We argue that in important circumstances meritocracy can be realized only through a specific form of affirmative action we call affirmative meritocracy. These circumstances arise because common measures of academic performance systematically underestimate the intellectual ability and potential of members of negatively stereotyped groups (e.g., non-Asian ethnic minorities, women in quantitative fields). This bias results not from the content of performance measures but from common contexts in which performance measures are assessed—from psychological threats like stereotype threat that are pervasive in academic settings, and which undermine the performance of people from negatively stereotyped groups. To overcome this bias, school and work settings should be changed to reduce stereotype threat. In such environments, admitting or hiring more members of devalued groups would promote meritocracy, diversity, and organizational performance. Evidence for this bias, its causes, magnitude, remedies, and implications for social policy and for law are discussed.

Ageism research tends to lump “older people” together as one group, as do policy matters that conceptualize everyone over 65 as “senior.” This approach is problematic primarily because it often fails to represent accurately a rapidly growing, diverse, and healthy older population. In light of this, we review the ageism literature, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between the still-active “young-old” and the potentially more impaired “old-old” (Neugarten). We argue that ageism theory has disproportionately focused on the old-old and differentiate the forms of age discrimination that apparently target each elder subgroup. In particular, we highlight the young-old's plights predominantly in the workplace and tensions concerning succession of desirable resources; by contrast, old-old predicaments likely center on consumption of shared resources outside of the workplace. For both social psychological researchers and policymakers, accurately subtyping ageism will help society best accommodate a burgeoning, diverse older population.

During recent years, the need to consider effective and innovative ways to prevent and end homelessness among individuals with serious mental illness has been abetted by an increased and more sophisticated understanding of the composition of the homeless population, the emergence of evidence-based practices to address homelessness, and the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. This article summarizes the evolving understanding of the role that serious mental illness plays in homelessness as well as the interventions that are effective at preventing and ending homelessness among persons with serious mental illness. This summary contextualizes a discussion of the practice and policy agenda to address homelessness among people with serious mental illness using a new prevention framework and considering the opportunities inherent in increased affordable health care coverage for very low-income individuals with serious mental illness.

The Cross-Race Effect (CRE), whereby same-race faces are recognized more accurately than cross-race faces, is a well-replicated psychological phenomenon with clear social consequences. The area in which its influence is most visible is that of eyewitness misidentification. Since the advent of DNA testing, it has been revealed that scores of people have been wrongly imprisoned for crimes that they did not commit, and cross-race eyewitness misidentifications are a determining factor in a large percentage of these convictions. This article reviews existing perspectives on the causes of the CRE, including new work on the social cognitive underpinnings of the bias. Next, we make recommendations aimed at reducing the cross-race effect in eyewitness identification, both at the point of witnessing the crime and during the witness lineup. The goal of this work is to encourage policymakers to implement suggestions based on the current understanding of the causes and moderators of the CRE.

Public policy decisions often appear based on an assumption that providing more options, more information, and greater decision-making autonomy to consumers will produce better outcomes. We examine reasons why this “more-is-better” approach exists based on the psychological literature. Although better outcomes can result from informed consumer choice, we argue that more options, information, and autonomy can also lead to unintended negative consequences. We use mostly health-related policies and guidelines from the United States and elsewhere as exemplars. We consider various psychological mechanisms that cause these unintended consequences including cognitive overload, affect, and anticipated regret, information salience and availability, and trust in governments as authoritative information providers. We also point toward potential solutions based on psychological research that may reduce the negative unintended consequences of a “more-is-better” approach.

Integrative research can lead to frame-breaking innovations; it can also lead to disruptive conflicts between research team members. In the present contribution, we propose a cultural perspective to integrative research, treating the knowledge tradition of a discipline or profession as a culture. We discuss how socialization into a disciplinary culture can reinforce intellectual centrism. We further propose that awareness of cultural differences between disciplines can further increase intellectual centrism by enlarging the perceived differences between disciplines. Nonetheless, awareness of disciplinary differences, when coupled with an interdisciplinary learning orientation or growth beliefs, can enhance creative performance and the quality of collaboration in integrative research. We discuss the implications of these ideas for promoting and managing integrative research.

Participating in collective actions, or acts of social protest, is one of the primary means that citizens have of participating in democracy and seeking social change. In this article, we outline the ways in which: social identity provides a psychological foundation for collective actions; social norms shape the mobilization and particular direction (disruptive vs. conventional) of that protest; and participating in collective actions is psychologically consequential and sociopolitically complex. We use this platform to put forward a series of practical implications for activists, social movement and nongovernmental groups, and authorities, who seek to mobilize consequential collective action. We conclude that collective action is a fundamental tool in the battle for social equality and justice. To better understand, and engage with this phenomenon, policy makers and practitioners need to attend to its origins in collective, group-based psychology.