DISRUPTING ILLEGAL FIREARMS MARKETS IN BOSTON: THE EFFECTS OF OPERATION CEASEFIRE ON THE SUPPLY OF NEW HANDGUNS TO CRIMINALS*
This research was supported under awards 1999-IJ-CX-0015 and 2003-IJ-CX-1033 from the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The authors would like to thank Special Agent in Charge Terrence Austin, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) National Tracing Center, for providing ATF firearms trace data to enhance the development of their firearms enforcement programs. The authors would also like to thank Commissioner Kathleen O'Toole, former Commissioner Paul Evans, Superintendent Paul F. Joyce, Jr., and Carl Walter of the Boston Police Department for their valuable assistance in the completion of this research. The authors would also like to thank Alan Saiz for his assistance with data management. The points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice or the Boston Police Department.
Abstract
Research Summary:
The question of whether the illegal firearms market serving criminals and juveniles can be disrupted has been vigorously debated in policy circles and in the literature on firearms and violence. To the extent that prohibited persons, in particular, are supplied with guns through systematic gun trafficking, focused regulatory and investigative resources may be useful in disrupting the illegal supply of firearms to criminals. In Boston, a gun market disruption strategy was implemented that focused on shutting down illegal diversions of new handguns from retail sources. Multivariate regression analyses were used to estimate the effects of the intervention on new handguns recovered in crime. Our results suggest that focused enforcement efforts, guided by strategic analyses of ATF firearms trace data, can have significant impacts on the illegal supply of new handguns to criminals.
Policy Implications:
The problem-oriented policing approach provides an appropriate framework to uncover the complex mechanisms at play in illicit firearms markets and to develop tailor-made interventions to disrupt the illegal gun trade. Strategic enforcement programs focused on the illegal diversion of new firearms from primary markets can reduce the availability of new guns to criminals. However, the extent to which criminals substitute older guns for new guns and move from primary markets to secondary markets in response to an enforcement strategy focused on retail outlets remains unclear. Our evaluation also does not provide policy makers with any firm evidence on whether supply-side enforcement strategies have any measurable impacts on gun violence. Jurisdictions suffering from gun violence problems should implement demand-side violence prevention programs to complement their supply-side efforts.




