<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"><channel rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/rss/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1755-053X" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Financial Management</title><description> Wiley Online Library : Financial Management</description><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291755-053X</link><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc</dc:publisher><dc:language xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">en</dc:language><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">© 2013 Financial Management Association International</dc:rights><prism:issn xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">0046-3892</prism:issn><prism:eIssn xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">1755-053X</prism:eIssn><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-06-01T00:00:00-05:00</dc:date><prism:coverDisplayDate xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Summer 2013</prism:coverDisplayDate><prism:volume xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">42</prism:volume><prism:number xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">2</prism:number><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">243</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">480</prism:endingPage><image rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/fima.2013.42.issue-2/asset/cover.gif?v=1&amp;s=51f5b725eddd465d6c44051a4bde0a5a50b22b22"/><items><rdf:Seq><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12026"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12024"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12025"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12021"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12020"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12013"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12027"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12023"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12022"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12010"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12019"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12018"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12017"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12016"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12015"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12009"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12011"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12012"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12007"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12006"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12003"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12005"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12001"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12002"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12004"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01206.x"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01218.x"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12008"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01221.x"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12028"/></rdf:Seq></items></channel><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12026" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>When Does a Merger Create Value? Using Option Prices to Elicit Market Beliefs</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12026</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">When Does a Merger Create Value? Using Option Prices to Elicit Market Beliefs</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Paul A. Borochin</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-07T05:20:23.555253-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12026</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12026</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12026</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I introduce and test a method to identify market expectations about value creation in mergers. Post-announcement market prices reflect beliefs about both merged and standalone firm values, and the likelihood of either outcome. Stock prices alone do not contain sufficient information to identify these latent beliefs. By adding exchange-traded stock option data, I deliver a clear decomposition of observed value change into two parts: value creation and new information about standalone value. Previous research has struggled to disentangle the two. This decomposition provides a strong and practical measure of the market's expectations about value creation in a merger.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

I introduce and test a method to identify market expectations about value creation in mergers. Post-announcement market prices reflect beliefs about both merged and standalone firm values, and the likelihood of either outcome. Stock prices alone do not contain sufficient information to identify these latent beliefs. By adding exchange-traded stock option data, I deliver a clear decomposition of observed value change into two parts: value creation and new information about standalone value. Previous research has struggled to disentangle the two. This decomposition provides a strong and practical measure of the market's expectations about value creation in a merger.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12024" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Why are stock splits declining?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12024</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Why are stock splits declining?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Kristina Minnick, Kartik Raman</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-17T05:17:47.795625-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12024</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12024</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12024</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The percentage of firms undertaking stock splits has fallen from a peak of 23% in 1982 to less than 1% in 2009. Controlling for time trends and other economic determinants, the declining incidence of stock splits is significantly associated with a drop in household investors’ equity holdings and with a rise in household income. We also report a decline in the size of split factors which is associated with an increase in institutional ownership of equity and with the increase in household income. Collectively, the evidence is consistent with firms responding rationally to changes in investor characteristics.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

The percentage of firms undertaking stock splits has fallen from a peak of 23% in 1982 to less than 1% in 2009. Controlling for time trends and other economic determinants, the declining incidence of stock splits is significantly associated with a drop in household investors’ equity holdings and with a rise in household income. We also report a decline in the size of split factors which is associated with an increase in institutional ownership of equity and with the increase in household income. Collectively, the evidence is consistent with firms responding rationally to changes in investor characteristics.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12025" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Voting with Their Feet: In Which Journals Do the Most Prolific Finance Researchers Publish?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12025</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Voting with Their Feet: In Which Journals Do the Most Prolific Finance Researchers Publish?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Morris G. Danielson, Jean L. Heck</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-12T15:00:41.616722-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12025</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12025</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12025</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The financial economics literature has experienced rapid growth over the past forty years, triggering a dramatic increase in the number of journals. We employ a new method to analyze the current pecking order of finance journals. Specifically, we analyze the publication records of prolific authors to provide evidence on the perceived quality of a set of 23 high-impact finance journals. Assuming these scholars target the “best” research outlets, their publication records can reveal information about their subjective rankings of the next-best alternatives to the traditional elite finance journals. The results suggest that prolific authors are most likely to target outlets that have raised their profile in recent years (e.g., Financial Management and Financial Analysts Journal) and new specialized finance journals (e.g., Journal of Financial Markets, Journal of Corporate Finance, and Journal of Financial Intermediation) when publishing outside the set of elite journals.</p></div>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>© 2013 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.</p></div>
]]></content:encoded><description>

The financial economics literature has experienced rapid growth over the past forty years, triggering a dramatic increase in the number of journals. We employ a new method to analyze the current pecking order of finance journals. Specifically, we analyze the publication records of prolific authors to provide evidence on the perceived quality of a set of 23 high-impact finance journals. Assuming these scholars target the “best” research outlets, their publication records can reveal information about their subjective rankings of the next-best alternatives to the traditional elite finance journals. The results suggest that prolific authors are most likely to target outlets that have raised their profile in recent years (e.g., Financial Management and Financial Analysts Journal) and new specialized finance journals (e.g., Journal of Financial Markets, Journal of Corporate Finance, and Journal of Financial Intermediation) when publishing outside the set of elite journals.
