When the G20 took up food security in 2010, many were optimistic that it could bring about positive change by addressing structural problems in commodity markets that were contributing to high and volatile food prices and exacerbating hunger. Its members could tighten the regulation of agricultural commodity futures markets, support multilateral trade rules that would better reflect both importer and exporter needs, end renewable fuel targets that diverted land to biofuels production, and coordinate food reserves. In this article, we argue that although the G20 took on food security as a focus area, it missed an important opportunity and has shown that it is not the most appropriate forum for food security policy. Instead of tackling the structural economic dimensions of food security, the G20 chose to promote smoothing and coping measures within the current global economic framework. By shifting the focus away from structural issues, the G20 has had a chilling effect on policy debates in other global food security forums, especially the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS). In addition, the G20 excludes the voices of the least developed countries and civil society, and lacks the expertise and capacity to implement its recommendations.

When the G20 took up food security in 2010, many were optimistic that it could bring about positive change by addressing structural problems in commodity markets that were contributing to high and volatile food prices and exacerbating hunger. Its members could tighten the regulation of agricultural commodity futures markets, support multilateral trade rules that would better reflect both importer and exporter needs, end renewable fuel targets that diverted land to biofuels production, and coordinate food reserves.

The political strategy of forum shopping is an under-researched but highly relevant concept for understanding the dynamics of global governance. Forum shopping involves actors seeking to realise their policy objectives within preferred policy arenas on the basis of an arena’s particular governing characteristics. We examine the forum shopping behaviour of the key states, business and non-governmental groups in regard to three policy issues: labour standards, intellectual property rights, and chemicals regulation. Our preliminary analysis is centred around the questions of why actors forum shop, the circumstances in which forum shopping enables actors to succeed in promoting their interests, and the impact of forum shopping on the effectiveness of global governance. Our cases suggest an arena’s membership, issue mandate, decision making procedures and enforcement capacity are the key characteristics that shape actors’ arena preferences. Another important implication is that a multi-arena global governance system comprised of duplication and overlap in issue mandate (rather than large multilateral single issue arenas) may be beneficial for advancing actors’ policy agendas. The overarching goal of the article is to spark more systematic research into the often practiced but under-theorised phenomenon of forum shopping.

Forum shopping involves actors seeking to realise their policy objectives within preferred policy arenas on the basis of an arena's particular governing characteristics. We examine the forum shopping behaviour of the key states, business and non-governmental groups in regard to three policy issues: labour standards, intellectual property rights, and chemicals regulation.

It is important to draw critical attention to the broad policy perspectives that travel across the globe and operate at multiple scales. Social Investment is clearly one such set of ideas that has assumed increasing prominence over the last two decades. Like most such rapidly diffusing ideas, however, it admits of quite different interpretations. In this article I examine the most recent iterations of the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs’ (DELSA) interpretation of Social Investment against the backdrop of its earlier work. I argue that its initial formulations could be seen as an example of inclusive liberalism. Since then, however, DELSA has begun to embrace important elements of a social democratic version, including a concern with gender equality.

While the idea of Social Investment may have opened anew a positive role for social policy, it is insufficient for such policies to focus narrowly on improving the human capital of the poor. Rather it is important to develop the human capital of all.

John Mikler introduces this special section on Global Companies and Emerging Market Economies. Drawing together experts in the field, these articles examine the institutional context of state-corporate relations in the modern world. Given that ‘global companies are central actors in global policy and governance, and therefore central to conceptualizing the economic, social and political transformations in world affairs that are encapsulated in the term ‘globalization’, the contributors show how this is important for understanding the way in which 'states and their corporations are emerging, and will continue to emerge, together'.

Gaining greater knowledge of the characteristics of large firms that dominate the global economy is an inherently important endeavour. Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC economies) have gained influence in the global economy and this is reflected in the increasing weight of their companies in Fortune Global 500 rankings. Uneven access to data and information makes understanding the strategy, structure, ownership and performance of large business an ambitious programme of research. The BRIC economies are different from each other and this is also true as far as the heights of their respective business worlds are considered. But they also share some crucial features: concentrated ownership, with governments and families at the helm, diversification and internationalisation.

‘Gaining greater knowledge of the characteristics of large firms that dominate the global economy is inherently an important endeavour.’ In this article, Andrea Goldstein examines the emerging BRIC countries’ position in the global economy, their similarities and differences in dealing with business, and the implications this has for the rest of the world.

