

Knuuttila concludes the book with the forward-looking claim that, “It seems that these philosophical traditions are much more relevant to the psychology of emotions in Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, or Leibniz than is usually acknowledged” (p. 286).

Throughout *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Knuuttila emphasizes a broad, representational approach over in-depth analyses of particular figures or positions. Although this decision allows him to include a number of interesting but obscure figures (such as Pachomius, an Egyptian monastic father, and Peter of Ailly, a twelfth-century Chancellor of the University of Paris), it leaves relatively little room for discussions of more influential authors. The complex and important positions of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, for example, are treated together in a mere nine of the 286 pages of text, while the writings of Nemesius of Emesa (a late fourth-century bishop in Syria) receive a full seven pages.

Given the complex and difficult nature of the positions the various philosophers hold, it would also have been helpful throughout if Knuuttila had provided illustrations for more of the theories. In his discussion of Epicurus, for instance, Knuuttila notes that “Epicurus said that the wise person will be gripped more by certain emotions than other people” (p. 83), but he refrains from giving examples of such feelings—leaving the reader to wonder not just what these feelings are but whether feelings are the same sort of thing as emotions for Epicurus. This is a particularly weighty question, since one of the central questions in theories of emotions involves the relation between the cognitive aspect of emotion and its attendant sensations or feelings. (Someone might *feel* as though he loves someone, for example, while not knowing whether he actually does love that person.)

Taken as a whole, the wide spectrum of scholars, topics, and views addressed in the book tends to hide the forest with the trees. Still, simply by exposing its readers to such a dizzying panoply of unfamiliar scholars and positions, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* demonstrates that there is much interesting work to be done in mediaeval theories of the emotions.

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Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Plato and the Trial of Socrates

By THOMAS C. BRICKHOUSE and NICHOLAS D. SMITH

Routledge, 2004. x + 298 pp. £45.00 cloth, £11.99 paper

Brickhouse and Smith set out with modest goals regarding the question of the historical accuracy of Plato’s dialogues concerning the events surrounding the death of Socrates. They write: “To what extent, if any can we regard what Plato wrote . . . as historically accurate? We doubt that evidence exists that would settle this dispute between those who affirm and those who deny Plato’s role as a faithful recorder of those famous events. Such a conclusion, however, should in no way detract from our study of Plato’s writings about the end of Socrates’s life” (p. 5). Despite this reasonable caveat, what emerges from Brickhouse and Smith’s patient scholarship is a compelling portrait of

Socrates's intellectual life, and a vigorous case for the overall veracity of the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and the famous death scene from the *Phaedo*.

The *Guidebook* is a masterly interweaving of philosophical and historical analysis, utilizing Xenophon, Aristophanes, Diogenes Laertius and other ancient sources alongside modern philosophical and historical scholarship. Brickhouse and Smith conclude (1) we have good reason to believe that the *Apology* is a largely accurate representation of Socrates's words before the jury; (2) the *Crito* presents an accurate reconstruction of Socrates's sophisticated reasoning concerning the interrelations between his duties to Gods, state, family and friends; (3) the primarily historical final chapter concerning the *Phaedo*, Plato's account of Socrates's last day, is largely accurate in regard to the manner of his death. The volume is also filled with many lesser, but no less intriguing conclusions, such as a hypothesis as to the meaning of Socrates's last words to Crito. This review will touch on each these topics in turn, providing brief synopses.

On Brickhouse and Smith's telling, the defence before the jury touches upon, and anticipates a line of argumentation more fully presented in the *Crito*. Socrates argues from some key principles that (1) he is not morally required to carry out any of his duties in an unjust manner, and (2) he is obligated to obey both the commands of Athenian law, and orders of the Gods or divine law. This raises a question about Socrates's position. Can he consistently hold these views in his particular circumstance? Playing these principles against each other, and expanding upon what they believe each meant for Socrates, Brickhouse and Smith provide a fascinating answer to this long standing question.

It would seem to be impossible for Socrates consistently to hold both principles, given what he says in his defence. He is convinced he has a duty, imposed upon him by "the God", to engage in philosophical discussion. He also makes it quite clear, in the *Crito*, that he believes he also has a duty to obey the laws of Athens.

However, in the *Apology* he argues that if the duly empanelled jury were to require him to desist from such discussions, he would obey the God rather than them. Brickhouse and Smith argue that he would go so far as to obey the God even if the Athenian assembly were to pass a law outlawing such activities.

This seems to involve him in a contradiction from which he cannot extricate himself. He cannot obey the God without thereby disobeying the jury, or the hypothetical law. If, on the other hand, he were to choose to desist from philosophy, thus obeying the duly empanelled jury, or that hypothetical law, he would necessarily be disobeying the God. In either case, he will be knowingly doing wrong, knowingly disobeying legitimate superiors, or returning wrong for wrong, which he thinks he should never do (pp. 222–243).