© 2013 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12021" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Do Family Owners Use Firm Hedging Policy to Hedge Personal Undiversified Wealth Risk?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12021</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Do Family Owners Use Firm Hedging Policy to Hedge Personal Undiversified Wealth Risk?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Chansog (Francis) Kim, Christos Pantzalis, Jung Chul Park</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-14T13:02:12.570544-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12021</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12021</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12021</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We examine whether family ownership affects the value impact of the operational and financial dimensions of firms’ hedging policies. In the process, we confirm that family firms’ market valuation is higher than non-family firms, consistent with a view that family firms benefit from family owners’ long term perspective and ability to monitor managers. We also find that while both operational and financial hedging policies per se are valuable in non-family firms, they do not create any value in family firms. These results support the notion that founding families’ need to hedge the risk of their undiversified personal wealth portfolio leads to suboptimal risk management decisions.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

We examine whether family ownership affects the value impact of the operational and financial dimensions of firms’ hedging policies. In the process, we confirm that family firms’ market valuation is higher than non-family firms, consistent with a view that family firms benefit from family owners’ long term perspective and ability to monitor managers. We also find that while both operational and financial hedging policies per se are valuable in non-family firms, they do not create any value in family firms. These results support the notion that founding families’ need to hedge the risk of their undiversified personal wealth portfolio leads to suboptimal risk management decisions.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12020" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Effect of Demand for Shares on the Timing and Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offers</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12020</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Effect of Demand for Shares on the Timing and Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offers</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Vincent J. Intintoli, Shrikant P. Jategaonkar, Kathleen M. Kahle</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-06T04:30:42.881777-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12020</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12020</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12020</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<h3 xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib">Abstract</h3>
<div class="para" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Despite high levels of asymmetry of information, firms that issue SEOs within a year of their IPO (follow-on SEOs) are able to offer shares at a lower discount compared to more mature firms. We provide evidence that this seeming contradiction can be explained by a very high degree of demand for the follow-on offering. We find that the likelihood of issuing a follow-on SEO is significantly related to the level of institutional demand and that discounts are lower for follow-on SEOs in which institutional demand is high. We also consider the joint effect of cash holdings and follow-on SEOs on discounts, since firms that have recently gone public tend to hold high levels of cash. Underpricing is higher for firms with elevated pre-offer levels of cash, which is consistent with market timing predictions. However, this relation is mitigated for both follow-on SEOs and issues that also have high share demand.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>

Despite high levels of asymmetry of information, firms that issue SEOs within a year of their IPO (follow-on SEOs) are able to offer shares at a lower discount compared to more mature firms. We provide evidence that this seeming contradiction can be explained by a very high degree of demand for the follow-on offering. We find that the likelihood of issuing a follow-on SEO is significantly related to the level of institutional demand and that discounts are lower for follow-on SEOs in which institutional demand is high. We also consider the joint effect of cash holdings and follow-on SEOs on discounts, since firms that have recently gone public tend to hold high levels of cash. Underpricing is higher for firms with elevated pre-offer levels of cash, which is consistent with market timing predictions. However, this relation is mitigated for both follow-on SEOs and issues that also have high share demand.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12013" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>On the Role of Intangible Information and Capital Gains Taxes in Long-Term Return Reversals</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12013</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">On the Role of Intangible Information and Capital Gains Taxes in Long-Term Return Reversals</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Ajay Bhootra</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-06-11T03:20:58.803569-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12013</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12013</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12013</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>Prior studies have linked long-term reversals to the magnitude of locked-in capital gains suggesting that reversals are driven by tax effects and not overreaction. I find that locked-in capital gains do not explain the reversals in winners when winner returns are based on intangible information. In fact, the reversals for intangible return winners are long lasting and robust to controls for growth in assets and capital expenditures. To the extent that reversals associated with intangible information stem from investors’ overreaction to intangible information and given the prior results linking reversals only to intangible information, my results suggest that overreaction still explains reversal patterns in US stock returns</em>.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>
Prior studies have linked long-term reversals to the magnitude of locked-in capital gains suggesting that reversals are driven by tax effects and not overreaction. I find that locked-in capital gains do not explain the reversals in winners when winner returns are based on intangible information. In fact, the reversals for intangible return winners are long lasting and robust to controls for growth in assets and capital expenditures. To the extent that reversals associated with intangible information stem from investors’ overreaction to intangible information and given the prior results linking reversals only to intangible information, my results suggest that overreaction still explains reversal patterns in US stock returns.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12027" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Do Private Placements Turn Around Firms? Evidence from Taiwan</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12027</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Do Private Placements Turn Around Firms? Evidence from Taiwan</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Cheng-Yi Shiu, Hui-Shan Wei</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-29T00:58:35.860215-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12027</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12027</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12027</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We analyze the stock and operating performance of firms issuing private placements in Taiwan. Issuing firms have poor pre-issue performance and earn significantly positive returns at announcement. Placements with an owner-manager or with nonexecutive directors are associated with better post-issue stock and operating performance, suggesting that an increase in insiders’ stakes leads to better alignment of managerial incentives and an increase in monitoring by insiders. In contrast, placements made to outside investors are unlikely to turn around the issuing firms.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>
