As the governments of the United States and Russia reduce their nuclear weapons inventories through negotiated arms control agreements, the Chinese government remains outside this strategic weapons trend while also continuing to modernize the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s nuclear weapons arsenal. Chinese policy, therefore, presents a number of dilemmas for global arms control. For example, given the PRC's lack of transparency, could Beijing be secretly building new missiles and warheads inside China's many miles of tunnels, and going for a first-strike capability or, in keeping with the PRC's announced doctrine of “minimal deterrence,” is Beijing simply hardening and modernizing the weapons capabilities it already has? This paper explores the public information and the debates about China's nuclear weapons as well as PRC nuclear proliferation behavior and agreements. The paper concludes with suggestions for encouraging more PRC nuclear transparency with the goal of producing a more stable situation.

This article examines what we call internal threats and civil alliances in connection with the two formal security alliances the United States has forged with Japan and South Korea. It investigates the causal link between the rise of internal threats to human and environmental security and the formation of civic alliances. In this process, we demonstrate the salience of networked human and environmental security actors and their articulation of anti-alliance and anti-base discourses. As case studies, the article focuses on the base relocation projects in Japan and South Korea at the heart of the formation of these civil alliances.

This study is to analyze why Russia continuously tries to construct the trans-Korean gas pipeline, despite the possibility of the “North Korean risk” and the limited economic benefit it offers compared to China's pipeline. As the world's number-one gas producer, Russia exports gas abroad through gas pipelines. As a result, Russia holds a wealth of expertise and experience related to gas pipelines. In particular, the crucial cases of gas pipeline disputes related to Russia since the collapse of the former Soviet Union mainly occurred during the Putin regime; the current President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, is trying to complete the trans-Korean gas pipeline. The content of the study is based on the above common ground. First, as Russia exports gas to various states through the gas pipelines, a great influence from its foreign policy standpoint is inevitable. Thus, this study will explore Putin's foreign policy of pragmatic realism. Second, the cause and effect of gas pipeline disputes concerning Russia during Putin's presidential term will be scrutinized with focus on Putin's pragmatic realism. Third, this paper will review the correlation between the results of cases of the gas pipeline dispute in relation to Russia and the gas market expansion in Russia's Northeast Asia. Lastly, this study will conceptualize the reasons for why Russia wishes to complete the trans-Korean gas pipeline based on these analyses.

This article explores the distinctive features of East Asian countries' involvement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute-settlement mechanism (DSM). Existing studies are divided into two opposing groups according to what they argue. The “passive legalism” argument emphasizes the reluctant attitude of East Asian countries, and tends to underestimate their involvement in the WTO DSM. On the other hand, the “aggressive legalism” argument highlights the drastic shift in East Asian countries' behavior from passive avoidance to aggressive utilization of the WTO DSM, and tends to overestimate East Asian countries' status in the system. Analyzing WTO dispute data, this article criticizes the limitations of both arguments and suggests responsive legalism or adaptive legalism as a more accurate concept for describing East Asian countries' legal attitude and behavior under the WTO DSM.

The aim of this article is to examine the implications of high politics in the South China Sea disputes, which basically involve the United States, and other claimant countries, such as Vietnam and the Philippines on one side, and China on the other. The two main actors, namely China and the United States, appear to be re-assertive. All the claimant countries are asking for their stakes, which involve their sovereignty, and sovereign and maritime rights. The fall-out is the polarization of the stakeholders and greater military build-up. Overt military confrontation is a remote possibility at the moment, mainly because of overriding considerations, such as interdependence in economy and a trend towards regionalism. Nevertheless, the array of sophisticated military forces and the vital national interests of the stakeholders in the Sea tend to portend a problematic frontier. This article indicates certain policy implications and attempts to develop the framework of a scenario that is likely to emerge premised on high politics.

This paper contends that the human security/development nexus lies at the heart of contemporary approaches to peace-building and development. The paper addresses not only the consequences of human security policy prioritization as a development objective by Canada and Japan, but also the hypothesis that different understandings or interpretations of human security are reflected differently in the policy domain. Burma/Myanmar, one of the least developed, and, in terms of human security, most vulnerable states in the world, is used as a case study to address these different policy implementations.