsive regulation. In a context that might have been fertile ground for developing genuinely responsive regulatory policy, empirically we find the development of policies that are better described as “regulatory degradation.” Thus we argue in this paper that, whatever the intentions of its proponents, there is a logical affinity between responsive regulation, and effective de-regulation, and that it is this affinity that has provided a convenient political rationale for the emergence of a neo-liberal regulatory settlement in the UK.

Responsive Regulation advocates a differentiated style of regulation and enforcement that is more responsive to the behavior of the regulated parties than a system of general or uniform rules. This article investigates whether such a differentiated approach can be reconciled with the traditional ideal of general law. On the basis of a conceptual analysis of generality, it is argued that the notion of generality is at best tautological and not inconsistent with a differentiated approach to regulation and enforcement. However, the value of generality is based on the assumption that rules function as reasons, rather than as instructions. As reasons, rules need not comprise large categories, but they do need to last for a long period of time. The conclusion drawn is that flexibility (rather than differentiation) is hard to reconcile with the notion of rules as reasons, although it may be demanded by a notion of rules as effective implementers of policies.

Responsive Regulation (RR) introduced important new ways of thinking about regulation. But RR was designed for domestic settings in which a single agency had clear jurisdiction, full regulatory capacity, and extensive information, and could (contingently) deploy stringent sanctions against well-defined targets. Under globalization, many regulatory problems have shifted to the transnational arena, characterized by multiple regulators, public and private, with limited capacities, authority, and information, and modest sanctioning ability; globalized production also renders the targets of regulation diffuse and difficult to identify. RR holds important lessons for transnational regulation, but it must be adapted to these challenging conditions. Some components of transnational RR are already emerging, including numerous private and public–private schemes that regulate business through voluntary norms: “transnational regulatory standard-setting” (TRSS). Alone, however, TRSS schemes face serious limitations. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are best positioned to “take RR transnational” by supporting and working with the nascent TRSS system. Two regulatory strategies are particularly promising: collaboration and orchestration. In “regulatory collaboration,” IGOs promote business self-regulation, much as in RR; they can escalate in response to defection by deploying reputational and market sanctions. In “orchestration,” IGOs support and steer intermediaries, including TRSS schemes and NGOs, which use their material and ideational capacities to regulate target behavior. Orchestration cumulates regulatory competencies, creates avenues of escalation, and provides many benefits of RR “tripartism.”

This comment extends the vision of Responsive Regulation by noting subsequent developments in regulatory pluralism, in particular those occurring under private auspices. The apparent weakening or withdrawal of state regulatory institutions has inspired considerable regulatory activity on the part of non-state actors. In addition, the concurrent growth and pervasiveness of digital technology have greatly facilitated the involvement of individual citizens in non-state regulatory activity. However, the full implications of what might be called “wiki-regulation” remain to be seen. The risks that accompany private regulation may include the lack of accountability of non-state regulatory actors, and the possibility of their failure. There is also a risk that with the increasing salience of what Vogel calls “civil regulation,” state regulatory institutions may atrophy, or fail to develop at all.

This response refutes point (i) in the Ayres comment's abstract. It argues that at its heart responsive regulation is about seeking strategies that will render regulation more relational when it counts. This is possible even in domains like tax compliance where 99 per cent of the routine regulatory action occurs without face-to-face encounter. A number of critiques in the special issue are embraced. While practitioners who reject civic republican values can learn from the responsive regulation literature, regulation conduces to tyranny if it is not explicit in a value commitment to reducing domination in the world. Concern that the republican elements of the argument have been insufficiently prominent in subsequent writing of the authors is therefore embraced. Freedom as non-domination requires a transnational regulatory vision for strategies with transnational leverage that reduce domination globally, not just nationally. A paradox advanced is that the largest regulatory errors of recent history on the global stage are best corrected by micro relational strategies invented with a global imagination for crafting micro–macro linkages.

In this comment, I try to do three things: (i) set the record straight about the disproportionate contributions of my co-author; (ii) briefly comment on the excellent articles by Etienne, Ford, and Westerman in this special issue; and (iii) describe how the Responsive Regulation concept of partial-industry regulation might usefully be extended to tradable licenses and randomized regulation experiments.