We analyze the stock and operating performance of firms issuing private placements in Taiwan. Issuing firms have poor pre-issue performance and earn significantly positive returns at announcement. Placements with an owner-manager or with nonexecutive directors are associated with better post-issue stock and operating performance, suggesting that an increase in insiders’ stakes leads to better alignment of managerial incentives and an increase in monitoring by insiders. In contrast, placements made to outside investors are unlikely to turn around the issuing firms.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12023" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Lifting the Veil on Reverse Leveraged Buyouts: What Happens During the Private Period?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12023</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Lifting the Veil on Reverse Leveraged Buyouts: What Happens During the Private Period?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Sudip Datta, Mark Gruskin, Mai Iskandar-Datta</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-14T00:29:18.301519-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12023</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12023</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12023</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We document the different types of restructuring activities undertaken during the private period after the reverse leveraged buyout (RLBO) of previously public firms. Preceding the LBO, firm leverage significantly exceeds that of their peers, while their profitability is better than the industry. However, despite their superior performance, these firms are undervalued before going private. While private firms undertake value-enhancement measures by increasing employee productivity, asset restructuring, decreasing cost of goods sold, and increasing ownership concentration. Enhanced valuation at the RLBO is a result of value capture, as well as efficiencies obtained from restructuring activities. We also identify factors determining the private period duration.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>
We document the different types of restructuring activities undertaken during the private period after the reverse leveraged buyout (RLBO) of previously public firms. Preceding the LBO, firm leverage significantly exceeds that of their peers, while their profitability is better than the industry. However, despite their superior performance, these firms are undervalued before going private. While private firms undertake value-enhancement measures by increasing employee productivity, asset restructuring, decreasing cost of goods sold, and increasing ownership concentration. Enhanced valuation at the RLBO is a result of value capture, as well as efficiencies obtained from restructuring activities. We also identify factors determining the private period duration.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12022" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Are Stock-for-Stock Acquirers of Unlisted Targets Really Less Overvalued?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12022</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Are Stock-for-Stock Acquirers of Unlisted Targets Really Less Overvalued?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Henock Louis</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-14T20:58:14.611954-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12022</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12022</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12022</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Extant studies assume that targets’ private ownership mitigates acquirers’ incentives and opportunities to finance acquisitions with inflated stocks. This view stems from the observation that, although the average stock-for-stock acquirer's merger announcement return is negative when the target is listed, it is positive when the target is unlisted. Accordingly, extant studies often suggest that announcements of stock-for-stock acquisitions of unlisted targets convey favorable private information about the acquirers. However, an analysis of stock-for-stock acquirers’ stock performance, abnormal accruals, net operating assets, and insider trading suggests the opposite. Acquirers of unlisted targets are generally more overvalued than acquirers of listed targets.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>
Extant studies assume that targets’ private ownership mitigates acquirers’ incentives and opportunities to finance acquisitions with inflated stocks. This view stems from the observation that, although the average stock-for-stock acquirer's merger announcement return is negative when the target is listed, it is positive when the target is unlisted. Accordingly, extant studies often suggest that announcements of stock-for-stock acquisitions of unlisted targets convey favorable private information about the acquirers. However, an analysis of stock-for-stock acquirers’ stock performance, abnormal accruals, net operating assets, and insider trading suggests the opposite. Acquirers of unlisted targets are generally more overvalued than acquirers of listed targets.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12010" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Competition, Efficiency, and Stability in Banking</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12010</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Competition, Efficiency, and Stability in Banking</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Klaus Schaeck, Martin Cihák</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-14T20:58:00.107566-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12010</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12010</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12010</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We examine the effect of competition on banking stability using a new measure of competition based on the reallocation of profits from inefficient banks to efficient ones. In a sample of European Banks, we find that this measure does capture competition, that competition is stability-enhancing, and that the stability-enhancing effect of competition is greater for healthy banks than for fragile ones. Our results suggest that efficiency is the conduit through which competition contributes to stability and that regulators must condition policy on the health of existing banks.</p></div>
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We examine the effect of competition on banking stability using a new measure of competition based on the reallocation of profits from inefficient banks to efficient ones. In a sample of European Banks, we find that this measure does capture competition, that competition is stability-enhancing, and that the stability-enhancing effect of competition is greater for healthy banks than for fragile ones. Our results suggest that efficiency is the conduit through which competition contributes to stability and that regulators must condition policy on the health of existing banks.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12019" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Idiosyncratic Volatility Covariance and Expected Stock Returns</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12019</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Idiosyncratic Volatility Covariance and Expected Stock Returns</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">David R. Peterson, Adam R. Smedema</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-08T02:42:29.282639-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12019</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12019</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12019</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Given that the idiosyncratic volatility (IDVOL) of individual stocks co-varies, we develop a model to determine how aggregate idiosyncratic volatility (AIV) may affect the volatility of a portfolio with a finite number of stocks. In portfolio and cross-sectional tests, we find that stocks whose returns are more correlated with AIV innovations have lower returns than those that are less correlated with AIV innovations. These results are robust to controlling for the stock's own IDVOL and market volatility. We conclude that risk-averse investors pay a premium for stocks that pay well when AIV is high, consistent with our model.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>