Brickhouse and Smith answer with a carefully parsed analysis of the *Crito*'s argumentation, to this effect: Socrates as a citizen of Athens has enjoyed some benefits that can be roughly divided into two sorts; economic, and moral. The material benefits Athens's laws have provided are obvious. He has been educated in important ways as well. He is literate, and cultured. In addition,

the *moral* benefits seem to be envisioned as a largely successful attempt on the part of 'the laws' of Athens to create conditions for human flourishing. Socrates saw these laws as in line with divine law, and divine views as to the sort of life worth living for human beings (pp. 243–245). They largely allow for this sort of life, much more so than any other extant constitution of his day. Because they do, the Athenian constitution meets all the conditions that must be in place for it to have a legitimate claim to Socrates's acquiescence to the jury's penalty: aside from the aforementioned benefits it also provides a set of laws that respect public debate, and free critical discussion, thus allowing him and others to fulfil the God's philosophical mission for human beings. It provides for a general sharing of legislative and executive power by all citizens that will be affected by the acts of the state. It provides safeguards against usurpation of these powers by elites, and any curtailment of the freedoms and rights listed above.

Socrates argues that because he cannot knowingly commit an injustice, unless by order of a legitimate authority, he cannot fulfil any obligation of his if, by doing so, he would be disobeying a legitimate authority. But to leave Athens and practise philosophy elsewhere would be to do precisely this, analogous to kidnapping and holding some reluctant interlocutor, in order for Socrates to be able to carry out his divine mission of philosophising. Yes, he would following a divine order, but would be committing an injustice to do so. This he is not obligated to do either by the laws of men or Gods.

This reconstruction nicely accounts for three episodes, two of which Socrates cites in his speeches before the jury (the arrest of Leon, and the Arginusa affair), the other involving his time in jail, awaiting execution.

In the aftermath of the battle at Arginusa, Socrates argued that the assembly was behaving illegally by trying the involved generals collectively for failing to rescue sailors after the battle. There was a law that such trials must be prosecuted severally. However, when the convictions and executions occurred, Socrates felt he could not act to prevent the injustice, because it was an action of a duly constituted authority. As such, he was bound to non-interference, while not himself being morally responsible for the act (pp. 148–150).

On the other hand, he could consistently refuse to go with three other men to arrest Leon of Salamis, when ordered to do so by 'the thirty', because these oligarchs were clearly usurpers of the legitimate constitutional government, puppets of the Spartans (pp. 150–152).

Brickhouse and Smith find support for their attribution of this nuanced view to Socrates in the little discussed relationship between Socrates and his jailor/executioner (pp. 256–257). They are on good terms. Socrates does not blame him for carrying out what is as a matter of fact, an injustice. The jailor thanks Socrates for laying the blame at the feet of the jury, not himself. This relationship would be inexplicable if Socrates thought we were obligated simply never to knowingly engage in wrongdoing. It is perfectly understandable if Socrates allows that one would be blameless in carrying out an unjust act only if required to do so by a legitimate authority.

This is one of several fruitful lines of investigation in the *Guidebook*. I conclude with another, primarily of historical interest. One of the most famous

scenes in literature is the death scene that ends the *Phaedo*. It has also generated debate concerning Plato's description of death by hemlock and the import of Socrates's last words to his friend Crito: "we owe a cock to Asclepius, Crito. Pay it. Do not neglect it."

Citing laudable modern research Brickhouse and Smith argue that the species of plant used for executions in Athens at that time in fact does bring on a relatively peaceful death, an ascending paralysis ending in suffocation, this contrary to longstanding scholarly opinion that Plato had falsified his account in order to dignify Socrates. This has interesting repercussions for the overall trustworthiness of Plato as historian (pp. 258–264).

In regard to the 'famous last words,' the authors argue that Socrates meant to remind his old friend to carry out a sacrifice that was common among people (Socrates and Crito included) that had survived the great plague of the early years of the Peloponnesian war. Such sacrifices were to be carried out upon the return of the sacred ship from its mission to Delos. Since all executions were postponed while the ship was away, Socrates was alive upon its return. He felt he still owed the sacrifice. This simple yet elegant interpretation flies in the face of much scholarly tradition, some of it quite fanciful, concerning Socrates's intention behind this gentle reminder. This explanation fits, and is somehow appropriate to the dignity and piety that was central to Socrates's character (pp. 265–271).

All in all, the *Guidebook* offers a stirring portrait of Socrates, philosopher, citizen, soldier, friend, and moral exemplar. This book is highly recommended.

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The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke: Man, Person, and Spirits in the "Essay"
By JOHN W. YOLTON
Cornell University Press, 2004. £20.50

The two intellectual worlds to which the title of Yolton's book refers are those of men or human beings on the one hand, and of God, Angels and Spirits on the other. Yolton's principal concern is with this second intellectual world and its relation to the world of finite beings. This is in recognition of the tendency of Locke scholars—the author himself included—largely to ignore the many references in the *Essay* to spirits. Thus, while Locke is in general concerned in the *Essay* with what it is to be human, this involves the question of how we are distinguished from these 'other spirits'. As Yolton indicates, from this point of view the chapter 'Of Identity' (*Essay* II:xxvii) is pivotal. In the first chapter of his book Yolton explores the complex relation between the concepts of person and man in Locke's discussion of personal identity suggesting that, for Locke, the human agent is both. He goes on to argue that 'man' emerges as the central term in so far as it is more basic than 'person', 'self' and 'agent' even if Locke is not to be taken here as referring to separate entities or Beings (p. 37). This part of Yolton's discussion alone provides considerable food for thought.

In his second chapter Yolton explores the connection with the different environments to which Locke's man belongs. While the bulk of the *Essay*