Volume 32, Issue 4
SHORT PAPER ‐ 5000 WORDS OR LESS

Willingness to transmit and the spread of pseudoscientific beliefs

H. Mercier

Corresponding Author

E-mail address: hugo.mercier@gmail.com

CNRS, Institut des Sciences Cognitives Marc Jeannerod, Bron, France

Correspondence

Hugo Mercier, CNRS, Institut des Sciences Cognitives Marc Jeannerod, 67, Boulevard Pinel, 69675 Bron, France.

Email: hugo.mercier@gmail.com

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Y. Majima

Department of Psychology for Well‐being, School of Social Welfare, Hokusei Gakuen University, Sapporo, Japan

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H. Miton

Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

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First published: 17 April 2018
Citations: 6

Summary

Pseudoscientific beliefs are widespread and can be damaging. If several studies have examined the factors leading people to accept pseudoscientific beliefs, no attention has been paid to the factors contributing to people's willingness to transmit these beliefs. To test whether the willingness to transmit pseudoscientific beliefs contributes to their spread, independent of their believability, we asked participants to rate statements corresponding either to pseudoscientific beliefs (Myths), or to their (correct) negations (Non‐Myths). Statements were rated on believability, on how willing participants would be to transmit them, and on how knowledgeable they would make someone who produces them. Results revealed that participants who believed in Myths were more willing to transmit them than the participants who believed in Non‐Myths were willing to transmit Non‐Myths. A potential factor driving the increased willingness to transmit both Myths and Non‐Myths might be participants' belief that holding the beliefs makes one seem more knowledgeable.

Number of times cited according to CrossRef: 6

  • Internet users engage more with phatic posts than with health misinformation on Facebook, Palgrave Communications, 10.1057/s41599-020-0452-1, 6, 1, (2020).
  • Why Do You Believe in Pseudoscience or Disbelieve in Science?, Adapting Human Thinking and Moral Reasoning in Contemporary Society, 10.4018/978-1-7998-1811-3.ch005, (116-131), (2020).
  • Do you believe what you have been told? Morality and scientific literacy as predictors of pseudoscience susceptibility, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10.1002/acp.3687, 0, 0, (2020).
  • Love is not exactly blind, at least for some people: Analytic cognitive style predicts romantic beliefs, Personality and Individual Differences, 10.1016/j.paid.2019.03.025, 145, (119-131), (2019).
  • Cognitive attraction and online misinformation, Palgrave Communications, 10.1057/s41599-019-0224-y, 5, 1, (2019).
  • Public Perception of Autism Treatments: Science Versus Pseudoscience in the Age of Mass Media, Encyclopedia of Autism Spectrum Disorders, 10.1007/978-1-4614-6435-8, (1-10), (2019).

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