Given that the idiosyncratic volatility (IDVOL) of individual stocks co-varies, we develop a model to determine how aggregate idiosyncratic volatility (AIV) may affect the volatility of a portfolio with a finite number of stocks. In portfolio and cross-sectional tests, we find that stocks whose returns are more correlated with AIV innovations have lower returns than those that are less correlated with AIV innovations. These results are robust to controlling for the stock's own IDVOL and market volatility. We conclude that risk-averse investors pay a premium for stocks that pay well when AIV is high, consistent with our model.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12018" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Corporate Payout Policy, Cash Savings, and the Cost of Consistency: Evidence from a Structural Estimation</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12018</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Corporate Payout Policy, Cash Savings, and the Cost of Consistency: Evidence from a Structural Estimation</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Hamed Mahmudi, Michael Pavlin</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-08T02:42:23.72114-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12018</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12018</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12018</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>We develop a dynamic structural model to better understand how corporate payout policy is determined in conjunction with other corporate decisions. In a first-best model, a manager maximizes equity value by choosing the firm's optimal financing, investment, dividends, and cash holdings. By using simulated method of moments, we show that, on average, firms excessively smooth their payout while making corporate savings overly volatile and retaining excess cash. We then extend the model to capture the effect of a manager, who perceives a cost to cutting payouts. Estimating the model, we infer the magnitude of this cost. We find that a managerial preference for consistent payout explains the smooth payout and high volatility of cash holdings.</p></div>]]></content:encoded><description>
We develop a dynamic structural model to better understand how corporate payout policy is determined in conjunction with other corporate decisions. In a first-best model, a manager maximizes equity value by choosing the firm's optimal financing, investment, dividends, and cash holdings. By using simulated method of moments, we show that, on average, firms excessively smooth their payout while making corporate savings overly volatile and retaining excess cash. We then extend the model to capture the effect of a manager, who perceives a cost to cutting payouts. Estimating the model, we infer the magnitude of this cost. We find that a managerial preference for consistent payout explains the smooth payout and high volatility of cash holdings.</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12017" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Quote Exception Rule: Giving High Frequency Traders an Unintended Advantage</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12017</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Quote Exception Rule: Giving High Frequency Traders an Unintended Advantage</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Thomas H. McInish, James Upson</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-08T02:42:14.342814-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12017</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12017</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12017</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Under the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 611 exchanges that have not matched a new National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) can trade at the old NBBO for one second. In 2008, this rule allowed fast traders to earn estimated revenues of $233 million at the expense of slow traders. Furthermore, we find that when the NYSE decreased latency by 600 milliseconds on March 10, 2008, execution quality improved markedly for fast liquidity demanders, but improved only minimally for slow liquidity demanders. However, we find a decrease in volume executed at adverse prices under the faster market conditions.</p></div>
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Under the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 611 exchanges that have not matched a new National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) can trade at the old NBBO for one second. In 2008, this rule allowed fast traders to earn estimated revenues of $233 million at the expense of slow traders. Furthermore, we find that when the NYSE decreased latency by 600 milliseconds on March 10, 2008, execution quality improved markedly for fast liquidity demanders, but improved only minimally for slow liquidity demanders. However, we find a decrease in volume executed at adverse prices under the faster market conditions.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12016" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Foreign Exchange Exposure Elasticity and Financial Distress</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12016</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Foreign Exchange Exposure Elasticity and Financial Distress</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Kelsey D. Wei, Laura T. Starks</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-08T02:42:08.926202-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12016</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12016</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12016</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Financially distressed firms have limited ability to manage exchange rate exposure over time which could cause their fundamental value to be sensitive to the cash flow volatility related to currency movements. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the likelihood and costs of financial distress help explain cross-sectional variations in return sensitivity to currency movements. We find that the level of exchange rate exposure elasticity is related to proxies for the likelihood of financial distress, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness. Further, firms with a greater likelihood and higher costs of financial distress exhibit greater abnormal returns in response to large exchange rate shocks.</p></div>
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Financially distressed firms have limited ability to manage exchange rate exposure over time which could cause their fundamental value to be sensitive to the cash flow volatility related to currency movements. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the likelihood and costs of financial distress help explain cross-sectional variations in return sensitivity to currency movements. We find that the level of exchange rate exposure elasticity is related to proxies for the likelihood of financial distress, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness. Further, firms with a greater likelihood and higher costs of financial distress exhibit greater abnormal returns in response to large exchange rate shocks.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12015" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>What Do We Know about the Capital Structure of Privately Held US Firms? Evidence from the Surveys of Small Business Finance</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12015</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">What Do We Know about the Capital Structure of Privately Held US Firms? Evidence from the Surveys of Small Business Finance</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Rebel A. Cole</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-04-08T02:41:54.423517-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12015</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12015</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12015</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This study examines the capital-structure decisions of privately held US firms using data from four nationally representative surveys conducted from 1987 to 2003. Book-value firm leverage, as measured by either the ratio of total loans to total assets or the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, is negatively related to firm age and minority ownership; and is positively related to industry median leverage, the corporate legal form of organization, and to the number of banking relationships. In general, these results provide mixed support for both the Pecking-Order and Trade-Off theories of capital structure.</p></div>
