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Original Article

Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno‐Mentalizing

David Rose

Corresponding Author

E-mail address: rose0david@gmail.com

Rutgers University

Correspondence to: E‐mail:

rose0david@gmail.com

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Emma E. Buchtel

The Education University of Hong Kong

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Ángeles Eraña Lagos

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

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Ivar Hannikainen

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro

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Carlos Mauro

Católica Porto Business School

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Masaharu Mizumoto

Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

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Jorge Ornelas

Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí

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Barbara Osimani

Ludwig‐Maximilians Univesität, München – MCMP

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Carlos Romero

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

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Andrea Sereni

Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS Pavia

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Sarah Songhorian

Università Vita‐Salute San Raffaele Milano

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Paulo Sousa

Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University Belfast

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Noel Struchiner

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro

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Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

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First published: 17 August 2017
Cited by: 2

Abstract

Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subject's assertion that p matches her nonverbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross‐cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology.

Number of times cited according to CrossRef: 2

  • , Mindreading beyond belief: A more comprehensive conception of how we understand others, Philosophy Compass, 13, 11, (2018).
  • , Problems of Translation for Cross-Cultural Experimental Philosophy, Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 10.1007/s40961-017-0119-5, 34, 3, (481-500), (2017).