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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Educational Justice, Epistemic Justice, and Leveling Down

Ben Kotzee

Jubilee Center for Character and Values, University of Birmingham

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First published: 20 August 2013
Cited by: 1

Abstract

Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift argue that education is a positional good; this, they hold, implies that there is a qualified case for leveling down educational provision. In this essay, Ben Kotzee discusses Brighouse and Swift's argument for leveling down. He holds that the argument fails in its own terms and that, in presenting the problem of educational justice as one of balancing education's positional and nonpositional benefits, Brighouse and Swift lose sight of what a consideration of the nonpositional benefits by itself can reveal. Instead of focusing on education's positional benefits, Kotzee investigates what emphasizing education's nonpositional benefits would imply for educational justice. Drawing on recent work in social epistemology, Kotzee holds that theories of educational justice would benefit from a consideration of the virtue of epistemic justice, and he outlines solutions to a number of problems in the area from this perspective.

Number of times cited: 1

  • , Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 10.1017/S1358246118000528, 84, (1-21), (2018).