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This study examines the capital-structure decisions of privately held US firms using data from four nationally representative surveys conducted from 1987 to 2003. Book-value firm leverage, as measured by either the ratio of total loans to total assets or the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, is negatively related to firm age and minority ownership; and is positively related to industry median leverage, the corporate legal form of organization, and to the number of banking relationships. In general, these results provide mixed support for both the Pecking-Order and Trade-Off theories of capital structure.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12009" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Timing of Opening Trades and Pricing Errors</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12009</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Timing of Opening Trades and Pricing Errors</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Sukwon Thomas Kim</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-03-17T22:38:43.629334-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12009</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12009</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12009</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>After demonstrating that a zero investment trading strategy that buys stocks with overnight returns below the market average and sells stocks with overnight returns above the market average earns more than 1% monthly profit, I demonstrate that this profit is greater for stocks that start trading more quickly than for other stocks. These results control for trading costs. The resulting pricing errors are a material portion of stock price volatility and suggest that a quick response to overnight information adds non-information-based stock volatility to stock prices.</p></div>
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After demonstrating that a zero investment trading strategy that buys stocks with overnight returns below the market average and sells stocks with overnight returns above the market average earns more than 1% monthly profit, I demonstrate that this profit is greater for stocks that start trading more quickly than for other stocks. These results control for trading costs. The resulting pricing errors are a material portion of stock price volatility and suggest that a quick response to overnight information adds non-information-based stock volatility to stock prices.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12011" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Capital Structure and Debt Priority</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12011</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Capital Structure and Debt Priority</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Sami Attaoui, Patrice Poncet</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-28T05:19:34.763682-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12011</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12011</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12011</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We study a defaultable firm's debt priority structure in a simple structural model where the firm issues senior and junior bonds and is subject to both liquidity and solvency risks. Assuming that the absolute priority rule prevails and that liquidation is immediate upon default, we determine the firm's interior optimal priority structure along with its optimal capital structure. We also obtain closed-form solutions for the market values of the firm's debt and equity. We find that the magnitude of the spread differential between junior and senior bond yields is positively, but not linearly related to the total debt level and the riskiness of assets. Finally, we provide an in-depth analysis of probabilities of default and the term structure of credit spreads</em>.</p></div>
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We study a defaultable firm's debt priority structure in a simple structural model where the firm issues senior and junior bonds and is subject to both liquidity and solvency risks. Assuming that the absolute priority rule prevails and that liquidation is immediate upon default, we determine the firm's interior optimal priority structure along with its optimal capital structure. We also obtain closed-form solutions for the market values of the firm's debt and equity. We find that the magnitude of the spread differential between junior and senior bond yields is positively, but not linearly related to the total debt level and the riskiness of assets. Finally, we provide an in-depth analysis of probabilities of default and the term structure of credit spreads.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12012" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Industrial Diversification and Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12012</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Industrial Diversification and Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Thomas J. Boulton, Scott B. Smart, Chad J. Zutter</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-02-26T05:38:20.719985-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12012</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12012</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12012</prism:url><prism:section xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">Original Article</prism:section><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">n/a</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The initial public offerings (IPOs) of diversified firms, those reporting more than one business segment at the time they go public, experience less underpricing than do IPOs by focused issuers. We explore two explanations for this phenomenon. Diversification may benefit IPO firms by reducing information asymmetries and therefore, lowering underpricing costs. Alternatively, high quality focused firms may be signaling their value by underpricing their shares to a greater degree. Though we find at least some evidence consistent with each explanation, a majority of the evidence favors signaling.</p></div>
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The initial public offerings (IPOs) of diversified firms, those reporting more than one business segment at the time they go public, experience less underpricing than do IPOs by focused issuers. We explore two explanations for this phenomenon. Diversification may benefit IPO firms by reducing information asymmetries and therefore, lowering underpricing costs. Alternatively, high quality focused firms may be signaling their value by underpricing their shares to a greater degree. Though we find at least some evidence consistent with each explanation, a majority of the evidence favors signaling.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12007" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>How Does Uncertainty Resolution Affect VC Syndication?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12007</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">How Does Uncertainty Resolution Affect VC Syndication?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Z. Ayca Altintig, Hsin-Hui Chiu, M. Sinan Goktan</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-07T08:58:55.005714-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12007</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12007</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12007</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">no</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">no</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We use the external certification due to the FDA 510(k) clearance process in the medical device industry as a natural experiment and analyze the dynamics of the syndicate formation of venture capital (VC) firms under various levels of uncertainty. We test several nonmutually exclusive hypotheses on project selection, second opinion, collusion, and diversification. Our results suggest that FDA 510(k) clearance serves as an outside certification and reduces uncertainty leading to greater amounts of capital flowing into the company from a larger group of investors. Our results also suggest that experienced VC firms are able to identify promising projects early on without the need for external 510(k) certification or second opinion.</em></p></div>