Understanding what kind of regulatory state/capitalism China represents can be an arduous task, and the issue is still under debate. This article uses a dynamic regulatory perspective to examine how the Chinese government has changed its roles of governance and relationships with global companies. Obviously, the changes would depend on the type, scope, power and other case-by-case intricacies of global companies. Using statistics across the 100 largest global companies chosen from Fortune's Global 500, this article explores the central tendency and relationship between regulators and global companies in China. As the evidence tends to suggest, in no respect can China's regulatory choices be looked upon as those of the regulatory state represented in the literature. The regulatory tactics of the Chinese government have merely allowed it to utilize the professional/technical expertise of the more well-established and/or credible foreign actors and regulators. The Chinese government has never its compromised long-term national goals or interests.

‘China is emerging as a market economy institutionally, as well as economically and politically.’ In this article, Shiufai Wong examines the role of global companies in the evolution of China's institutional structure, the role of the regulatory state in this evolution and how China deviates from the traditional regulatory state model described in the literature.

How have the developmentally oriented states of East Asia coped with the unprecedented levels of structural power that global companies now possess? This article argues that under conditions of intensifying knowledge-based competition, states with strategic industry objectives seek new ways of managing collaborative ties between public and private actors. The argument is developed by examining the development of the Korean telecommunications sector from the 1980s to the 2000s. The Korean state's relationship with the conglomerates or chaebol has been based increasingly on an equal partnership in which the chaebol themselves are expected to bear greater responsibility for promoting national techno-industrial competitiveness. These expectations have been translated into two main forms: (i) collaborating in state-sponsored efforts to promote the international standardization of Korean-developed technologies, and (ii) providing initial markets for the innovations created by fledgling high-tech start-ups who provide crucial sources of innovation in the pursuit of the Korean state's emphasis on transitioning towards innovation-led development.

‘The impressive economic transformation of states throughout East Asia over the past fifty years cannot be explained without understanding the role and relationship between governments and firms.’ In this article, Sung-Young Kim examines the case of Korea and the ways in which the state effectively supports global companies to globalize Korean technologies.

From the conceptual point of view, the notion of global justice coincides primarily with the notion of fair consideration of interests and equal treatment of people the world over. From the historical point of view, the priority of distributive justice at a global level is explained by the struggle between capitalism and communism that characterized international political theory and practice during the second part of 20th century.

In the last two decades, the academic debate on justice has undergone an important change: its scope of application has enlarged; from the national to the global.

This article presents an overview of calculations of global inequality, recently and over the long term, and outlines the main controversies and political and philosophical implications of the findings. It focuses in particular on the winners and losers of the most recent episode of globalization, from 1988 to 2008. It suggests that the period has witnessed the first decline in inequality between world citizens since the Industrial Revolution. However, the decline can be sustained only if countries' mean incomes continue to converge (as they have been doing during the past ten years) and if internal (within-country) inequalities, which are already high, are kept in check. Mean-income convergence would also reduce the huge ‘citizenship premium’ that is enjoyed today by the citizens of rich countries.

Development is about people: either poor people have ways to become richer where they are now, or they can become rich by moving somewhere else. Looked at from above, there is no real difference between the two options. But from the point of view of real politics, there is a whole world of difference.

At the global level, the idea of moving goods and resources away from rich states towards poorer societies might seem appealing. But, one might ask, is this the solution to the problem of inequality in the world?

A common perception is that the world is experiencing a period of growing inequality since the intensification of the globalisation process, labour migration and rising competition from emerging countries. Is this perception real?

Nation states and non-state entities that can draw upon the past and adapt to the future in terms of the overall environment for warfare – including the human, political, social and technological – are more likely to succeed in attaining their aims and objectives and retain a unique identity in the global order of tomorrow.

How does one acquire the massive financial investment needed for a fundamental re-configuration of the core infrastructure to confront the challenges posed by climate change mitigation and adaptation and by resource scarcity and energy security? Andŕ Schneider and Daniel Wiener, CEOs of Global Energy Basel, outline their plans for the creation of a private debt fund in order for institutional investors to able to invest in graded sustainable infrastructure, bringing together private investors, development banks and other interested parties.

The key to a successful Energiewende will be to find the ‘right’ balance between technological feasibility, economic common sense and legitimate public participation.