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We use the external certification due to the FDA 510(k) clearance process in the medical device industry as a natural experiment and analyze the dynamics of the syndicate formation of venture capital (VC) firms under various levels of uncertainty. We test several nonmutually exclusive hypotheses on project selection, second opinion, collusion, and diversification. Our results suggest that FDA 510(k) clearance serves as an outside certification and reduces uncertainty leading to greater amounts of capital flowing into the company from a larger group of investors. Our results also suggest that experienced VC firms are able to identify promising projects early on without the need for external 510(k) certification or second opinion.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12006" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Underwriter Reputation, Issuer Ownership, and Pre-IPO Earnings Management: Evidence from China</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12006</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Underwriter Reputation, Issuer Ownership, and Pre-IPO Earnings Management: Evidence from China</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Chao Chen, Haina Shi, Haoping Xu</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-07T08:55:34.078248-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12006</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12006</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12006</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">no</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">no</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This paper investigates the correlation between pre-initial public offering (pre-IPO) earnings management and underwriter reputation for issuers with different ownership structures in China. We document a significantly inverse relationship between underwriter reputation and pre-IPO earnings management for non-state-owned enterprises (NSOE) issuers only, while no significant association is found for state-owned enterprises (SOE) issuers. We also find that for the NSOE new issue market, underwriter reputation is positively correlated with issuer post-IPO performance indicating that prestigious underwriters can incrementally improve issuer post-IPO performance.</em></p></div>
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This paper investigates the correlation between pre-initial public offering (pre-IPO) earnings management and underwriter reputation for issuers with different ownership structures in China. We document a significantly inverse relationship between underwriter reputation and pre-IPO earnings management for non-state-owned enterprises (NSOE) issuers only, while no significant association is found for state-owned enterprises (SOE) issuers. We also find that for the NSOE new issue market, underwriter reputation is positively correlated with issuer post-IPO performance indicating that prestigious underwriters can incrementally improve issuer post-IPO performance.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12003" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>The Impact of Stock Transfer Restrictions on the Private Placement Discount</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12003</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">The Impact of Stock Transfer Restrictions on the Private Placement Discount</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John D. Finnerty</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-07T08:55:22.448729-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12003</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12003</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12003</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">no</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">no</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>The literature contains four explanations for the private placement discount. I find that all four contribute to the discount: loss of option value due to transfer restrictions, equity ownership concentration, information gathering, and overvaluation and expected underperformance post-issue. An average-strike put option model calculates marketability discounts that are consistent with empirical private placement discounts when observed discounts are adjusted for equity ownership concentration, information, and overvaluation effects. In contrast to the positive signaling effect of traditional private placement announcements, there is a negative signaling effect for private investments in public equity when the firm commits to register the shares promptly.</em></p></div>
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The literature contains four explanations for the private placement discount. I find that all four contribute to the discount: loss of option value due to transfer restrictions, equity ownership concentration, information gathering, and overvaluation and expected underperformance post-issue. An average-strike put option model calculates marketability discounts that are consistent with empirical private placement discounts when observed discounts are adjusted for equity ownership concentration, information, and overvaluation effects. In contrast to the positive signaling effect of traditional private placement announcements, there is a negative signaling effect for private investments in public equity when the firm commits to register the shares promptly.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12005" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Is Timing Everything? The Value of Mutual Fund Manager Trades</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12005</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Is Timing Everything? The Value of Mutual Fund Manager Trades</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Jon A. Fulkerson</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-22T05:06:41.983463-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12005</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12005</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12005</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">243</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">261</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>I develop new measures of the value of active mutual fund management using portfolio holdings. These measures simultaneously test for trading and selection skill within stocks, industries, and characteristics. I demonstrate that most of the skill documented in prior studies comes from correctly trading stocks within industries, though funds also have some skill in timing industries. However, prior research focuses on the period 1980-1994. I also test the hold out sample 1995-2007. Contrary to prior results, the latter period (and the full sample) demonstrates that mutual funds generate no excess returns from any category of skill</em>.</p></div>
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I develop new measures of the value of active mutual fund management using portfolio holdings. These measures simultaneously test for trading and selection skill within stocks, industries, and characteristics. I demonstrate that most of the skill documented in prior studies comes from correctly trading stocks within industries, though funds also have some skill in timing industries. However, prior research focuses on the period 1980-1994. I also test the hold out sample 1995-2007. Contrary to prior results, the latter period (and the full sample) demonstrates that mutual funds generate no excess returns from any category of skill.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12001" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Market Cycles and the Performance of Relative Strength Strategies</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12001</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Market Cycles and the Performance of Relative Strength Strategies</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Chris Stivers, Licheng Sun</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-22T05:12:44.70587-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12001</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12001</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12001</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">263</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">290</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We study the effect of market cycles on both medium-run and long-run relative strength trading strategies. We find that payoffs for both strategies tend to be relatively higher within a market state (rising or falling markets), but substantially lower over transitions between states. Since shorter duration strategies are relatively less likely to include market transitions, our results help reconcile the puzzling fact that medium-run strategies are profitable, but long-run strategies are not. We find that the market's cross-sectional return dispersion: 1) tends to be higher around market transitions, and 2) is negatively related to the subsequent payoffs for both medium-run and long-run strategies.</em></p></div>
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We study the effect of market cycles on both medium-run and long-run relative strength trading strategies. We find that payoffs for both strategies tend to be relatively higher within a market state (rising or falling markets), but substantially lower over transitions between states. Since shorter duration strategies are relatively less likely to include market transitions, our results help reconcile the puzzling fact that medium-run strategies are profitable, but long-run strategies are not. We find that the market's cross-sectional return dispersion: 1) tends to be higher around market transitions, and 2) is negatively related to the subsequent payoffs for both medium-run and long-run strategies.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12002" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>A Test of Technical Analysis: Matching Time Displaced Generalized Patterns</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12002</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">A Test of Technical Analysis: Matching Time Displaced Generalized Patterns</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Jimmy Hilliard, Adam Schwartz, James Squire</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-22T05:11:18.826781-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12002</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12002</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12002</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">291</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">314</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We use a least squares metric to match the return pattern of a target stock with that of an out-of-sample-twin. The twin with the smallest metric is found by a comprehensive period-by-period search of stocks in the Center for Research in Security Prices data set extending back to 1926. If technical analysis has value, targets of twins producing the highest returns in the twin postperiod should also have the highest performance in the target postperiod. Using a randomly selected sample of 66,000 return patterns, we find higher means for targets corresponding to the highest returning twin quintile. We also use regressions to risk adjust target returns and find that twin returns in the postmatch period significantly predict risk-adjusted target returns</em>.</p></div>
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We use a least squares metric to match the return pattern of a target stock with that of an out-of-sample-twin. The twin with the smallest metric is found by a comprehensive period-by-period search of stocks in the Center for Research in Security Prices data set extending back to 1926. If technical analysis has value, targets of twins producing the highest returns in the twin postperiod should also have the highest performance in the target postperiod. Using a randomly selected sample of 66,000 return patterns, we find higher means for targets corresponding to the highest returning twin quintile. We also use regressions to risk adjust target returns and find that twin returns in the postmatch period significantly predict risk-adjusted target returns.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12004" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Do Investment Newsletters Move Markets?</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12004</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Do Investment Newsletters Move Markets?</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Scott Brown, Jose J. Cao-Alvira, Eric Powers</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-22T05:17:12.18314-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12004</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12004</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12004</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">315</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">338</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We analyze the market impact of stock recommendations made by a single investment newsletter that focuses on instances of heavy insider trading. The market reacts positively to the actual insider trades and the associated Form 4 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings that attracted the newsletter's interest. The subsequent recommendations, which occur within a delay of several days, are associated with an even larger announcement period return and higher trade volume. Thus, despite the fact that recommendations are largely based on publicly available information on insider trades and the reach of the newsletter is limited, the newsletter has a significant impact on the market.</em></p></div>
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We analyze the market impact of stock recommendations made by a single investment newsletter that focuses on instances of heavy insider trading. The market reacts positively to the actual insider trades and the associated Form 4 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings that attracted the newsletter's interest. The subsequent recommendations, which occur within a delay of several days, are associated with an even larger announcement period return and higher trade volume. Thus, despite the fact that recommendations are largely based on publicly available information on insider trades and the reach of the newsletter is limited, the newsletter has a significant impact on the market.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01206.x" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Emerging Stars and Developed Neighbors: The Effects of Development Imbalance and Political Shocks on Mutual Fund Investments in China</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01206.x</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Emerging Stars and Developed Neighbors: The Effects of Development Imbalance and Political Shocks on Mutual Fund Investments in China</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Shu Lin, Shu Tian, Eliza Wu</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-06-21T23:12:03.47648-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01206.x</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01206.x</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01206.x</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">339</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">371</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>This paper examines the influence of regional economic development on mutual funds investment decisions. Using fund holdings from 2003 to 2008, we find that Chinese mutual funds that collectively reside in the developed coastal region have the ability to select “star” firms from neighboring inland areas and overweight them in their portfolios. However, they present a clear local bias within the coastal region. Such investment behavior is robust to political interventions. In particular, changes in political climate make mutual funds seek fundamentals like growth prospects and diversification benefits. Overall, economic and political factors significantly influence mutual funds investment decisions in emerging China</em>.</p></div>
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This paper examines the influence of regional economic development on mutual funds investment decisions. Using fund holdings from 2003 to 2008, we find that Chinese mutual funds that collectively reside in the developed coastal region have the ability to select “star” firms from neighboring inland areas and overweight them in their portfolios. However, they present a clear local bias within the coastal region. Such investment behavior is robust to political interventions. In particular, changes in political climate make mutual funds seek fundamentals like growth prospects and diversification benefits. Overall, economic and political factors significantly influence mutual funds investment decisions in emerging China.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01218.x" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Pension Contributions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Frozen Defined Benefit Plans</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01218.x</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Pension Contributions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Frozen Defined Benefit Plans</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Hieu V. Phan, Shantaram P. Hegde</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-09-04T22:47:23.595003-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01218.x</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01218.x</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01218.x</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">373</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">411</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We study the impact of freezing defined benefit (DB) pension plans and replacing them with defined contribution (DC) plans on liquidity, financial leverage, investment, and market value of a sample of firms over 2001-2008. We find evidence that the pension freeze tends to attenuate the drain on corporate liquidity and relieve the pressure to borrow to pay for mandatory contributions (MCs) associated with underfunded DB plans. Although investors seem to favor the pension freeze as evidenced by positive announcement abnormal stock returns, there is little reliable evidence that the freeze increases investment efficiency and long-term stock performance</em>.</p></div>
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We study the impact of freezing defined benefit (DB) pension plans and replacing them with defined contribution (DC) plans on liquidity, financial leverage, investment, and market value of a sample of firms over 2001-2008. We find evidence that the pension freeze tends to attenuate the drain on corporate liquidity and relieve the pressure to borrow to pay for mandatory contributions (MCs) associated with underfunded DB plans. Although investors seem to favor the pension freeze as evidenced by positive announcement abnormal stock returns, there is little reliable evidence that the freeze increases investment efficiency and long-term stock performance.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12008" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Pension Policy and the Value of Corporate-Level Investment</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12008</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Pension Policy and the Value of Corporate-Level Investment</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Michael J. Alderson, Neil L. Seitz</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-01-07T08:59:00.434493-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12008</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12008</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12008</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">413</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">440</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We examine how pension policy affects the value of corporate-level investment to the firm and its various claimants using Monte Carlo simulation. Shareholders lose the greatest amount of project value to the pension plan when it is undiversified across asset classes. Improved funding levels mandated by the provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 generally reduce those wealth transfers. Thus, mitigation of the overhang effect joins the reduction of financial distress costs as a motivation for holding both stocks and bonds in the pension fund</em>.</p></div>
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We examine how pension policy affects the value of corporate-level investment to the firm and its various claimants using Monte Carlo simulation. Shareholders lose the greatest amount of project value to the pension plan when it is undiversified across asset classes. Improved funding levels mandated by the provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 generally reduce those wealth transfers. Thus, mitigation of the overhang effect joins the reduction of financial distress costs as a motivation for holding both stocks and bonds in the pension fund.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01221.x" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Institutional Investment Horizons and the Cost of Equity Capital</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01221.x</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Institutional Investment Horizons and the Cost of Equity Capital</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Najah Attig, Sean Cleary, Sadok El Ghoul, Omrane Guedhami</dc:creator><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2012-12-20T04:15:37.448593-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01221.x</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01221.x</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fj.1755-053X.2012.01221.x</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">441</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">477</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[
<div class="para" xmlns:ol="http://www.wiley.com/namespaces/ol/xsl-lib" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><em>We examine the influence of institutional investors’ investment horizons on a firm's cost of equity. We argue that the cost of equity will decrease in the presence of institutional investors with longer-term investment horizons due to improved monitoring and information quality. Our empirical results demonstrate that the cost of equity declines in the presence of institutional investors with long-term investment horizons, all else remaining equal. Our results indicate also that the monitoring role of long-term institutional investors is more pronounced for firms with higher agency problems (poorly governed firms). Overall, our evidence suggests that when considering the influence of institutional investors, it is critical to account for institutional heterogeneity, which leads to new directions for future research.</em></p></div>
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We examine the influence of institutional investors’ investment horizons on a firm's cost of equity. We argue that the cost of equity will decrease in the presence of institutional investors with longer-term investment horizons due to improved monitoring and information quality. Our empirical results demonstrate that the cost of equity declines in the presence of institutional investors with long-term investment horizons, all else remaining equal. Our results indicate also that the monitoring role of long-term institutional investors is more pronounced for firms with higher agency problems (poorly governed firms). Overall, our evidence suggests that when considering the influence of institutional investors, it is critical to account for institutional heterogeneity, which leads to new directions for future research.
</description></item><item rdf:about="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12028" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"><title>Announcements</title><link>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12028</link><dc:title xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">Announcements</dc:title><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:date xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">2013-05-28T08:06:55.657962-05:00</dc:date><dc:identifier xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">doi:10.1111/fima.12028</dc:identifier><dc:rights xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"/><dc:publisher xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</dc:publisher><prism:doi xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">10.1111/fima.12028</prism:doi><prism:url xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Ffima.12028</prism:url><prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">478</prism:startingPage><prism:endingPage xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">480</prism:endingPage><content:encoded xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><![CDATA[]]></content:encoded><description/></item></rdf:RDF>